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P R E F A C E
The purpose of the study is to describe the origin and 
functions of the office of "commissaire ordonnateur" of French 
Louisiana from 1731 to 1769* It Is shown that none of the fiscal 
and judicial officials was conmissioned as an intendant of finance, 
justice, and police; and that the colony of Louisiana was a pawn 
for the French crown on the diplomatic chessboard of Europe. With 
this in mind, the dissertation, largely written from documents in 
the Archives Nationales in Paris, begins with a description of the 
colony in 1731 and with some notes on French colonial policy. 
Chapter III examines the nature of the office of "coranissaire 
ordonnateur". The subsequent chapters describe the office by 
examining the "ordonnateur's" duties and functions in the different 
areas of colonial administration: public administration, finance,
justice, and his relationship with the governor.
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A B S T R A C T
Sharing the governmental administration of French Louisiana 
were a governor in charge of the military and general administration 
of the colony and the "coranissaire ordonnateur" who, as the legal 
and financial officer, was entrusted with public expenditures, 
exercised certain judicial functions, presided over the Superior 
Council, and, like the governor, reported confidential matters to 
the Minister of Marine.
The instructions from the Minister of Marine's office show 
that the governor and "commissaire ordonnateur" acted as a check 
upon each other. The system of checks and balances seemed to have 
been a contrivance to control the officials. However, this type 
of system naturally fostered friction between the officials 
concerning their respective spheres of power.
The office of "comnissaire ordonnateur" is perhaps the 
least known in the history of French Louisiana. Because of this 
many authors have used the titles of "commissaire ordonnateur", 
royal comnissioner, "ordonnateur", first councillor and intendant 
interchangeably. "Commissaires ordonnateurs" were commissioned 
with specific powers and not as intendants of finance, justice, 
and police. The personnel data show that none of the fiscal 
officials of French Louisiana was appointed as intendant.
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After 1712 when governmental changes were instituted, the 
colonial government was shared by a governor and "coranissaire 
ordonnateur". The French crown attempted to end the confusion 
surrounding the particular duties and power of the two officials. 
The "ordonnateur" was charged with royal finances and commerce 
and the governor with the military duties, while the general 
administration was the coranon concern of both. The move had little 
result; for the dual authority remained a constant source of 
conflict between the governor and "commissaire ordonnateur".
Before assuming the office of governor and "coranissaire 
ordonnateur", officials were informed of their respective duties 
and functions. But, however clear these instructions were, they 
seldom improved the relationship between the two top officials 
because they subordinated the governor to the "coranissaire 
ordonnateur" or vice versa even for the least of matters. The 
"coranissaire ordonnateur" could and did at times render the 
governor inactive by his control of the purse. The administrative 
stagnation which frequently plagued French Louisiana is no small 
result of this condition.
The drawbacks of the system of dual authority in governing 
colonies were common knowledge to officials in Versailles.
Conflicts of personalities played a disruptive role in French 
Louisiana because they were ever present between military and 
civil officials whom the French government had invested with twin 
powers. The ultimate reasons for this conflict lie not in French
vii
Louisiana, but rather in Versailles, in the mechanism created 
there for colonial administration and its effect on officials in 
the New World. This shaped colonial government and gave it its 
character. The motives behind the nominations of colonial 
officials, the conflicts, and cliques that ensued, were conditioned 
and as such explained by the characteristics of this mechanism.
That the colony of Louisiana was governed from Versailles 
there is no doubt. But the New World influenced the old and 
affected the diplomacy and dictates of Versailles. But when all 
is said and done, the structure of the colonial system, once 
established, developed a momentum of its own; and the governors 
and "conmissaires ordonnateurs" who would not often play the role 
of puppets did not advance far in the bureaucracy.
This dissertation is largely written from documents in the 
Archives Nationales in Paris and describes the office of 
"commissaire ordonnateur" by examining his duties and functions in 
the different areas of colonial administration: public
administration, finances, and justice. His relationship with the 
governor is also explained. The conclusions reached are that the 
"coranissaire ordonnateur" was an indispensable figure, though not 
an intendant of finance, justice, and police, in the administration 
of an area which was a pawn for the French crown on the diplomatic 
chessboard of Europe.
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C H A P T E R  I
THE COLONY OF FRENCH LOUISIANA IN 1731
On October k, 1731» Edme-Gatien Salmon, the first 
"commissaire ordonnateur" after retrocession from the Company of 
the Indies, arrived at New Orleans after forty-six days at sea1 and 
found the city in the midst of a severe epidemic caused by a recent 
flood. "The air was thick with the stench of dead fish. Most of 
the colonists along with the soldiers were sick. Many had died."2 
Since half of the soldiers were hospitalized and others on patrols,3 
Salmon admitted not having reviewed the troops in November for fear 
of exposing the weak garrison to the few Indians in the capital city.4 
Besides, most of the troops were without uniforms.5 Versailles 
expected her governor and "commissaire ordonnateur" to convert 
this miserable colony into a profitable possession.
1Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, November 2k, 1731> AC,
C13A13.
2Ibid.
^orty soldiers had recently been despatched to help St. Denis, 
commander at Natchitoches, lift the siege of the fort by the Natchez. 





The first task of Governor Etienne Perier and "coranissaire 
ordonnateur" Salmon was the reorganistation of the Superior Council 
to eliminate the Company's representatives.6 The two officials 
allowed the councillors of the Superior Council to continue their 
functions until the crown dispatched commissions for those chosen 
from a list of nominees.7 The governor and "ordonnateur" did not 
include Brusle on the list, even though he was a very able 
councillor, because his position as director of the Company of 
the Indies would create a conflict of interest. Dausseville was 
in a similar position. However, there was no reason to exclude 
Prat from the list. The king's physician was an intelligent man 
with a pleasant disposition; and, accordingly, Perier and Salmon 
asked for his appointment as councillor. Fazende, a former 
councillor who had resigned in protest when the Company gave 
greater power to the director general in the Superior Council, 
was also included in the list of nominees to fill three vacant 
seats in the Council. He was a good settler and unreproachable.
In order to assure harmony between the two officials, Perier and
a"Projet de lettre patente en forme d'edit concernant 
l'^tablissement du conseil superieur de la Louisiane," Versailles, 
October l(?), 1731> AC, C1JA13; and Henry Plauche Dart, "The Legal 
Institutions of Louisiana," LHQ, II (January, 1919)» 98*
7Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 3, 
1731> AC, C13A13. Where only the surname of a particular official 
is given, it means that the name was not available in either the 
"Records of the Superior Council" or in the general correspondence 
between Versailles and New Orleans.
3
Salmon asked Versailles to apply in Louisiana both the regulations 
of April 27» 1716, made for New France concerning rank in church 
and public ceremonies and those for public administration.8
The Superior Council was reorganized on May 7» 1732. It 
was composed of the following individuals: Governor Perier;
"commissaire ordonnateur" Salmon; two royal lieutenants, Louboey 
and D'Artaguiette; Major Benac, commander at New Orleans; 
councillors Fazende, Brusl^, Bru, Lafrenifere, Prat and Raguet; 
and "procureur general" Fleuriau.9
Both Perier and Salmon promised to devote all their 
attention to Versailles' main concern in Louisiana: to Increase
the population, production, and commerce. Since Louisiana 
attracted so few settlers, Versailles planned to increase the 
population by discharging soldiers desirous of becoming 
inhabitants of the colony. "However," Perier and Salmon explained, 
"to make this possible one hundred recruits had to be sent each 
year to replace those dead, discharged, or who deserted."10 Thus 
it was realized that the increase in productivity was dependent 
on population growth. The only means at hand to increase the 
population were soldiers who, upon being released from service, 
would settle in the colony. "But," they wrote, "this would not be
8Ibid.
9Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana (U vols; New 
Orleans: Pelican Publishing Co., 1965), I, ^55» and Dart, "Legal
Institutions," 98*
l0Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 5, 
1731, AC, C13A13.
4
sufficient unless the colonists were furnished Negro slaves since 
it was impossible to build levees, clear the land and farm without 
a substantial influx of slaves."11 However, the colony's need was 
never satisfied.12
Probably the most important reason for Versailles' interest 
in Louisiana was comnerce. In 1731 most of the colonists were 
familiar with the arrangement established by the Company by which 
the inhabitants gave 2/3 of their crops to pay their debts and the 
other third was exchanged for supplies.13 One of the crops was 
rice which, for want of a market in France, was primarily consumed 
locally. Indigo production had been neglected since the Company 
preferred and encouraged the more profitable tobacco crop.14 To 
diversify the economy Salmon brought twelve barrels of indigo 
seeds for distribution among interested inhabitants. However, 
few colonists showed interest in indigo cultivation.15 Yet,
Salmon hoped to develop this staple since that which was distributed 
yielded a good crop. But frequent rains in the area made harvest
11Ibid.
12Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 22, 
1731, AC, C13A14; Bienville and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, April 
3, 1734, AC, CI3AI8; Maurepas to Bienville and Salmon, Versailles, 
March 24, 1738, AC, B66; and "Memoire du roi aux Srs. Vaudreuil 
gouverneur et Salmon commissaire ordonnateur de la Louisiane," 
Versailles, October 22, 1742, AC, B74.





difficult. This more than anything else discouraged the inhabitants 
because of crop loss. Louisiana cotton was of high quality but it 
required the tedious process of removing the seeds before shipment 
to France.16 Children, who were used greatly for this process, 
were few in number in 1731• Flax and hemp production depended on 
the migration of families from Normandy, Britanny and Lanquedoc, 
where these products were cultivated and processed.17 Both Salmon 
and Perier were convinced that hemp production would be a financial 
success in Louisiana because the few individuals who cultivated it 
had surprisingly good results. The two officials were as optimistic 
with regard to flax. However, the main obstacle to the 
diversification of crops was tobacco, to which the inhabitants 
devoted all their energy. Thus, tobacco was the principal crop 
in 1731, "for the inhabitants considered it their only source of 
livelihood after they had painfully realized the futility of 
cultivating other crops."18 Perier and Salmon encouraged the 
colonists to send only top quality tobacco to France as a sure 
means of realizing advantageous prices.18 Besides, both officials 





20Sec Mauxepas to Bienville and Salmon, Versailles, March 10, 
1739, AC, B68.
6
administrators that the immediate growth of the colony depended on 
its commerce in tobacco; so much so that Perier and Salmon informed 
Versailles that "if the farmers-general in France cease buying 
Louisiana tobacco, the nascent colony will be crippled."21
The Company of the Indies had spent large sums of money in 
the colony. Nevertheless, it failed just as Antoine Crozat, its 
predecessor, had.22 But, in failure, it had accomplished more 
for the colony by virtue of superior means. The Company founded 
New Orleans, named for its patron, the Duke of Orleans, Regent of 
France, and established important settlements at Natchez, 
Tchoupitoulas, Cannes Brules, Baton Rouge, Manchac, and Pointe 
Couple. In 1717, it began her Louisiana venture with a population 
of about 500 whites and twenty Negro slaves and ended it with a 
population of 5,000 white settlers and about 2,500 slaves.23 
However, for the last ten years, between 1721 and 1751» white 
population had remained static while the Negro population had 
increased from about 600 to more than 2,000.24 Here is how
21Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 5» 
1731, AC, C13A13.
22"M^moire du roi pour servir d'instruction au S. Salmon 
comnissaire de la marine, ordonnateur a la Louisiane," Versailles, 
May 15, 1751* AM, C7 2S£?; Gayarre, Louisiana. I, ^5^J "Extrait du 
registre general des deliberations prises dans les assemblees 
generates d'administration," Paris, January 22, 1731» AC, CI3AI3.
23Gayarre, Louisiana. I, ^5^.
24lbid.
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Gayarr^ concludes his evaluation of the Company's venture In 
Louisiana:
The fact Is, that the financial schemes of John Law 
had given to the colonization of Louisiana by a 
company, an Impetus which was destined to cease by 
the collapse of the bubbles from which the attempt 
had originated. Unfortunately, the colonization of 
Louisiana had not been a great national enterprise,
undertaken by patriotism and carried on by
enlightened statesmanship. It was a stock-jobbing 
operation, a mere money-making speculation, a bait 
thrown out to greedy stockholders; and like most 
speculations of this kind, it ended in ruin. It 
had only the honor of being a splendid deception; 
it blazed out like a meteor, only to be soon 
swallowed up by obscurity.25
Thus, the money which the Company poured into the colony did not
filter down to the mass of colonists. Perier and Salmon observed
that the Company distributed Negro slaves to farmers of large
plantations but neglected the small farmers, who, nevertheless,
represented the bulk and strength of the colony. The life of
the small farmer was so difficult that many families would have
left Louisiana for France if Perier and Salmon had not refused
them passage while assuring them of a brighter future.26
Pitch and tar were produced at Mobile. Salmon appointed 
Cremont, the conmander at Mobile, to inquire into the amount 
which could be produced yearly. The "ordonnateur" intended to 
send a sample to Rochefort for a possible market.27 As a further
^Ibid.




attempt to revive the commerce of French Louisiana, Versailles 
ordered the governors and lntendants of the French Islands lacking 
wood for construction to Induce local merchants and Inhabitants 
to prepare ships for commerce In Louisiana wood.28 The governor 
and "ordonnateur" assured Versailles that "the merchants of the 
French Islands will find a ready supply of construction wood and,
at the same time, a market for their syrup and rum." "The
colonists of Louisiana needed only the inducement of a sure 
market."28 Louisiana was not prepared to undertake such a 
conmercial venture in 1731» but Salmon hoped that the carpenters 
and other artisans of the marine in the service of the king in 
Louisiana would incite the inhabitants in ship building for this 
enterprise.30 In addition, the two colonial administrators foresaw 
a potentially rich commerce in raising horses and grazing cattle 
for the French islands. The colonists of French Louisiana had 
totally neglected this source of wealth, making it necessary to 
buy horses and cattle from their Spanish neighbors.31
Versailles, in another move to revive commerce which the
Company's monopoly had all but destroyed, granted privileges and
commercial advantages to French merchants who would trade with 
Louisiana. The ordinance of September 13, 1731» provided for a
2BIbid.
20Ibid.
° ° m d .
3lIbid.
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duty-free trade between France and her colony.32 Gayarr^ comments
on the above ordinance:
This was, at last, taking one step In the right 
path, and doing what ought to have been done long 
before Instead of allowing to one man, or one 
company, In violation of all the rules of common 
sense and justice, a monopoly which did not even 
benefit the grantees. But as soon as It was 
known that the trade with Louisiana was open to 
competition, the merchants of St. Malo, of 
Bordeaux, of Marseilles, and of Cap Francals 
began to make preparations to try this new 
market.33
However, Gayarr£ should have realized that France was In no 
position to do otherwise In 1712 or 171?• Besides, as will be 
seen in Chapter VI, the crucial element for the development of 
commerce in French Louisiana was not necessarily ships, but 
Louisiana products. French merchants were willing to trade 
with Louisiana and some French products were available most of 
the time; but the colony never seemed to have enough goods for 
profitable trade with the colony.34 Besides, the deplorable
32Ibid.: Gayarre, Louisiana. I, k55; «nd Maurepas to Perier, 
Versailles, May 22, 1731, AC, B55*
33GayarW, Louisiana. I, ^55"b56.
34Maurepas to Bienville and Salmon, Versailles, September 8, 
1733. AC, B59; Maurepas to Bienville and Salmon, Versailles,
September 2, 173^ > AC, B6l; "M^moire du roi aux Srs. Vaudreuil 
gouverneur et Salmon coranissaire ordonnateur de la Louisiane," 
Versailles, October 22, 17^2, AC, B7^J Maurepas to Vaudreuil, 
Versailles, September JO, 17^7 > AC, B85; Salmon to Maurepas, New 
Orleans, March JO, 1732, AC, C13A1U; Bienville and Salmon to Maurepas, 
New Orleans, April J, 173b, AC, CI3AI8; and Bienville and Salmon to 
Maurepas, New Orleans, June 10, 1736* AC, C13A21.
10
financial situation was most unattractive to French merchants. Be 
that as it may, Perier and Salmon assured Versailles in 1731 that 
"the French merchants will find all the conveniences for the sale 
and payment of their cargoes in New Orleans."35
If the prime motive behind French interests in Louisiana was 
the development of commerce, the best opportunity existed with the 
Spanish colonies of North America. "Commerce with the Spaniards," 
Maurepas wrote, "is essential for the growth of French comnerce in 
Louisiana and for the establishment and growth of the colony."36 
Although recognizing the barriers to commerce, Perier and Salmon 
were still optimistic: "The advantages to be gained by trading
with the Spanish colonies will incite the colonists to establish 
commercial ties with them,"37 expecially with Pensacola and New 
Spain. For this trade to develop, Perier and Salmon observed, 
"Louisiana needed the appropriate merchandise in sufficient 
quantity in its warehouses."38 Needless to say, the colony was 
not ready for this in 1731. For example, that very year "the 
inhabitants watched with regret the recently arrived supplies 
reloaded for a Spanish colony."39 It was difficult for the
35Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 5,
1731. AC, C13A13.
3%aurepas to Bienville and Salmon, Versailles, September 2, 
173^, AC, b6i.





colonists to comprehend why these long awaited supplies were being 
shipped to a Spanish colony. Many protested vigorously to Perier 
and Salmon, but the administrators admitted "not having any 
precise orders to prevent the shipment."40
In the financial realm Salmon Informed Versailles that:
"...he would attempt to economize as much as 
possible and would confer with Governor Perier when 
extraordinary expenses had to be made. However, 
these expenses will be ordered only in absolute 
necessity involving the security of the colony and 
when the urgent matter cannot wait for the orders 
of Versailles."41
In 173^ > Versailles maintained about 800 soldiers for the 
defense of the colony. According to Perier and Salmon the number 
was insufficient.42 They were referring, of course, to the Indian 
threat. For one thing, the colony was still tormented by the 
Natchez and Chickasaws. Though dispersed, the latter numbered 
about 1,000 warriors while the former about 200.43 The Natchez 
held the fort of Natchitoches, commanded by St. Denis, under siege. 
On November 2k, Governor Perier sent forty men under Major Louboey 
to relieve the fort. The relief column marched about I50 miles and 
was a week from Natchitoches when St. Denis sent word that the
^Ibid.
4lIbid.
42Ibid.; "Observation sur la necessite d'entretenir a la 
Louisiane un corps de troupes plus considerable que par le passe," 
anonymous and undated, Louisiana, C13C1; and Salmon to Maurepas, 
New Orleans, March 2k, AC, C13A1^.
43Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 5> 
1731, AC, C13A13.
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Natchez had dispersed In several bands and fled.44 But the Natchez 
threat continued to plague the colony.
One major problem which harassed the governor and 
"commissaire ordonnateur" In 1731 was the abuse In trade conducted 
at the several posts. Governor Perier had recognized the existence 
of such practices as forcing the colonists to buy supplies at 
exorbitant prices for some time, but apparently he had been slow 
in taking corrective action. After receiving many bitter complaints 
the French government ordered Perier to act. Accordingly,
Governor Perier suppressed the objectionable activities and 
informed the home government that "in the future no one will be 
accorded exclusive trade rights."45 In retrospect, the abuse 
was neither eradicated nor diminished. Instead, it became a 
means by which military officers supplemented their meager 
salaries.
In December, 1731* there was little construction in the 
colony. Due to slow communication between Mobile and New Orleans 
and the threat of Indian attacks, Perier and Salmon could not 
inform Versailles on the progress of construction at Mobile. They 
were still waiting for the plans and progress report. At Ballze 
construction had stopped. Salmon, who inspected the area, 
reported that he found the fort of Balize in the same condition 




languor, the colonist would despair of not being able to find a 
negotiable crop for his subsistence."50 "If this situation 
persisted," they continued, "the colonists would be unable to 
provide for their own clothing and those of their slaves, much 
less for the basic necessities of life."51 In this light tobacco 
was an Indispensable source52 for the economic life of the colony 
In 1731. Without it there would be general despair.53 On the other 
hand, the two administrative officials believed that the profit from 
tobacco would eventually lead to diversification of agriculture by 
providing the inhabitants with the means to cultivate other 
profitable crops such as indigo, flax, hemp, and silk, not to 
mention the establishment of commerce in cattle and horses.54
Nevertheless, the hopes and optimism of Perier and Salmon 
in December, 1731, were misplaced.
Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville, to his satisfaction, 
was reappointed governor of Louisiana on July 25, 1732.55 There 






55"Memoire du roi pour servir d'instructions au S. Bienville 
gouverneur a la Louisiane," Marly, February 2, 1732, AC, B57.
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1733> after an absence of eight years.se Retrocession, the
resumption of royal administration, and Bienville's return "were
circumstances which gladdened their hearts, and Inspired them with
high hopes of approaching a permanent prosperity."57 On March Id,
1733, Versailles fixed the price at which the French farmers-general
were obliged to buy Louisiana tobacco, 35 livres per hundred pounds.
Thus Versailles assumed the role of sole purchaser of Louisiana
tobacco and the right to pay a price independent of the cost of
production.58 This had severe economic repercussions on the
colony. Gayarr^ comments, "Such was one of the thousand
absurdities and flagrant injustices of the suicidal system applied
by France to her colonies!"50 In a letter dated April 23, 1733,
Diron D'Artaguiette, chosen to command at Mobile in 1732, described
the situation in which he found that settlement:
I have found on my arrival at this place two 
contagious diseases: first, the small-pox, which
has carried off and is still killing, every day, a 
considerable number of persons of both sexes and of 
every age; and next, a general dearth of provisions, 
from which everybody is suffering, and which has 
been the result of the destruction of the late crop 
by a hurricane. Our planters and mechanics here 
are dying of hunger, and those at New Orleans are in
56Gayarr4, Louisiana. I, b$6; and Salmon to Maurepas, 
New Orleans, March 6, 1733* AC, C13A17.




explanation of the languishing state of French Louisiana, one must 
look at the material and moral resources of eighteenth century 
France, her diplomacy, and colonial policy.
C H A P T E R  I I  
FRENCH COLONIAL POLICY AND LOUISIANA
Spain did not: take possession of a flourishing colony in 
1764. It is unlikely that France would have been so generous with 
a flourishing colony. Spain did not accept the colony because of 
its wealth, but rather, for its strategic location to New Spain 
and the Caribbean. On June J, 176k, Governor D'Abbadie described 
the miserable state of the colony in a letter to Versailles:
"I have the honor to submit my observations on 
the character and dispositions of the inhabitants of 
Louisiana. The disorder long existed in the colony, 
and particularly in its finances, proceeds from the 
spirit of jobbing which has been prevalent here at 
all times, and which has engrossed the attention 
and faculties of the colonists. It began in 1737> 
not only on the currency of the country, but also 
on the bills of exchange, on the merchandise in the 
King's warehouses, and on everything which was 
susceptible of it. It is to this pursuit that the 
inhabitants have been addicted in preference to 
cultivating their lands, and to any other occupation, 
by which the prosperity of the colony would have 
been promoted. I have entirely suppressed the abuse 
existing in connection with the King's warehouses, 
out of which merchandise was extracted to be sold 
to individuals, and frequently to the King himself.
"The old paper currency, not having been 
converted by the government into bills of exchange 
on the French treasury, has no fixed value, but that 
which public confidence assigns to it; and it has 
fallen so low, that it loses three hundred per cent 




"If the Inhabitants of Louisiana had turned 
their industry to anything else beyond jobbing on 
the King's paper and merchandise, they would have 
found great resources in the fertility of the land 
and the mildness of the climate. But the facility 
offered by the country to live on its natural 
productions has created habits of laziness. The 
Immoderate use of taffia(a kind of rum)has stupified 
the whole population. The vice of drunkenness had 
even crept into the highest ranks of society, from 
which, however, it has lately disappeared.
"Hence the spirit of insubordination and 
independence which has manifested itself under 
several administrations. I will not relate the 
excesses and outrages which occurred under Rochemore 
and Kerlerec. Notwithstanding the present 
tranquillity, the same spirit of seduction does not 
the less exist in the colony. It reappears in the 
thoughtless expressions of some madcaps, and in the 
anonymous writings scattered among the public. The 
uncertainty in which I am, with regard to the 
ultimate fate of the colony, has prevented me from 
resorting to extreme measures to repress such 
license; but it will be necessary to come to it at 
last, to reestablish the good order which has been 
destroyed, and to regulate the conduct and the 
morals of the inhabitants. To reach this object, 
what is first to be done is, to make a thorough 
reform in the composition of the Superior Council.
I have already had the honor of expressing my 
opinion on the members of the council, and parti­
cularly on the Attorney-General Lafrenlere.
Subjects chosen in France, to fill the offices of 
Councillors and of Attorney-General, would assist 
me in the intention I have, to devote myself 
exclusively to promoting the welfare of this colony, 
which has been ruined by the effects of jobbing, 
that first cause of all the evils front which we 
suffer here. Three-fourths, at least, of the 
inhabitants are in a state of insolvency. But 
everything will again be set to rights, and with 
some advantage, through the severity which is 
required to inforce the observation of the laws 
and to maintain good order."1
1Quoted in Gayarre, Louisiana. II, 10U-106.
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supplies furnished by foreign powers; and since England was one of 
the main suppliers, Brazil became in reality an English colony, 
more beneficial to Great Britain since, without having to care for 
the Portuguese colony, she received all the benefits expected 
from a colony.
To France, the sole purpose of colonies was to increase 
the sale and consumption of French products because the measure 
of commerce was one of work. The measure of work was one of 
population and wealth, and the power of a state was but the result 
of the number and wealth of its people. How did this policy affect 
the colonies? Three consequences which embraced the essence of 
French colonization resulted from this policy.
The first of these consequences was that the crown did not 
consider colonies as provinces of France. They differed from 
the French provinces as the means differed from the end. Colonies 
were regarded merely as establishments of commerce. The second 
consequence was that the more the colonies differed from the parent 
state by their products, the more profit they would bring by 
commerce. The French colonies in the Antilles were examples of 
this. They had none of the French commercial objects and had 
others which the parent state needed. It was this fortunate 
difference in products which permitted a considerable trade to 
develop between the French kingdom and islands. The impact on 
France was considerable. A multitude of French workers, occupied 
in supplying the colonies, lived on the surplus wealth which 
consumed the products of the French islands and an even greater
25
number existed at the expense of foreigners whom these goods 
rendered tributary to France to the value of sixty to eighty 
millions yearly. The third truth which resulted from the 
experience of colonies was that they must be held In the greatest 
state of wealth possible and under the law of the most austere 
prohibition In favor of the patent state: for without wealth
they were of no use to France; and without prohibition they profited 
rival nations. However, Versailles admitted that there were times 
when circumstances arose where wealth and prohibition were Incom­
patible and thus the law of prohibition gave way. These truths 
embraced the French theory of colonization.
According to this theory, the colonist was a free planter 
on a slave soil. The revenues of the sugar Islands though real for 
the state were but Imaginary for the greater part of the colonists. 
All that the colonist derived from his work and what he saved by his 
economy and privation was Immediately returned to the land through 
the purchase of Negro slaves. There was no time for pleasure 
during harvest. Between harvests the necessities of life prohibited 
enjoyment. Besides, the work involved before harvest time was 
almost always longer than the life of the settler —  the colonist 
saw the end of his days before the end of his work. He lived in 
poverty on a soil every day enriched by his work but which was only 
beneficial to the parent state. It was on this soil full of lies 
for the one who gave it his sweat and money and a soil even 
homicidal on which the French government settled these cultivators. 
The colonial administrators were urged to do more: to incite the
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but for one reason or another the colony languished.6 In the light 
of this, what was the nature of French interest in Louisiana and 
New France?
Apparently, Versailles had two main interests in the 
retention of Louisiana: the colony was believed crucial to English
penetration into the Mississippi Valley and to the security of New 
France; and it was viewed as a possible base to gain a share of 
the Spanish trade.7 Since the middle of the seventeenth century 
both France and her rival England were aware of the necessity of 
controlling their own colonial trade and the legal and illegal 
trade between Spain and her colonies. In the eyes of the French 
crown the growth of Louisiana depended on the development of a
a"Memoire sur l'etat de la colonie de la Louisiane en ljk6»" 
New Orleans, AC, CI3A3O.
7Maurepas to Salmon, Marly, May 22, 1731» AC, B55» Maurepas 
to Bienville and Salmon, Versailles, September 8, 1733* AC, B59* 
Maurepas to Bienville and Salmon, Versailles, September 2, 173^> AC, 
B6l; "Memoire du roi aux Srs. Vaudreuil gouverneur et Salmon 
coomissaire ordonnateur de la Louisiane," Versailles, October 22, 17^2, 
AC, B7^; Maurepas to Le Normant, Versailles, May 11, 17^» AC, B83; 
Maurepas to Vaudreuil, Versailles, September 30, 17^7» AC, B85; 
Maurepas to Vaudreuil, Versailles, November U, 17^8* AC, B87; Perier 
and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 3, 1731» AC, C13A13; 
Perier to Maurepas, New Orleans, August 19, 1731* AC, C13A1^;
Bienville and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, May 12, 1733* AC,
CI3AI6; Bienville and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, April 3,
173^, AC, C13A18; Bienville and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans,
April llf, 1735* AC, C13A20; and in most of the instructions to the 
governors and "commissaires ordonnateurs".
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substantial commerce with the Spanish colonies.8 This objective 
is included in most of the instructions sent to the governors and 
"commlssaires ordonnateurs" of Louisiana. But the hope of 
establishing a profitable commerce between Louisiana and the 
Spanish colonies, an important French objective in her rapprochement 
with Spain under the Family Compact and her designs on Spanish 
commerce at Spain's expense,8 never materialized.l° Spain held 
fast to her restrictive policies irrespective of Bourbon ties 
and the Family Compact. Besides, the development of comnerce 
was dependent on the ability of the colony to produce goods for 
trade which in turn meant the presence of settlers capable of 
cultivating the soil. However, to support the colonization of 
Louisiana, "France had neither the material nor the moral resources 
which had enabled her to conduct with comparative success the 
colonization of Canada and the West Indies."*1 The War of the 
Spanish Succession, which involved Europe shortly after the first 
expedition of Iberville, occupied much of France's attention and 
dissipated her dwindling material resources. As early as 1703, 
it was obvious that the Ministry of Marine could no longer carry 
the financial burden of the new colony. Because the colonies were
8See references in note 7*
9Allen ChrisLelow, "French Interest in the Spanish Bnpire 
During the Ministry of the Due de Choiseul, 1759"1771," HAHR. XXI 
(November, 19M), 519-537.
l°See note 7.
11Marcel Glraud, "France and Louisiana in the Eighteenth
Century," MVHR, XXXVI (1950), 657-
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In 1712, France, too weak and perhaps too indifferent to 
support Louisiana, placed the destiny of the colony in the hands 
of a private entrepreneur, Antione Crozat. This experiment in 
capitalistic development had been tried elsewhere with discouraging 
results. Yet the French crown was too glad to be rid of the 
unprofitable colony to consider the consequences.15 The peace 
which came to France after the War of the Spanish Succession and 
the Crozat regime in French Louisiana did not bring prosperity 
to the struggling colony. The colony was in dire need of "massive 
injections of people, money, and goods and required a quaranteed 
market for its products."16 But Crozat supplied none of these. He 
relinquished his grant to the crown in 1J17- Versailles was then 
no better prepared nor any more willing to undertake the 
development of the colony than in 1712. Louisiana was farmed 
out again, this time to a joint-stock company. However, the 
Company of the Indies, with its ruinous enterprises and deplorable 
administration, was unable to meet the challenge. The colony, 
far from inproving, was rapidly declining. The French government 
showed its disregard of French Louisiana by reducing the military 
force from twenty to ten companies.17 Drouot de Valdeterre,
l5N. M. Miller Surrey, The Commerce of Louisiana During the 
French Regime. 1699-1765 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1916),
157.
16John G. Clark, New Orleans. 1716-1812: An Economic History 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970)» 9»
l7Gayarre, Louisiana. I, 365"36^.
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former commander at Dauphine Island and Biloxi, gave this 
description of the colony in 1726.
"The inhabitants of this country whose establish­
ment in it is of such recent date, not being 
governed in the name of his majesty, but in that of 
the company, have become republicans in their 
thoughts, feelings, and manners, and they consider 
themselves as free from the allegiance due to a 
lawful sovereign. The troops are without 
discipline and subordination, without arms and 
ammunition, most of the time, without clothing, and 
they are frequently obliged to seek for their food 
among the Indian tribes. There are no forts for 
their protection; no places of refuge for them in 
case of attack. The guns and other implements of 
war are buried in sand and abandoned; the 
warehouses are unroofed; the merchandise, goods, and 
provisions are damaged or completely spoiled; the 
company as well as the colonists are plundered 
without mercy and restraint; revolts and desertions 
among the troops are authorized and sanctioned; 
incendiaries who, for the purpose of pillage, 
commit to the flames whole camps, posts, 
settlements, and warehouses, remain unpunished; 
prisoners of war are forced to become sailors in 
the service of the company, and by culpable 
negligence or connivance they are allowed to run 
away from ships loaded with merchandise; other 
vessels are willfully stranded or wrecked, and their 
cargoes are lost to their owners; forgers, robbers, 
and murderers are secure of impunity. In short, 
this is a country which, to the shame of France 
be it said, is without religion, without justice, 
without discipline, without order, and without 
police."18
Meanwhile, questions of security and strategy were being 
raised at Versailles. Was it possible to leave Louisiana in such 
weak hands while ambitious and jealous neighbors threatened the 
mouth of the Mississippi? The Company was the first to admit it
iaQuoted in ibid., 375“376.
could not contain the English. Facing the just apprehensions 
Initiated by the Natchez revolt and Its inability to protect its 
American domain, the general assembly of the Company of the 
Indies decided to return the colony to the crown.10
The crown accepted the offer. In its instructions to 
Salmon, the first "commlssaire ordonnateur" after retrocession, 
the crown informed him of the situation. The colony of Louisiana, 
situated between Carolina to the east and old and new Mexico on 
the west, was discovered in 1683 by Jean-Baptiste de la Salle. 
Shortly thereafter, France established a colony along with a 
garrison which held the territory during the War of the Spanish 
Succession. However, France was unable to derive all the 
advantages which she anticipated from a potentially rich colony 
promising wealth and advantageous commerce, for the long 
European war interrupted navigation. Louis XIV, well aware of 
the importance of commerce to France, searched for means to 
revive it. Thus, in IJ12 he granted exclusive commercial rights 
for a period of fifteen years to Antoine Crozat. But this 
attempt had failed. The French crown then formed in 171?> the 
Company of the West, later known as the Company of the Indies, 
and granted it land concessions and exclusive commercial rights
10For the deliberations of the general assembly of the 
Company of the Indies see "Extrait du registre general des 
deliberations prises dans les assemblees generales d'administration 
Paris, January 22, 1731* AC, CI3AI3; and for the background which 1 
up to retrocession see Pierre Heinrich, La Louisiane sous la 
compagnie des Indes. 1717*1731 (Paris: E. Guilmoto, I90M), Chapter
II, "La retrocession de la Louisiane au gouvcrncmcnt royal."
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To remedy this situation was the task which would tax the ability 
and energy of the governor and "commissaire ordonnateur" from 
1731 to 176k. But as seen in D'Abbadie's report of 176ht the 
colony had not improved.
The failure of Louisiana to progress between I73I and 1762 
was due in the main to the weakness of the French government at 
home. In 1763 France lost the islands of Dominique, Saint-Vincent, 
Tobago, Grenade, and Grenadines, New France, the island of 
Cap-Breton, the islands of Saint-Lourent, the Ohio Valley, and 
the left bank of the Mississippi.22 One must not consider the 
end of the French colonial adventure in North America as a stroke 
of destiny announced by a trumpet call. Rather, it was a long 
prepared drama of which the English conquest of I76O was the 
final episode before the curtain fell.23 At the time the 
French crown was indifferent to the fate of the colony. The 
reasons for the French indifference and neglect of Louisiana are 
many. But the all encompassing one stems from the fact that 
France, during the last years of Louis XIV's reign, had lost her 
momentum at home and in Europe while England quickly stepped in 
to fill any vacuum created by France. Louisiana, born of this 
condition, suffered the birthpains of the declining mother
22H. Carre, 1^ regne de Louis XV (1715-177U). VIII, part ? 
of Histoire de France depuis les origines iusqu'a la revolution, ed. 
by Ernest Lavisse (9 vols; Paris: Hachette, I9OO-I9H), ?M7»
2^laurice Filion, "La crise de la marine francaise, d'apres 
lc memoire de Maurepas de 17^5 sur la marine et le conmerce," Revue 
d1 histoire de l'Am^rique francaise. XXI (September, l'K*Y),
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country. No other French colony In the New World was born In 
similar difficult times nor subjected to a similar painful 
growth due to conditions in France.24
In the light of this, the early history of French 
Louisiana cannot be described apart from the history of France.
The ragged beginning of the colony symbolized and reflected the 
difficulties of the French government and the economic and moral 
state of her people. Thus, to explain the persistent stagnation 
of the colony, the desperate situation of France itself must be 
examined.25
Within the limits of French bureaucracy of the eighteenth 
century, the Ministry of Marine was reasonably efficient. What 
it lacked was financial and political power. Accordingly, the 
crisis of the French navy in the first half of the eighteenth 
century throws light on French colonial decline in North America.26 
In 1730, French commerce employed 200 ships in Spanish and 
Portuguese ports; more than 700 in Italian and commercial ports 
of the Levant; and about 600 in the sugar islands of the Antilles.27 
The expansion of colonial commerce and the merchant marine was, 
however, so great that it became difficult to recruit men for the
24Giraud, "France," 657*
25Ibid.
26Filion, "La crise," 2JP.
Carr6, Louis XV. 106.
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navy. Thus commerce was ill-protected. Port officials complained 
but the state could not or did not attempt to protect the ports 
against English and Dutch smugglers.28 In spite of the revival 
initiated by Maurepas, the French navy remained inferior to 
that of the English. While France comnissioned eighty-eight 
ships between IjkO and 1750 > England put to sail 226. Besides, 
ic was comnon knowledge in England that the struggle between 
France and England would be decided in the New World and India 
and by the most powerful navy. Nevertheless, France appeared 
not to be aware of the importance of her navy, for little 
consideration was given her navy in comparison to paid her 
army.29
Much of this decline must be attributed to the ministers 
who followed Colbert. It is said that the experience of a 
century had not enlightened the colonial politics of France and 
that the principles of Richelieu and Colbert were forgotten or 
ignored at the time Louisiana was established.30 It is true 
that Pontchartrain did not compare in ability or as a statesman
28Ibld., 109-110.
^Ibid., 156.
^Francois-Xavier Garneau, Histoire du Canada (9 vols; 
Montreal: Editions de l'Arbre, I9kk~l9k6), IV, 21.
to Colbert.31 However, the evidence of Filion,32 Duch£ne33 and 
the content of Choiseul's "mAnoire" of I76534 point to the fact 
that Colbert's principles still formed the essence of French 
colonial philosophy.
There were other reasons for the decline of the navy: 
these were financial and political. In a 'Wmoire" written at 
the end of 17^5» Maurepas demonstrated the necessity of naval 
forces to the survival of France, noted the importance of 
maritime and colonial commerce in the French economy, and 
illustrated the gravity of the present crisis in the French 
navy.35 After the death of Cardinal Fleuri, Minister of State 
from 1726 to 17^3, the reduction of the marine was proposed as 
it had been in l68l. It was to show the importance of the navy 
and to defend it against his detractors that Maurepas was 
prompted to write his important "mAnoire" to Louis XV.36 His 
"memoire" of 17̂ 5 reveals a personality unlike the one 
discredited by many historians. The deep perception on the 
foundation of French strength, the penetrating recognition 





^Filion, "La crise," 230.
36Ibid., 230-231.
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the qualities of a high order.37 In summary, Maurepas demonstrated 
the importance of naval forces not only for the security of France 
but for her prosperity and strength. Commerce brought wealth.
Thus, the role of colonial commerce was preponderant, for the 
increase of French wealth went hand and hand with the growth 
of colonial commerce. This fact alone, according to Maurepas, 
sufficed to show the importance of the colonies. The foundation 
of French power had no firmer support. Maurepas clearly indicated 
the political and economic dependence of France on the colonies 
and the imprescriptible role of the navy for its support and 
preservation.38 But then, France had lost her momentum.
Accordingly, the crown had lost interest in both the navy and 
colonies at the time when English threats redoubled. Under the 
pretext of pacifist policies, the crown sacrificed the navy to 
the ambition of England.39
The second role of Louisiana in French colonial policy 
was to prevent the establishment of a foreign foothold at the 
mouth of the Mississippi. A rival base at this point would 
endanger French exploitation of islands in the Caribbean and 
French commerce in the Gulf of Mexico. The period from the Treaty 





death-struggle of New France and opened the golden age of the 
French sugar Islands. By far the most prized French colonies were 
In the Antilles. Sugar was one of the most profitable products 
of the French colonies in the New World. To transport the sugar 
to Europe, France employed five to six hundred ships a year.
According to a "memoire" of 1733* sugar was more profitable to 
France than all the mines of Peru were to Spain. Sugar 
plantations multiplied in Saint Domingue with the clearing of 
the forests. It was hoped that Negro slaves would permit the 
full exploitation of Saint Domingue.40 Accordingly, France 
concentrated her attention in the Antilles. And to protect 
her interests in America and Europe, France faced England in 
seven major conflicts from 1688 to 1815 totalling sixty years 
of war. French interest in Louisiana and New France must be 
viewed within the context of these struggles which preoccupied 
France and Europe. It is true that England was a crucial factor 
in the history of Louisiana from its beginning to the final 
decision to cede it to Spain.41 French Louisiana, besides 
promising economic gains to the mother country served certain 
strategic purposes in the general struggle. It was French 
sensivity to English pressures along the St. Laurence River, in
^Carr^, Louis XV, 109.
4lClark, New Orleans, 5"6; Carre, Louis XV, especially 
"politique dc 1'Anglcterre," ll’O, "Anglais et Francais dans 
1'Anu^rique du Nord," :'J|8, and "la guerre en Amerique," ‘.'"(h; and 
Ronald D. Smith, French Interests in Louisiana: from Choi sen I Lo 
Napoleon (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilm, Inc., I()77i).
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the Hudson Bay area, and to rumors of English plans to gain 
control of the lower Mississippi which prompted the expedition 
of Pierre Le Moyne d*Iberville in I698. Versailles' 
apprehension of English penetration into and design on New 
France and the Mississippi Valley was well founded. The English 
were already trading with the Louisiana Indians when Iberville 
founded the French settlement at Biloxi.42 The French strategic 
policies for the area were reactions to English threats. The 
conflicting interests and goals of France and England were 
clear. The French were determined to maintain their territory 
by keeping the English east of the Alleghanies and holding the 
communication between French Louisiana and New France open.43 In 
the correspondence of the governors of Louisiana and communication 
with Versailles, the English threat was a constant theme.44 One 
of the best examples is the letter written to the Minister of
42Clark, New Orleans. 6-7.
43J. H. Schlaraan, Froc Quebec to New Orleans; the Story of 
the French in America (Bellville, Illinois: Buechler Publishing Co.,
1929), 1^6-167.
44Maurepas to Bienville, in code, Versailles, March 5, 1739> 
AC, B68; Maurepas to Bienville, in code, Versail1es, August 12, 1739> 
AC, B68; Maurepas to Bienville, in code, Versailles, October 13,
17^1, AC, B72; Minister to^Kerlerec, Versailles, February 17, 1755» 
AC, B101; Minister of Kerlerec, Versailles, February 17, 1733? AC, 
B101; Minister to Kerlerec, Versailles, January 26, 1756, AC, BiC3; 
Kerlerec to the Minister, in code, New Orleans, January 28, 1757 >
AC, C13A1K); and "Observation sur la necessite d'entretenir a la 
Louisiane un corps de troupes plus considerable que par le passe," 
New Orleans, undated, AC, C13C1.
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Marine from Cadiz in 1737 by either a merchant or a French 
official which unmistakably reveals both the concern over the 
English threat and France's inability to respond.
The protection of Florida from English seizure involved
the security of France as well as that of Spain. For if a
foreign power occupied Florida it would control the Bahama
Channel and consequently be in an excellent position to prey on
Spanish ships returning from the West Indies. Florida was 
without defense other than a small fort of Saint Augustine.
Pensacola was even less defended. France could not depend on 
Spain to hold her settlements, for they were neglected 
regardless of their strategic location. At one time there was 
a fort, Sante Marie d'Apalache, which was destroyed in I7O5 by 
the English and their Indian allies. This settlement was 
important because it furnished wheat for all of Havana. But it 
was never resettled by the Spaniards. The settlement was reduced 
to a garrison of twenty-five to thirty men which the Spaniards 
called "presidio". The English with their recent establishment 
of "New Georgia" were only thirty-five miles from Saint Augustine. 
Besides, the English progressively strengthened their position 
with the least friction with Spain. Consequently, the English 
were in a position to take Saint Augustine, Sainte Marie 
d'Apalache, anti even Pensacola. Therefore, it was up to France 
because of her interest in protecting the Spanish commerce to 
take the necessary measures to prevent English penetration.
France might have halted English progress in the area by
kk
and those of England. Destruction of French power 
in the Mississippi Valley would open both Florida 
and Mexico to English conquest.55
On the other hand, the English were alarmed by the expansion of
French overseas trade in the 1730'8• They feared that unless
French commerce was curbed it would pose a threat by driving
English traders out of profitable markets as had already
occurred in the Levant and some of the Spanish colonies.56
The War of the Austrian Succession (17^0-^8) dealt a 
damaging blow to French commerce, but not enough to cripple it. 
England realized that a war of attrition would have the effect 
of crippling French commerce. Accordingly, England was 
determined to renew hostilities as soon as possible but with 
a different strategy: "to reduce its continental commitment
to the minimum and devote itself to gaining maritime supremacy 
in order to destroy French overseas trade."5*7 Versailles was 
aware of the aims of the English and adopted a policy which would 
force England to take the defensive. By attacking Hanover, on 
the continent France might force England to disperse her navy. 
France hoped that this dispersement of the English navy would 
prevent England from both blockading continental ports and
55Ibid., 1̂ -15.
56Eccles, "Military Establishment," 2 0 .
57Ibid.
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severing ship lanes on the Atlantic.58 While the North American 
French colonies were assigned a major role in the execution of 
this strategy, New France would be the key area. A comparatively 
small force in New France would pin down a much larger English 
force.59 La Galissoniere, former governor general of New France, 
had previously suggested this: force England to dispatch a large
military and naval force to North America. He was certain that 
his hardy Canadians, with some help from Versailles, could 
contain the English by exerting strong pressures on the northern 
English colonies.60 In the early years of the Seven Years' War, 
the strategy was successful; but in the end the French forces 
met with defeat and thus enabled the bulk of English military 
forces to be available for service elsewhere. New France had 
failed in its mission.61
This failure probably weighed more heavily than any 
other in Choiseul's decision to cede Louisiana.62 There was no 
further need by France of Louisiana except as a Spanish barrier 
against the English threat. Apparently, the value which 







the colony's physical resources."63 In reality Louisiana had
served the purpose of a check written by Choiseul to serve as
payment for securing the French sugar Islands, "... and the
furtherance of future alliance between the courts of Madrid and
Versailles."64 The minister's main concern was to obtain a peace
settlement as quickly as possible. France had to recuperate and
rebuild in order to renew the conflict. All efforts were
centered on strengthening the Family Compact along with both
navies with the ultimate aim of protecting their respective
trade and inevitably to cripple English commerce.65 Ramsey, the
author of "Anglo-French Relations, 1763“1770: A Study of
Choiseul's Foreign Policy," describes what he calls Choiseul's
real policy toward Spain after the Treaty of Paris:
During the peace, Spain was to provide a fertile 
market for French commerce and industry. If war 
should break out and should go badly for France,
Spain with her fat colonial empire would certainly 
attract more attention in a war of conquest than 
lean France. It was probable that in the flurry 
and confusion attending a grand attack on the 
Spanish colonial system, France might hold on to 
her now meager overseas possessions. And since 
the Pacte de Famille did not apply to the 
colonial world, it was scarcely possible, outside




Europe, to distinguish the ally, Spain, from the 
enemy England. Thus Spain was to play a part in 
the next wars by reason of her losses.66
Furthermore, Choiseul was confident that his policy of 
revenge would be better served with New France and Louisiana in 
English and Spanish hands respectively.07 Choiseul foresaw that 
the defeat of France and her withdrawal from North America would 
lead to revolution in the English colonies and the disruption of 
England's commercial empire. "This is", concludes Eccles, "of 
course, exactly what happened, Canada in the hands of the 
British finally fulfilled the purpose that France had long before 
assigned to it."68
In summary, France had two main interests in Louisiana: 
to prevent a foreign foothold at the mouth of the Mississippi 
and to realize commercial gains at Spain's expense. The latter 
did not materialize, but the promise was ever present. Louisiana 
was a financial liability. This was admitted time and again in 
the correspondence between Versailles and her officials in 
Louisiana. The colony received special attention at times. But 
this is explained by the changing diplomatic situation in Europe 
with its possible repercussion in the New World. An example of
66John Frazer Ramsey, "Anglo-French Relations, 1763-1770:
A Study of Choiseul's Foreign Policy," University of California 
Publications in History. XVII (Berkeley, California: University of
California Press, 1939)* 150.
67Eccles, "Military Establishment," ?1.
68Ibid.
this is the substantial increase in troops during Vaudreuil's 
administration. France, because of the Bourbon dynasty, the 
Family Compact, and the rising threat of her hereditary enemy, was 
forced to keep Louisiana. Louisiana was neglected. But then, 
France could not give what she did not have, what she vitally 
needed elsewhere. It was a matter of priority. In short, 
Louisiana was the victim of the times and a pawn on the 
diplomatic chessboard of France. Louisiana, with the exception 
of Mobile, was never conquered by arms. The fate of its
population and immense territory was decided in Europe by a
few pen strokes: "Union with Spain," said Choiseul, "is more
important to France than Louisiana and many other American 
possessions."68 Meanwhile, colonial administrators strove to 
implement the designs of the home government. One of the two 
most important administrators was the "commissaire ordonnateur". 
Because of his financial responsibilities, he often bore the 
brunt of the crown's failures in the colony. A look into the
origin and nature of the office will reveal the important
role played by the "commissaire ordonnateur" in the colonial 
government.
e9Villiers, du Terrage, Les demieres annees de la 
Louisiane francaise (Paris: E. Guilmoto, 1903)> 15^»
C H A P T E R  I I I
THE OFFICE OF "COffdSSAIRE ORDONNATEUR"
The office of "conmissaire ordonnateur", is an important 
one, but is perhaps the least known in the history of French 
Louisiana. This obscurity is not due simply to a lack of 
research. If it were, much of the confusion surrounding the 
office would not exist. In his scholarly work Le grand marquis, 
Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil et la Louisiane. Fregault comments 
on obstacles to historical knowledge: "The most formidable
obstacle to historical knowledge is this pretentious mania of 
considering resolved problems which are barely understood and 
left unquestioned because one imagines to have the answers."1 
The historiography of French Louisiana seems to reflect this 
mania. Many authors have translated "ordonnateur" as intendant. 
Because of this a series of historians, down to the present, have 
used the titles of "commissaire ordonnateur", royal commissioner, 
"ordonnateur", first councillor and intendant interchangeably.
The significance that French bureaucracy attached to titles should 
suffice to cause one to differentiate an "ordonnateur" from an 




intendant are in error.2 These officials were appointed and 
comnissioned as "commissaires ordonnateurs" with specific powers 
and not as intendant of finance, justice, and police.
The error stems from overlooking and or not understanding 
certain basic points in the analysis of the "commissaire 
ordonnateur". 1. "Commissaire de marine" is defined as an 
officer who provisioned royal ships and reviewed the troops.
There were different ranks of "commissaire de marine": "sous
commissaire", "commissaire ordinaire", "commissaire de premiere
2Gayarre, Louisiana. Gayarre always translated the title of 
"commissaire ordonnateur" as intendant; Henry Plauch^ Dart in 
several articles in the LHQ. However, Dart eventually reached the 
conclusion that "ordonnateur" was not synonomous with intendant.
Here are some of his statements: "Originally in France an intendant
was an officer charged with supervision over local government, and 
to inquire into, correct and reform abuses therein. A Commissaire 
Ordonnateur on the other hand, was one charged with any particular 
duty invested with authority to order and perform the same. When 
the title Intendant was conferred on an officer in the colonies, 
the scope of duty was greatly enlarged and included those just 
described for both officers." Dart, "Legal Institutions," 78-79.
In 1956, it seems Dart finally concluded on the matter." Gayarre 
always translated the title of Comnissaire Ordonnateur as Intendant 
in which he was in error...." "Cabarets in New Orleans in the 
French Colonial Period," LHQ, XIX (July, 1936), 578-583; Villiers, 
Deraiferes ann^es. ii; D. K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Bnplres: a
Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century (New York: Delacorte
Press, 1967), 37-38; Pierre H. Boulle, "Some Eighteenth-Century 
French Views on Louisiana," Frenchmen and French Ways in the 
Mississippi Valley, ed. John Francis McDermott (Urbana, Illinois: 
University of Illinois Press, 1969), 17; Walter J. Saucier and 
Kathrine Wagner Seineke, "Francois Saucier, Engineer of Fort de 
Chartres, Illinois," in McDermott cited above, 212; Jerry A. Micelle, 
"From Law Court to Local Government: Metamorphosis of the Superior
Council of French Louisiana," LH, IX (Spring, 1968), 99, 102, 103; 
Alcee Fortier, A History of Louisiana (New York: Manzi, Joyant and
Co., 190^) and last but not least Norma Ward Caldwell, "The French 
in the Mississippi Valley, 17UO-1750," The University of Illinois 
Studies in Social Sciences. XXVI (19^0-19^-2).
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classe", "conmi8saire de seconde classe", "commissaire general", 
etc.. "Ordonnateur" described certain administrators in charge 
of military and marine expenses.3 These definitions make 
neither mention of nor reference to judicial functions as first 
councillor of the Superior Council. In the light of this certain 
conclusions follow. Because the colonies were under the direction 
of the marine, the minister recruited colonial administrators 
from the rank and file of "commissaires" of marine. However, 
and this is a point which many authors fail to see, the position 
or title of "commissaire" of marine and "conmissaire ordonnateur" 
did not automatically include judicial duties, membership in 
the Superior Council, or the position of first councillor in the 
Council. It was upon the receipt of the commission of first 
councillor that they were assigned judicial duties.4 On the other 
hand, the intendant did not need such a commission; for it was 
understood and included in the position of intendant of finance, 
justice, and police.
Bescherelle, Dictionnaire national ou grand dictionnaire 
class!que de la langue francaise (2 vols.: Paris: Chez Simon, lS4^),
I, 703, II, 712; and Adolphe Hatzfeld et Arsene Darmesteter, 
Dictionnaire p^n^ral de la langue francaise. du commencement du XVII 
siecle lusqu'a nos 1ours”T2 vols.; Paris: Librairie CH. Delagrave,iQ9̂ 9mrrt w —
^Haurepas to D'Auberville, Versailles, August 14, ljkjf AC, 
B85; Berryer to Descloseaux, Versailles, August 27, 1759» AC, B109; 
"Provisions de premier conseiller au conseil superieur de la 
Louisiane pour S. Le Normant," Versailles, April 30, 17^, AC, B78; 
"Provisions de premier conseiller au conseil superieur de la 
Louisiane pour le S. Michel de la Rouvilli&re," Versailles, January, 
17^7, AC, D2C3; and "Memoire du roi pour servir d'instruction au S. 
Salmon commissaire de la marine, ordonnateur a la Louisiane," 
Versailles, May 15, 1751, AM, C7 299.
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2. The "conmissaire ordonnateur" was neither as powerful 
nor as prestigeous as the intendant. This is borne out by the 
following example. In the general instructions to both Perier 
and Salmon in reference to rank in church and public ceremonies 
one finds this statement: "His Majesty wishes the regulation
made for Canada on April 27> 1716, regulating rank in churches 
and public ceremonies to apply to Louisiana also. Accordingly, 
Salmon will enjoy the same rank of the intendant in his absence."5 
However, the regulation for Canada, where the two top officials —  
governor general and intendant —  held more prestigious offices, 
confused matters when applied to Louisiana with lesser offices.
Thus, to alleviate all further dispute, Maurepas, Minister of 
Marine, laid down specific regulations for Louisiana in August,
1734. In essence, the regulations were similar to those of the 
islands and Canada. Both the governor and "ordonnateur" were 
to have a pew reserved in churches in New Orleans and Mobile; 
but unlike the governor general and intendant of Canada, they 
were not permitted a prie-dieu in the sanctuary.6 What can 
one conclude from the regulation of I'jjkl "Commissaire 
ordonnateur" Salmon was at most a subdelegate of the intendant 
of New France and, therefore, not an intendant.
5flMemoire du roi aux Srs. Perier gouverneur et Salmon 
commissaire ordonnateur," Versailles, May 22, 1731> AC, B55*
6Charles Edward O'Neill, Church and State in French Colonial 
Louisiana: Policy and Politics to 1732 ̂ New Haven, Connecticut:
Yale University Press, 19^6), 2^5.
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Father Charles O'Neill, author of an Important work on 
church history In colonial Louisiana, describes an interesting 
argument which eventually led to the regulation of 173^ an(* in 
the process provides additional proof toward establishing the 
fact that the "commissaire ordonnateur" was not an intendant.
The incident occurred when "procureur general" Fleuriau, 
political rival of La Chaise, was horrified upon learning that 
the "commissaire" was granted a prie-dieu in the sanctuary.
During the dedication of a church in New Orleans in December,
1727, Fleuriau noticed three prie-dieux in the sanctuary, one 
of which was for La Chaise. Infuriated, he stated that La Chaise 
was nothing more than the first councillor of the Superior 
Council. He later argued before the Council that since an intendant 
is not recognized here, he opposed the assumption of this special 
privilege by the first councillor and urged the Council to act 
accordingly by ordering the prie-dieu removed from the sanctuary.7 
Though the incident stemmed from and was inflamed by a political 
feud, it is unlikely Fleuriau would have pursued an argument 
against an official commissioned as intendant and registered as 
such in the Superior Council.
3. It was the policy of France to have a governor 
general and an intendant administer larger or more important 
colonies and a governor and "ordonnateur" in lesser or dependent
7Ibid., 2k2-2k5.
5^
colonies.8 This was the relationship between New France and 
Louisiana. The latter, though only in theory, was under the 
authority of the former. Consequently, New France was 
administered by a governor general and an Intendant while 
Louisiana by a governor and "ordonnateur".
4. At most the "commissaire ordonnateur" of Louisiana
was in theory a subdelegate to the intendant of New France.
Sometimes this was explicit in the instructions; but, whether 
it was explicit or not, it was always assumed.
5. By simply reading their commissions and the 
correspondence between Versailles and French Louisiana, one 
sees that the "commissaires ordonnateurs" were not intendants.
Had those historians who allude to intendants in French 
Louisiana have read these documents, the error would have been
corrected long ago. As support for this point, some notes on
the career of the "commissaires ordonnateurs" from 1731 to 1769. 
accompanied by their commissions, are in order in the following 
paragraphs:
Edme-Gatien Salmon was "commissaire ordonnateur" of 
Louisiana from 1731 to 17^.9 He was a remarkable man. Unlike 
that of many officials, his correspondence shows little 
indication of pettiness, avidity, peevishness or vanity. This
8See "Guadeloupe," KMC, XII (186M, 7^-106 and 289-330.
9"Do8sier Salmon," AM, C7 299 and for the most part from 
Fregault, Vaudreuil, 181-182.
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conscientious official is remembered for his preoccupation to 
serve, above all, the interests of the colony and colonists —  a 
rare attitude among colonial officials and even less frequent 
among civil administrators than among military administrators 
because of the prejudice and narrow formalism of the former. 
Salmon was not a man of means: his salary of 8,000 livres made 
life difficult, but he made the best of it. In Louisiana, he 
possessed a small farm, "The Providence", worth less than 2,500 
livres. Born to some wealth, Salmon purchased two offices in 
the province where he settled, but only to have them suppressed 
when Louis XIV died. His wife also had means, but the system 
dissipated them. Uhen he asked to be recalled from Louisiana, 
he only wished some employment which would enable him to finish 
his career with some ease. He received nothing. The leave which 
the minister sent in the spring of 17^  was a pure and simple 
dismissal. Salmon was to receive a salary for the first four 
months of the current year. How can this lack of appreciation 
for a dedicated official be explained? Versailles was at the 
time extremely dissatisfied with the bad financial condition 
of French Louisiana and the French government and was 
consequently searching for scapegoats on whom to place the 
blame. Salmon lacked both influence and patrons at Versailles. 
Hence, while others were protected, Salmon faced the brunt of 
the home government's anger. The mission of his successor,
Le Normant, was to investigate the financial affairs of
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him, the summit of which was attained in I7U8 when the Marquise 
de Pompadour appointed him assistant to Massiac, the Minister of 
Marine. However, Cardinal of Bernis saw Le Normant as a "mediocre 
official with high credentials but possessing no vision."
Perhaps there is no better example of the mechanism of 
colonial administration than in the personality and career of 
Le Normant. Not only did he have great influence at Versailles 
but he shrewdly employed it to his advantage and advancement.
As early as 17^4, Maurepas treated him with special attention 
by giving him the rank of "commissaire general" of the marine 
with a choice, once his mission in Louisiana was completed, of 
the Intendancy of Saint Domingue or a port position at home.11 
He chose the port position at home: the Intendancy of
Rochefort.12
The case of Le Normant provides an example of both 
mistranslation and misinterpretation. For, it is clear from 
the instructions to Le Normant that he received three coranissions: 
one for "ordonnateur";13 a second for subdelegate of the intendant 
of New France;14 and a third for first councillor to the Superior
11Maurepas to Le Normant, Versailles, April 30, 17^> AC, B78.
l2nDossier Le Normant," AC, E278.
l3"Memoire du roi au S. Le Normant commissaire general de la 
marine, ordonnateur a la Louisiane," Versailles, April 17^-* AC, 
B78.
141'Commission de subdelegue de 1*intendant de la Nouvelle 
France pour le S. Le Normant," ibid.
of marine.1,23 Versailles favorably received his demands —  an 
indication of his influence at Versailles. From 1733 on> the 
"conmissaire" held in the Superior Council a seat immediately 
following that of the first councillor when the intendant 
presided. If the Intendant could not attend, the "commissaire" 
acted as president.
In 1737* Michel attached himself to an illustrious family 
by marrying the daughter of Claude-Michel B^gon, who was the king' 
lieutenant at Montreal and who succeeded Vaudreuil to the 
government of Trois Rivieres in 17^3* Michel's father-in-law was 
the brother of the former intendant of New France with whom the 
elder Vaudreuil was far from agreeable. The Begons were related 
to the Count of La Galissoniere, who was acting governor general 
during the captivity of La Jonquiere and later became one of the 
most listened to advisors of the Minister of Marine.
Mrs. B^gon was infatuated with her son-in-law and wrote 
many letters filled with advice on how to comport himself and 
to advance his career. However, Michel did not return her 
affection. A lively man inflated with as much fat as vanity, he 
had apparently an abominable character. The old woman complained 
that he wrote insulting letters insinuating he did not need advice
Michel solicited the Secretary of State for the office of 
"ordonnateur" with the rank of "conmissaire general" to replace
23Ibld.. 275-
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of Rochemore on April 16, 1738.27 Descloseaux returned to France. 
Near the end of 1759» Berryer, the Minister of Marine, ordered 
him to return immediately to Louisiana to replace Rochemore as 
"ordonnateur".28 However, the recall of Rochemore signed on 
August 27, 1759* was blocked by powerful family influence.
Rochemore was finally recalled in 1761 and succeeded by Foucault. 
Vincent-Gaspard-Pierre de Rochemore, "commissaire general" of the 
marine, was the sixth "ordonnateur" of Louisiana holding the 
office from 1758 to 1761.
Rochemore was born in 1713*20 Tbe third son of the 
Marquis de Rochemore, resident of Nimes, he was destined for the 
priesthood by his parents and accordingly received the proper 
training. He changed his mind at the last minute before joining 
a religious order, thus showing his repugnance for the 
ecclesiastical state. It was the custom of the time to approach 
the minister in order to obtain positions for members of 
influential families. Maurepas, who thought it necessary to 
bring military and civil officials into a narrow unity, held the 
idea that when positions were solicited for members of the same
^Villiers, Dernieres annees. 76 and 1^0-1^1; and "M&noire 
pour servir d'instruction & M.Bobe-Descloseaux commissaire de la 
marine faisant fonctions d'ordonnateur & la Louisiane," Versailles, 
October, 1759, AC, C13B1; Berryer to Descloseaux, Versailles, August 
27, 1759, AC, B109; and Berryer to Descloseaux, Versailles, August 1, 
1759, AM, C7 33.
28Villiers, Dernieres annees. 126.
^See ibid., 126-128.
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family, the older should be appointed as a scribe and the other 
a marine guard. Thus, Rochemore was appointed scribe in 1731.
In 1732, after two assignments in the commercial port of the 
Levant, he was promoted to ordinary scribe and in I738 to 
principal scribe. That same year he graduated from the University 
of Avignon, tantamount to becoming "ordonnateur".
From 1731 to 17*40 he worked in several offices in the port 
of Toulon and during this interval participated in four sea 
campaigns. In 17*40, he was in the office of colonies at 
Rochefort, chief at the main warehouse for hospital supplies and 
provisions in 17*4-2, on board the Elephant for Louisiana in 17*4-5 > 
chief at the main warehouse for construction and batteries in 
17*4-7, at the office of troops in 1750* "commissaire ordonnateur" 
in 1751, and in the office of funds and at the Intendancy of 
Rochefort in 175*4-*
He requested in 1757 the position of "ordonnateur" at 
Marseille. However, he was appointed "ordonnateur" of Louisiana 
the following year and was promoted to "commissaire general".30 
With the exception of Le Normant, former "ordonnateur" of 
Louisiana, his superiors never gave him outstanding recommendations. 
Even Le Normant*s recommendation is subject to qualification. 
"Rochemore," said Le Normant, "has much uprightness and probity,
^"Memoire du roi pour servir d'instructions aux Srs. 
Kerlerec gouverneur et de Rochemore commissaire de la marine
ordonnateur de la Louisiane," Versailles, 1758, AC, C13A*40.
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enjoys work, has depth and reason, and is the right man to analyze
a situation and put it in order. Yet he is not fully trained in
this but will become a very capable subject to the service of the
colonies."31 On the other hand, the evaluations by other superiors
are far from flattering. "He has," De Givry thought in 1751»
"enough intelligence to be capable, but having neglected to apply
himself to his work, he is today too old to learn and consequently,
will never be anything but an uninformed fconmissaire' .',32 de Ruis'
evaluation is slightly more optimistic:
Rochemore entered His Majesty's service with high 
birth and some finesse, capable of reasoning, and 
action but it seems that up to now he fails to 
apply this which leads me to believe, he will never 
advance. It's a pity that a man of high birth, 
common sense, intelligence, and worthy of 
consideration is stagnating in inferior positions 
and renders no service to the king. Undoubtedly, 
the fault is his but his superiors must also bare 
the blame. If we had wished to utilize him 
appropriately, we would have profited from his 
talents; thus, most of the time the best plants 
bear no fruits which results in a considerable 
loss to His Majesty's service. However, it is a 
question of repairing the wrong. I will hold him 
responsible for the minor details, insist on their 
exact execution, and thus make him worthy of 
advancement, unless he shows bad will which I do 
not expect.33
These reports are borne out by the trouble Rochemore caused 
Kerlerec, a topic which is the subject of Chapter IV.




The seventh "commissaire ordonnateur" of Louisiana was 
Jean Jacques D'Abbadie.34 D'Abbadie was born in 1726, at which 
time his father held the position of principal "conmis" of 
marine. In a note, in his own handwriting, D'Abbadie stated that 
he completed his studies at the College of Harcourt in July, 1742. 
From there he went to Rochefort, where he entered the marine as a 
scribe. He was promoted to principal scribe in the main office at 
Rochefort in 1743 and in 1744 worked in the masts workshops. In 
1745 he was on the expedition in the Antilles under the command of 
the Count of Gue. A year later the English captured him while 
serving in the squadron of the Marquis of la Jonquiere. In 1756 
D'Abbadie, with the rank of "commissaire" of marine, was on an 
expedition to Canada. Appointed "commissaire general" of the 
marine and "ordonnateur" of Louisiana on December 29» I76I,35 he 
left Bordeaux for the colony in February, 1762. However, after 
two days at sea, he was captured by the English and taken prisoner 
to Barbados. Upon his release three months later, in August,
1762, D'Abbadie returned to France. On March 16, 1763* Versailles 
appointed him comptroller at New Orleans.
Denis-Nicolas Foucault was the last "commissaire 
ordonnateur" of Louisiana serving from May, 1762 to June, 1763,
34See ibid., I67-I68.
^"Manoire du roi pour servir d'instruction au S. D'Abbadie 
commissaire general de la marine ordonnateur a la Louisiane," 
Versailles, January 18, 17&2, AC, Bll4.
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and February, 1765 to August, 1769.36 The son of Francois Foucault, 
president of the Superior Council of Quebec, he was b o m  on December 
15, 1723* at Quebec. At fifteen, in 1738* he entered the office of 
marine in Canada and served under Hocquart. In 17^2, by orders of 
Maurepas, Foucault, then scribe, returned to France on board "The 
Canada" —  a ship constructed at Quebec. In 17^, Foucault was a 
student on board "La Gironde" for the campaign of lie Royale and 
Quebec. After the campaign Foucault returned to Rochefort where 
he received another assignment. Maurepas ordered him to go to 
Brest to serve as scribe on a frigate of forty-eight cannons for 
the campaign to relieve lie Royale commanded by Perier de Salver.
Alter the campaign, the intendant of Brest sent Foucault as scribe 
to the Orient. In 17^7, Foucault was promoted to royal scribe.
Four years later the minister ordered him to Rochefort for the 
campaign of Canada. From 1732 to I76I Foucault was at Rochefort 
under the command of Le Normant de Gevry and de Ruis where he 
worked in different offices. In 1762 Foucault was sent to 
Louisiana as "commissaire ordonnateur" at Mobile under D'Abbadie, 
"commissaire ordonnateur" of Louisiana. However, the latter was 
captured by the English, whereby Foucault, as ordered by Versailles, 
became "ordonnateur" of Louisiana.37 When D'Abbadie returned to 
Louisiana in June, 1763, Foucault was appointed comptroller of
^"Dossier Foucault," AC, E190.
^Choiseul to Foucault, Versailles, January 10, I762, AC, B114.
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New Orleans. With the death of D'Abbadie In February, 1765,
Foucault assumed the functions of "ordonnateur" and remained until 
Aubry arrested him on August 23» 1769 tor leading the revolt 
against the Spanish.38 After his trial, Foucault continued his 
career serving as "ordonnateur" of Pondrechery in 1772,
"commissaire general", "ordonnateur" and acting intendant of H e  de 
France and Bourbon in 1776.
In stannary, the personal data and especially the language 
of the commissions show that none of the fiscal officials described 
above was appointed as intendant of finance, justice, and police. 
However, since much has been said on this point, a brief description 
of the office of "ordonnateur" and the scope of its duties and power 
is appropriate. These functions will be explained in detail in 
later chapters.
The government of French Louisiana had undergone some 
changes during the period from the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 to 
1 7 3 1 . The relatively simple structure of administration was adopted 
to the embryonic state of the colony.38 The year of 1712  introduced 
a number of innovations: a Superior Council was established; the
colony was ceded to Antoine Crozat —  a sudden change in policy for 
Versailles had abandoned the idea of companies in I7IO;40 and the
^"Dossier Foucault."
38Marcel Giraud, Histoire de la Louisiane francaise (3 vols.;
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953"1966), I, 279-
4°Ibid.. 229.
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The move had little result; for the dual authority which had been 
a constant source of conflicts between Bienville and La Salle gave 
way to the same, if not more inflamed, quarrels under the 
administration of La Mothe and Duclos.47 Human nature being what 
it is, there were too many common functions and subordination 
of one type or another.
What about Duclos? Was he typical of the "consnissaires 
ordonnateurs" who followed him? Duclos served as "commissaire" 
of marine at Dunkerque prior to his promotion of "commissaire 
general" and "ordonnateur" of Louisiana in 1712.48 Pontchartrain 
gave him the mission of putting an end to administrative abuses.48 
But Duclos was young and without colonial experience. Furthermore, 
the contentions which caused him to oppose the governor and 
Crozat's agents rendered his mission fruitless.50 His troubled 
administration and the course of his career seem typical of the 
other "ordonnateurs" who followed.
At the end of 1715» Crozat solicited the Count of Toulouse 
to recall both La Mothe and Duclos.51 Delanglez, the Jesuit 
historian, explains this as follows: "In the margin of one of
47Ibid.. 280.
^Henry Plauch^ Dart (introduction) and Albert G. Sanders 
(translation), "Documents Concerning the Crozat Regime in Louisiana, 
1712-1717." LHQ. XV (October, 1952), 589-609.




the first memoirs written on Louisiana shortly after the council 
took charge is the following annotation: 'Above all M M de Lamothe
and Duclos(conmissaire ordonnateur)must be replaced by more capable 
administrators.'"52 Marc-Antoine Hubert replaced Duclos as 
"ordonnateur".53 However, this did not mean the disgrace and end 
of Duclos. Though he would have preferred a post at home, he was 
appointed "commissaire ordonnateur" at Saint Domingue in 1718 and 
remained in office until 1726. That same year, as "commissaire 
general", Duclos performed the functions of intendant. Finally, 
he held the title of full intendant from 1729 to 1735*54
The "ordonnateurs" from Duclos to Salmon, with the 
exception of de la Chaise, were mediocre officials notorious for 
their disagreements with the governor. Hubert, for example, was 
an inauspicious character who set the bad example of systematic 
disagreement with the governor which unfortunately for the growth 
and tranquility of the colony was followed by almost all of his 
successors.55 The Company of the Indies further complicated 
matters. The colonial council, its administrative arm in 
Louisiana, formed in April, 1718, and composed of the directors,
52Jean Delanglez, "Louisiana in 1717*" RHAF. Ill (June, 19^9),
9^.
5a'M4noire du roi pour servir d'instruction au S. Hubert 
commissaire de la marine ordonnateur a la Louisiane," Versailles, 
October 20, 1716, AC, B38.
54Giraud, Louisiane francaise. II, 80; Dart and Sanders, 
"Crozat Regime," 591.
55Villiers, Dernieres annees. 17.
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royal lieutenants, and other high officials of Louisiana, paralyzed 
the action of Bienville, the commander general.56 Besides, by 
acting as a superior court of justice, it abused rather than 
rendered justice. Yet in September, 1720, the Company sent 
Duvergier as "commissaire ordonnateur" with a program of reform.57 
However, this act was to no avail. The system quickly reduced 
the "ordonnateur" to powerlessness.
It was not until Jacques de la Chaise took over as 
"ordonnateur" in 1725 that the long awaited reforms were 
attempted and some abuses corrected, de la Chaise was the only 
"ordonnateur" prior to Salmon who devoted his time and energy 
to the interests of the colony and colonists instead of vying 
with the governor for influence.58 As the nephew of Louis XIV's 
confessor, he had influence at Versailles. But, this honest 
and energetic man wanted to have more order and justice and 
soon came to grips with everyone.58 Be that as it may, 
de la Chaise was the most powerful man in Louisiana of his 
time. More will be said on this subject in Chapter IV.
56Emile Lauvrifcre, Histolre de la Louisiane francaise: 
1675-1939. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 19^0), Jlk;
and Giraud, Louisiane francaise. Ill, 287-296.
^"M&aoire pour M. Duvergier dlrecteur ordonnateur de la 
colonie de la Louisiane concernant les differentes operations qu'il 
est charge de faire pour fectionner les etablissements de la colonie," 
Paris, September 15, 1720, AC, B^2.
58Villiers, Dernieres annees. 23.
58Lauvriere, Louisiane francaise. Jlk.
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The "ordonnateurs" differ in character and ability, but 
the attributes of the office show constancy. Each "ordonnateur" 
received from Versailles a commission of appointment which 
explained his duties and powers and which was presented to and 
registered in the Superior Council. The comnissions differ 
somewhat one from another, but taken together they reveal 
uniformity.60
The "ordonnateurs" of French Louisiana were not appointed 
for any definite term; they held office at the discretion of 
Versailles. Thus, the terms varied.61 Apparently, there was no 
desire to fix the length of the term; for the policy of the time 
was to hold the administrative officers, both at home and in the 
colonies, in complete dependence on Versailles. During the period 
of thirty-eight years (I73I-I769), eight "ordonnateurs" assumed 
the duties of the office in French Louisiana with an average 
tenure of almost five years. Salmon might have remained in office 
longer had he so desired. But, he was the exception. Others were 
recalled by Versailles because of dissatisfaction with their work, 
especially in the realm of finances, or bitter quarrels with the 
governor.
^The format for the attributes of the office comes from 
W. B. Munro, "The Office of Intendant in New France," AHR, XII (1906), 
15-27.
6lTaking the "ordonnateurs" from 1731 to 1769* Salmon held 
office for thirteen years; Le Normant and Michel for four each; 
D'Aubervllle for only one during his first term and five during his 
second; Descloseaux for two years; Rochemore for three; and Foucault 
for one year during his first term and four during his second.
7^
In all cases the "ordonnateur" was sent from France. 
Indications are that the office was not regarded as lucrative; the 
salary was minimal compared to the high prices and cost of living 
in New Orleans and to the heavy responsibility of the office. In 
fact most "ordonnateurs" politely complained of their salary.62
Host of the "ordonnateurs" looked however, upon the office 
as a stepping-stone to a better or higher position in France or in 
a more important colony. Consequently, the more politically 
oriented and career-minded strove to conduct themselves so as to 
gain or retain the favor of Versailles. Besides, the colony 
provided means of gaining wealth by engaging in conmercial 
activities. Those who served well and had family influence at 
Versailles were rewarded by advancing to more prestigious and 
lucrative positions. For instance, Le Normant was promoted to 
the Intendancy of Rochefort.
The wide scope of the duties and powers of the "ordonnateur" 
is somewhat narrowed when placed under the heading of two main 
groups: those us a member of the Superior Council and those as an
independent official. It was pointed out that the "ordonnateur", 
by virtue of a commission of first councillor, presided at the
62The salary of the "ordonnateur" was about 8,000 livres 
per year which was small compared to 16,000 livres for the intendant.
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sessions of the Superior Council. Though possessing a single vote 
in the Council, the "ordonnateur", depending on his ability and 
political acumen, had considerable power over the Council; for 
its members were usually divided into two factions. It was up 
to the "ordonnateur" to gain control of one against the other 
which was military oriented and as such led by the governor. This 
was important, for the support of councillors made for a favorable 
position.
More important, however, were the duties and powers of 
the "ordonnateur" as an independent administrative and judicial 
official; for in this realm he was not a subordinate of the 
governor nor were his actions subject to review by the Superior 
Council. His sole responsibility was to Versailles. Furthermore, 
his correspondence and reports were not scrutinized by the 
governor —  a privilege which Versailles considered important in 
its system of checks and balances, but it permitted quarrelling 
governor and "ordonnateur" to unmercifully denounce each other 
in their correspondence to Versailles. While all the "memoires" 
and instructions emanating from Versailles stressed harmony and 
union between the governor and "ordonnateur" as essential to the 
progress and tranquility of the colony, complete harmony was 
neither expected nor looked upon as desirable.
It was the policy of Versailles to have the "ordonnateur", 
who frequently united with the governor, report on the general 
state of affairs of French Louisiana. These reports, sometimes
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more than thirty closely written pages, covered almost every aspect 
of colonial life. However, as the colony grew in population, 
shorter and more frequent reports on particular aspects of 
colonial life were sent when the opportunity arrived.
Besides his duty of keeping Versailles informed on matters 
of interest in the colony, the "ordonnateur" as an independent 
official was charged with administration, financial, and judicial 
duties, which will be covered in Chapters IV, VII, and VIII 
respectively.
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adjoining the gallery of mlrrora. The aeveral ministers, making 
their way through the crowd of courtiers, entered in turns to 
see the king. Each minister received his instructions from the 
king after pulling out of his large portfolio the small papers 
drawn up by the "commis". Whereas Louis XIV saw his ministers 
several times a week, his successor, Louis XV, a man bored by 
administrative matters, saw them very infrequently. Consequently, 
Louis XV viewed only the major questions, and all details were 
left to the ministers and particularly to the "commis". It could 
not be otherwise in a kingdom of nineteen million people in the 
seventeenth century and twenty-five in the eighteenth. It must 
be admitted that under these conditions absolutism was not 
exercised often.
Because Canada and Louisiana were part of the French 
kingdom during the reigns of Louis XIV and XV, it is important to 
know who these officials were and which role each played in the 
administration of the colonies. It is therefore the Ministry of 
Marine and its officials which must be studied in order to 
understand the management of French Louisiana.
The ministry began with the nomination of Clausse de 
Marchaumont, who received the title of Secretary of State to 
the Marine in 15^7. The marine was at that time responsible 
to the Admiral of France, Henri de Montmorency. After the death 
of the Admiral, Cardinal Richelieu, under the title of Grand 
Master, Chief and Superintendent of Navigation and Comnerce,
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directed the marine and the colonies. With the passing of 
Richelieu, the charge of Admiral of France was reestablished in 
favor of the Duke of Beaufort. But, it was Lyonne who signed 
and gave the orders, as Beaufort was but a bureaucrat. However, 
the actual direction of the marine and colonies was in the hands 
of "commis", for Lyonne, Secretary of State to Foreign Affairs, 
knew next to nothing about the marine. This explains why all 
was done by the "commis". Consequently, their reign dates from 
the infancy of Louis XIV. However, it is impossible to know 
their names since they left no trace of their stay in office.
It is only with Colbert that the officials of the marine begin 
to spring out of the shadow of the minister.
Colbert began to contrive for the control of the marine 
as early as 1665. First, he wanted it under the control of the 
monarch. In fact, for a long time, all the sovereign rights 
—  nomination of officers, maintenance of the fleet, etc. —  
were executed by the admiral. Accordingly, Colbert persuaded 
Louis XIV to appoint the Duke of Vermandois Admiral of France. 
Colbert would have no trouble with this prince since the latter 
was a two year old child.2 It was obvious then that the 
nomination was a move by Colbert to gain control of the marine. 
In 1669 Louis XIV created the office of Secretary of State at 
the Marine and as expected appointed Colbert as its titular
2The bastard son of Louis XIV and Mademoiselle de la Valliere.
80
head. This was the origin of the Ministry of Marine. Henceforth, 
there would be an Admiral of France, but he would have limited 
powers and no control over the ministry, the entire control of 
which would be in the hands of the minister and his "commis".
At first, Colbert had three "commis", of whom is known 
only Clalrambault. However, Colbert, who assumed the direction 
of commerce, consulate and colonies in addition to the marine, 
soon had many officials under him. At his death in 1683, Colbert 
had raised the number of "commis" serving under him to nine.
The reign of the first "commis" who became important 
figures begins with Seignelay, the son and successor of Colbert. 
Later, under the ministers of Louis XV, they will become figures 
of considerable Importance. Under the ministry of Seignelay the 
two first "commis" were Valocieres and Morel-Boistiroux.
Henceforth, the post of first "commis" was occupied by high 
officials with important ranks in the administration of marine, 
commerce and colonies.
With Pontchartrain the ministry was directed by two first 
"commis": La Touche and Salaberry. The number of "commis"
increased proportionately to the Importance of the boards of the 
marine. In 1715, there were four first "commis" and in 1729 there 
were five first "conmis" under whom there were nine second "commis" 
in charge of details. In 17**0, there were eight first "commis" and 
an increasing number of second and third "commis" and secretaries. 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, the ministry was composed 
of eight boards with a personnel of sixty-five "commis".
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Some of the first "commis" served terms of long duration 
and were thus assured dictatorial power over the administration of 
the marine and colonies. For example, Fontanieu was first "commis" 
from 1710 to 1725; Forcade from 1725 to 1738* ai*d Arnaud de La Porte 
from 1738 to 1758.
The title of "commis", which seems modest in modern 
terminology, was not so in the language of the administration of 
the Old Regime. It is comparable to the term of "civil servant" 
as retained by the English. Further, the men who held this post 
were recruited from the nobility and high bourgeoisie.
Certain first "commis" were the masters of both their 
department and minister. As experienced officials, they conducted 
their department and made the decisions. Arnaud de La Porte at 
the Marine and Ticquet at Foreign Affairs were dictators. DuchSne 
observes that all the first "commis" of the Old Regime —  La 
Porte, Forcade, Dubuc, to name a few—  were important men.
Because of their functions, they had an official role, a public 
charge, and were often sub-ministers.3 The first "commis" had in 
their hands the political direction at the ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, War, and Marine. They held the strings of colonial 
politics.4




In general, the first "commis" were well obeyed. At 
Foreign Affairs, Le Dran was a constant inspiration to both 
ministers and king through his historical and diplomatic 
"memoires". At the Marine; Raudot, the younger, inspired the 
colonial politics of Louis XIV and of Pontchartrain. It was 
Raudot who pointed out to the king the strategic importance of 
"lie Royale" for the defense of Canada. When the minister was 
incompetent, the "commis" directed all the affairs. Fontanieu 
swayed Jerome Pontchartrain. Arnaud de La Porte was master at 
the marine and colonies for twenty years. The power of these 
officials lay in their remaining at a post while ministers 
changed. When the Regent replaced the Minister of Marine by a 
Council of Marine under the direction of the Count of Toulouse 
and the Marchal of Estrees in 1715 Fontanieu stayed on as first 
"coranis". At that time the navy was in ruin; the colonies 
neglected. The Count of Toulouse reacted by severely criticizing 
Pontchartrain, who attempted to justify his position by the lack 
of funds. Pontchartrain was reduced to a subordinate of the 
Council of Marine. Fontanieu remained as first "commis" until 
1725. Under Maurepas, who was Minister of Marine for twenty 
years, the "commis" Forcade and Arnaud de La Porte controlled 
everything.
The high position of the "conanis" was further enhanced by 
the nobility of some, the considerable wealth of others, and the 
influence of their families.
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Sometimes a "commls" succeeded his father or uncle; thus 
there were dynasties of "commls" as there were dynasties of 
ministers. Three Phelypeaux were ministers of marine; two 
Pontchartralns, and one Maurepas. Two Clairambaults were 
"commls" of marine, two Pellerln<i, and three La Portes. Some 
often owed their position to other "commls", their patrons. The 
families of "commls" were sometimes connected through marriage.
Certain "commls" were guilty of Irregularities. First 
"commls" of marine Araaud de La Porte Is an example. He used 
his position for business gains In the colonies where the 
lntendants were at his disposal. He protected Bigot, Intendant 
of New France from 17^8 to 1760, and even associated himself with 
him while making sure that denunciations never reached the 
minister. La Porte was eventually dismissed but with a substantial 
pension.
The construction of ships, armaments, and supplies of all 
kinds provided many temptations for personal gain. The following 
bitter reflections are expressed in an anonymous "memoire" which, 
most likely, was written by a naval officer:
"The state can no longer pay its debts; the 
crews are no longer paid. The king is robbed. His 
funds are never usefully employed. What an 
individual would do for 60,000 livres must have a 
zero added to Its price when it concerns the king.
But the evil worsens when instead of good bread 
along with other provisions which cost the king 
dearly, the sailors and soldiers find a mixture of 
dirt, gravel and flour."5
5Quoted in ibid., 1*87.
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To find the source of this corruption, it was necessary to 
investigate the bureau of marine. But no one dared to undertake 
this task. The loss of Canada exposed the scandal and malfeasance 
of Intendant Bigot. Berryer accused him of having lost Canada; 
however, no one dared accuse first "commis" La Porte, who had 
protected his associate Bigot. Living comfortably in retirement 
at the time of Bigot's trial, La Porte remained rich and honored. 
But, in general, the "commis" were honest men.
From Versailles, where they lived near the king and the 
ministers, the powerful "commis" sent out "memoires" and 
dispatches for Canada and Louisiana and received the numerous 
letters from colonial officials. They condensed the "correspondance 
generale" into "r^sum^s" —  "Feuilles au Mimistre" and "Feuilles au 
Roi" —  which Seignelay, Pontchartrain, Count of Toulouse, Maurepas, 
Berryer, and Choiseul used to inform Louis XIV and XV on colonial 
affairs.
The above "expos^" is important. For La Roque de 
Roquebrune shows that the minister of marine or the king did not 
always dictate colonial policies. From 1725 to 1758 two men 
occupied the post of first "commis" of marine: Forcade and Arnaud
de La Porte. Louisiana was under the thumb of these two officials 
during the reign of Louis XV. This is all the more important as 
historians have often accused the king for the neglect and final 
loss of Louisiana. The fact is that historians have attached too 
much importance to the word absolutism. The mechanism of
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governor the management of the colony. The "commissaire 
ordonnateur", as a legal and financial officer, was entrusted 
with public expenditures, exercised certain judicial functions, 
presided over the Superior Council, and, like the governor, 
reported confidential matters to the Minister of Marine.
It can be seen from their instructions that the governor 
and "commissaire ordonnateur" each acted as a check upon the 
other. The system of checks and balances seemed to have been a 
contrivance to control the officials. However, this type of 
system naturally fostered friction between the men concerning 
their respective spheres of power, and from time to time the 
minister had to settle problems of that nature. The constant 
bickering between the governor and "conmissaire ordonnateur" 
disastrously weakened the government of French Louisiana and was 
a reflection of the general condition among the officials of the 
bureaucracy.7
The colony of French Louisiana was divided into nine 
military districts, of which New Orleans, Mobile, and Illinois 
were the main ones.8 Mobile came to control the districts of 
Alabama and Tombechb^e; Illinois, those of Arkansas and 
Natchitoches; and New Orleans, those of Pointe Couple and Natchez.
In the Illinois and Mobile posts, we see the development 
of subdelegates to the "commissaire ordonnateur" and governor.
7Caldwell, "The French," 10.
aIbld.. 12.
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Usually a "commissaire de la marine" acted as a subdelegate to 
the "commissaire ordonnateur", while the highest ranking military 
officer acted as a deputy to the governor.8
The army was the main force of the governor for the 
defense of Louisiana and the maintenance of the administration. The 
number of troops was not large. The "m&noire" of 17^6 on Louisiana 
has the number of troops at 900*1,0 The most Louisiana had at one 
time was about 2,000 which occurred between 17^0 and 175 *̂ On 
February 1 J , 1 7 5 0 , the Minister informed Governor Vandreuil and 
"commissaire ordonnateur" Michel of an increase in troops. 
Twenty-four new companies would leave France in July, 1750 to join 
the thirteen already in Louisiana, totalling thirty-seven.11 
Since each company was composed of 50 soldiers and four officers12 
the number of French troops in Louisiana would be increased to 
about 2 ,0 0 0 .  This number along with the 150 Swiss troops would 
give a grand total of about 2 ,1 5 0  men. However, the new emphasis 
on the defense of Louisiana was ephemeral. One company was 
suppressed in 175^13 and another in 1759*14
9Ibid.
l0"M^molre sur l'etat de la colonie de la Loulsiane en 17^6," 
New Orleans, AC, C13A30.
Iln0rdonnance du roi portant augmentation dans les troupes de 
la Loulsiane," Versailles, September 2 0 ,  1 7 5 0 , AC, B91; and Rouille 
to Vaudreuil and Michel, Versailles, February 13, 1750* AC, B91.
l2Ibid.
l3"0vdonnance pour la suppression d'une des 57 compagnies
francalses entretenues a la Loulsiane," Versailles, January 30, 175^, 
AC, B99-
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What was the reason for this increase? Fregault and 
Gayarre attribute it to the influence of Vaudreuil at Versailles. 
An official's influence, or his lack of it, can throw light on the 
colonial mechanism both at Versailles and in French Louisiana.
More will be said on this subject later. But, returning to the 
reason for this new emphasis, here is how Gayarr^ explains it:
During the year 1751» the colony found Itself in 
a better state of protection that it had ever been.
This evidently proves the power of the Marquis at 
court; for more had been done for him than for any 
of his predecessors. His salary was greater than 
that of any preceding governors; and he had under 
his orders two thousand regulars....
This increase of troops and expenses was 
received as a demonstration that the French govern­
ment intended to push on the work of colonization 
with more energy than it bad previously done, and 
with the expectation of better results. But it 
was a mere transient effort; that it had not 
originated in any deep laid and settled plan, or 
any firm resolve in a perservering course of 
action; and that it was, either the offspring of 
accidental and ephemeral determination from those 
in power, or of personal consideration and 
favoritism. Whatever may have been the cause of 
this unusual grant of protection to Louisiana, the 
events which followed in a few years, prove it to 
have been one of those fitful, apparent revivals 
of strength and health, which frequently precede 
the last agonies of death.15
The increase in troops, though substantial, should not 
overshadow the fact that the thirteen companies already in 
Louisiana were in need of replacements. In addition, sickness
l4"0rdonnance du roi portant la suppression d'une des 56 
compagnies francaise entretenues a la Loulsiane," Versailles, November
1, 1759, AC, B109.
l5Gayarr4, Louisiana. II, 55"56.
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and desertions took their tolls.10
The military officers were appointed by the king, usually 
upon the recommendation of the governor.17 Whether it was to 
increase his "coterie" of supporters in the colony or to gain the 
support of some influential family, the motivation was for 
personnal advancement. However, in most cases officers were 
recommended upon the solicitation of influential family members.
In this area as in others of the colonial administration, politics 
was the norm.18 Consequently, promotions were not always regular 
nor were they necessarily based on seniority and merit.10
In addition to regular soldiers, the colony had a militia 
officered by men commissioned by the governor. It included all 
the able-bodied men of the colony, but in general was poorly 
equipped and trained. There were never enough arms and powder 
for the regular troops, much less for the militia. Most of the 
dispatches from Louisiana to Versailles include a plea for 
additional arms, powder, and uniforms.20 In a letter dated 
December 1, 1751, "commissaire" Salmon complained that the
ieThe dispatches from Louisiana contain many references to 
desertions.
l7Caldwell, "The French," 12.
l8Ibid.
l9Ibid.
^Innumerable examples of this could be cited from Series
C13A.
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soldiers were naked.21 Though an exaggeration, his complaint was 
constantly made throughout the French period.
On the whole the morale and discipline of the troops were 
deplorable. Although there were many reasons underlying this 
problem, the main one rested in the type and source of the men 
sent to Louisiana as recruits. One must conclude from reading 
the letters of the governors and "comnissaires ordonnateurs" from 
1731 to 1763 that Versailles sent convicts and rejects from 
France and her other colonies to Louisiana. Bienville was 
critical of the troops sent to serve under his command: "Troops?
Instead of soldiers we have deplorable recruits, dwarfs, thieves, 
useless mouths dependent on the care of the colony who will 
render nothing in return."22 "Ordonnateur11 Michel will add:
"People picked up in the streets and, more often than not, 
bandits."23 Governor Perier reluctantly confessed that his troops 
usually fled at the first shot from an Indian gun.24 He suggested 
that, if Negroes were not such a valuable property, it would be 
better to have them on the battlefield as soldiers, for they, at 
least, were brave men.25 Salmon and Perier writing in common
2lSalmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 1, 1731, AC,
C13A13.
^Quoted in Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 11(0; and Bienville to 
Maurepas, New Orleans, June 28, 1736, AC, Moreau de Saint M^ry, F3 2k.
23Quoted in Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 140; Michel to Rouill^, New




alluded to Bienville's comaents. They pointed out that many of the 
men sent to Louisiana were too weak to serve as soldiers on the 
battlefield and could only serve as patients in the hospital. The 
money spent for their transport was wasted and so was the cost of 
their substanance in Louisiana.28 In 1755 Governor Kerl&rec wrote 
despairingly that his troops, besides nunbering only 1,229 French 
and 164 Swiss, had been recruited for several years from soldiers 
rejected by the governors of Saint Domingue and Martinique.27
It is no wonder the colonists constantly and bitterly 
complained of the lack of discipline of the troops. The officers 
were accused of living on their plantations; their subordinates 
had taverns and the others spent the day in small "cafes" and the 
night at gambling.28
Governor Kerlerec wrote on October 28, 1757. that "the 
increase of twenty-four companies which the king sent to this 
colony, being composed of deserters and vicious characters, have 
done more harm than good. A part deserted, another lives in 
debauchery, and the rest, which is fortunately a small number, is 
today more dangerous to the colony than the enemy."29
26Perier and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 7, 
1731. AC, C13A13.
^Villiers, Dernleres ann^es. 69.
28Fr4gault, Vaudreuil. 140.
^Quoted in Villiers, Dernieres ann^es. 78.
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The number of desertions Increased constantly, especially 
In the remote posts.30 However, lack of supplies, food, regular 
pay, bad living conditions and the prevailing practice of 
quartering troops with the colonists led to many Irregularities 
and contributed much to the problems of morale and discipline. 
Almost innumerable examples such as these could be cited and 
supported by letters, dispatches and "m&noires"; but suffice it 
to conclude that discipline was deplorable In French Louisiana and 
the main cause lay in the types of recruits sent to serve in the 
army. Probably, there is no better example of French neglect of 
Louisiana, whether through lack of concern and interest or 
incapability. Some reforms were attempted. In I7M 1 Governor 
Vaudreuil suggested shifting the posts' garrison yearly. But, 
this was considered too expensive to execute. Another attempt 
was made in 17^6 to minimize abuse in payments of the troops 
especially in the more distant posts.31
The actual rulers of the colony, except when interferred 
with from Versailles, were the governor and "conanissaire 
ordonnateur". However, to assist them in the administration of 
the colony, the crown created a Superior Council32 the nature 
and development of which is interesting in view of the many
3°Maurepa8 to Vaudreuil, Versailles, April 26, 17^5, AC, B8l; 
Kerl^rec to the Minister, New Orleans, January 28, 1797* AC, Cl^A^O.
3lCaldwell, "The French," 14.
^'Copie des lettres patentee pour l'^tablissement d'un conseil 
superieur a la Loulsiane pendant trois ans," Versailles, December 23, 
1712, AC, A22; and Dart, "Legal Institutions," 7^-78.
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contradictions surrounding it and the assumptions by historians 
concerning its duties and importance.
The Superior Council, the legal arm of the administration 
of French Louisiana, was created in 1712 for a period of three 
years. This marked the beginning of civil government in French 
Louisiana in contrast to the purely military rule of the preceding 
period.33 The Council was made permanent in 1716,34 was 
reorganized in I7I9 to acconanondate the Company of the West,35
and was reorganized once again in 1751- based on the Edict of
1716.36 Therefore, the Edicts of 1716 and 1731 *re basic to the
structural study of this institution and except for the
provision of four councillors instead of two in the Edict of 
1731 and the addition of assessors to the Council in August 17^2, 
the form established by the Edict of 1716 remained until the end 
of French rule in Louisiana. It is by analysing the period from 
1731 to 1763 that a true picture of the duties and functions of 
the Superior Council comes to light; for the functions which it 
exercised prior to 1731* especially under the control of the
33James D. Hardy, Jr., "The Superior Council in Colonial 
Louisiana," in McDermott, Frenchmen. 87*
34Dart, "Legal Institutions," 82.
35Ibid.. 86.
36"Projet de lettre patente en forme d'edit concernant 
1'etablissement du conseil superieur de la Loulsiane," Versailles, 
October 1, 1731, AC, C13A13* This document includes a stannary of the 
Edicts of 1712, 1716, and 1719*
9^
Company of the West, are not indicative of its true purpose and 
functions. This will be brought out below.
The Superior Council was composed of resident councillors 
appointed by Versailles by virtue of a commission, sometimes for 
life, upon the nomination of the governor and "commissaire 
ordonnateur".37 Usually chosen from leading colonists, the 
councillors were rich by the standards of colonial Louisiana and 
"were friends of the local administration.,,3e However, in August, 
17^2, Versailles issued a general edict permitting the governor 
and intendant or "ordonnateur" of the French colonies to appoint 
assessors to assist the superior councils. Henceforth, these 
officials served as judges in certain cases and were permitted to 
vote on some decisions in case of a tie.30
37ks stated in the general instructions to the governors and 
"ordonnateurs". For more specific references see "Memolre du roi aux 
Srs. Vaudreuil gouverneur et Salmon commissaire ordonnateur de la 
Loulsiane," Versailles, October 22, 17^2, AC, B7^J Perier and Salmon 
to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 5* 1731» AC, C13A13* Bienville 
and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, September 15, 1733* AC, CI3AI6; 
and Henry Plauche Dart, ed., "Appointment of Members of the Superior 
Council of Louisiana in 1762," LHO. XXI (July, 1938). 669-670.
38Hardy, "Superior Council," 87* note U.
38Henry Plauch^ Dart, "The Office of Councillor*Assessor in 
the Superior Council of Louisiana in the French Regime," LHQ. XV 
(January, 1932)* 117-119* As early as 1733 Bienville and Salmon 
had recommended assessors to help in handling the work of the Superior 
Council. See Bienville and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, October 
15, 1733, AC, C13A16; and Caldwell, "The French," 15.
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The "commissaire ordonnateur" preaided over the Council 
by virtue of his commission of first councillor, or presiding 
judge.40 The above point Is Important. The comnission of 
"commissaire ordonnateur" did not automatically Include the title 
of first councillor; he needed a commission for this position or 
title. The "coomlssaire ordonnateur" or any other official 
commissioned as first councillor ruled cases of first instance, 
but not of appeal. The latter appeared before the Council.41 
It was in such cases on which the councillors voted. "By 
stipulating," an author asserts, "that the First Councillor was 
not to issue judgments in the last resort, the king made it 
possible for the people of Louisiana to appeal the decisions of 
the Superior Council to a higher court In Canada or France."42 
This statement is not born out by the instructions to colonial 
administrators. The Superior Council judged cases of appeal, 
and its judgments were final.
Associated with the Council was a lawyer, the "procureur 
general",43 and a clerk, "greffier", who was also a notary. Neither 
had a vote in the Council.44 Sometimes other officials participated
^Dart, "Appointment," 117.
4lGiraud, Loulsiane francaise. I, 280.
4%Iicelle, "Superior Council," 93* note 25*
^Attorney general.
^'Projet de lettre patente...l'etablissement du conseil 
superieur," Versailles, October 1, (?), 1731* AC, C13A13* and Dart, 
"Legal Institutions," 82-83*
96
in the sessions of the Council, such as the sheriff and his 
deputies, attorneys for vacant estates, agents for the Company of the 
Indies, the keeper of the king's warehouse, subdelegates of the 
"comnissaire ordonnateur", and post officers.45
Because it is important historically and is basic to the 
understanding of the structure, purpose, and mechanism of the
Superior Council and invariably to dispel some errors surrounding
it, the Edict of September 18, 1716, is reproduced:
We have by our letters patent of December 18,
1712, for the reasons therein stated, established 
a Superior Council in our Province of Louisiana to
administer Justice to our subjects during the
period of three years, commencing from the day of 
the first session, and as we have judged that it 
was conducive to the good of our service and to 
the interest of said Colony, we... have ordered 
and decreed that the Superior Council established 
in our said Province of Louisiana shall in the 
future perform the same functions as it has in the 
past, and accordingly we have created and 
established, and do by this edict perpetually and 
irrevocably establish and create the same in 
conformity to those of the others of our Colonies.
It shall be composed of the Govemor(our 
Lieutenant General)of New France, of the Intendant 
of Justice, Police and Finance to said country, of 
the Particular Governor of the said Province of 
Louisiana, our first councillor, our Lieutenant, 
and two of our Councillors, a Procureur General 
and a Clerk, granting power to the said Council to 
judge in the last resort all suits and differences, 
civil as well as criminal, instituted or to be 
instituted, between our subjects in said Province, 
and this without costs. They shall assemble 
themselves on certain days and hours, at such place
45See "Records of the Superior Council" in LHQ.
4eTran8lated by Henry Plauch^ Dart in "Legal Institutions,"
82-81*.
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as shall be deemed by them most convenient, at 
least once a month, and all judgments rendered by 
said judges shall be executed In the same manner 
as the decrees of our courts and Superior Councils; 
provided that the same shall be rendered by not 
less than three judges in civil matters and 
prohibiting them from judging criminal matters 
except by five judges.
Our said Council is permitted in case of absence 
or legitimate excuse of the judges established by 
these presents, to call in their lieu and stead 
such persons as they shall believe the most 
capable of performing the functions of judge, 
provided that the requirement as to three judges 
in civil matters and five judges in criminal 
matters shall always be observed in order to 
give effect to the judgments.
Our Governor Lieutenant General in New France 
shall preside over said Council, and in his absence 
the Intendant of Justice, Police and Finance, and 
in the same order the particular Governor of the 
said Province of Louisiana, the first Councillor; 
our Lieutenant and the two councillors shall 
preside in case of absence of the others.
Nevertheless, the Intendant of Justice, Police 
and Finance, of New France, even though the 
Governor Lieutenant General be present at the 
Council and presiding over the same shall assemble 
the opinions, receive the vote of those present and 
pronounce the judgment, and he shall have the same 
advantages and perform the same functions as the 
First President of our Courts; in case of the 
absence of the Intendant, our First Councillor 
shall exercise the same right, notwithstanding it 
be presided over by our said Governor, conferring 
upon our said First Councillor the functions of 
judge of first instance, such as the fixing and 
breaking of seals, inventories, and other 
provisional matters. In the absence of the 
Intendant and of the First Councillor, the oldest 
in point of service of our said Councillors shall 
perform the same functions that we have conferred 
on the said First Councillor.
Our Procureur General to the said Council shall 
have power to perform, without exception, all the 
other functions of our other Procureurs General(s) 
in our Courts and Councils and the said Clerk shall
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keep a register of all judgments rendered by our 
said Council and of all that shall be done and 
ordered by our said First Councillor in his 
capacity as first judge. Done at Paris, Sept.
18, 1716.
The subordination of the governor, "commissaire ordonnateur", 
and Superior Council to the authorities of New France, as seen in 
the edict, had no practical effect. The distance separating the 
two colonies guaranteed their independence.47
The specific duties of the Superior Council were judicial.
It was empowered "to judge in the last resort all suits and 
differences, civil as well as criminal, between the subjects of 
the colony."48 As a court, the Superior Council performed several 
functions. Its spectacular side, the administration of civil and 
criminal justice in the first instance and on appeal, was brought 
out in the above edict. Its silent and all pervading side was 
that it was charged with notarial and registry functions.48 The 
notaries50 of the Superior Council were required to file or 
register marriage contracts, deeds, mortgages, wills, property 
transfers, and other documents, papers and agreements necessary
47Giraud, Loulsiane francaise. I, 280.
^"Projet de lettre patente...l'etablissement du conseil 
sup^rieur;" and Dart, "Legal Institutions," 83.
^Henry Plauch^ Dart, "A Criminal Trial Before the Superior 
Council of Louisiana, May, 1747," LHQ, XIII (July, 1930), 367.
5°See W. K. Dart, "Ordinance of 1717 Governing Notaries in 
Louisiana During the French Colonial Period," LHQ. X (January, 1927), 
82-85; and Dart, "Legal Institutions," 84-85.
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to establish rights and protect property.51 Any contract, whatever 
its nature, when registered in the Council "made the beginning of 
proof of the same under the rule of evidence prevailing at that 
time."52 Moreover, all decrees, ordinances, edicts, commissions, 
and letters of patent from Versailles had to be registered. Thus, 
the Superior Council, through its notaries, became the center of 
civic activities in French Louisiana.53
That the Superior Council exercised judicial and 
administrative functions cannot be questioned; what is 
questionable, however, is its legislative function alluded to 
by some authors.54 The Records of the Superior Council seem to 
indicate that the local or police regulations were initiated by 
the "commissaire ordonnateur", the "procureur general", and the 
governor through the Superior Council which had to register these 
regulations.
In an article, Plauch^ Dart explains that at first, 
particularly after 1719> "the Superior Council exercised
5lDart, "Criminal Trial," 367.
52Ibid.
53Ibid.
54Hardy, "Superior Council," 87-101, does not specifically 
assign legislative functions to the Superior Council. This is not the 
case with Micelle, "Superior Council," 85-IO7. However, "It does not 
appear," Dart wrote in 1919» "that the power of legislating was 
conferred on these Councils, and it is not specified in our Edict of 
1712, nor in any of the subsequent amendments. They had the power and 
exercised it to make local or polic regulations, but the Edicts and 
orders emanating from France not infrequently trenched(sic)on this 
also." See Dart, "Legal Institutions," 80.
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administrative and legislative powers to a considerable extent, 
but was at all times predominantly a judicial body...."55 Plauch^ 
Dart is correct, but fails to explain why. As it was stated above, 
the functions which the Superior Council exercised prior to 1731* 
especially under the control of the Company of the West, are not 
indicative of its true purpose and functions. The Council was 
organized to accommodate the Company's representatives who did 
legislate through the Council. Furthermore, the Company of the 
West was granted the political and commercial direction of 
Louisiana. In fact, quoting an author, "in return for the 
Company's financing of the large debt of the monarchy, the king 
conceded for a period of twenty-five years the ownership of all 
the lands of Louisiana together with the whole administrative 
system of the colony, even control of the military establishment."56 
It is no wonder then that the Superior Council exercised legislative 
powers. However, with retrocession in 1731 the Council reverted to 
its true purpose and functions.57 Micelle does not agree; he 
insists that the Council continued to exercise legislative 
functions. Chambers, in his multi-volume history of Louisiana 
concluded that the Superior Council was not a lawmaking institution;
55Dart, "Assessors," 117-119*
5^lichelle, "Superior Council," Qfi,
^This point is often overlooked.
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it was "a purely judicial body".58 One author dismisses Chambers' 
conclusion by stating that "•■%*? acceptance of Chambers' conclusion 
has prevented historians of Louisiana from realizing the true 
significance of the Superior Council in the history of the colony."59 
Some authors have failed to realize the import of pertinent 
factors: (l) that the mere registration of ordinances and
regulations is not a sign of legislative power; (2) that the local 
or police regulations were initiated by the governor, "commissaire 
ordonnateur" as first councillor, and the "procureur general";60 
(3) that the word "suffrage" (vote) in the instructions to the 
governor and or "commissaire ordonnateur" with reference to the 
Superior Council refers to justice and not to legislature; and 
(1*-) the sources of the laws for Louisiana. The main sources of 
the laws for both New France and Louisiana stemmed from the same 
family.61 In New France, they were the following: (a) the edicts
and declarations from Versailles; (b) the ordinances and regulations 
from the governor, lieutenant general and intendant through the 
Superior Council and registered by the latter; (c) the "Coutumes 
de Paris"; and (d) the judgments of the Parliament of Paris on 
questions arising from the "Coutumes de Paris" and the decisions
58Henry E. Chambers, A History of Louisiana (3 vols.: Chicago
and New York; The American Historical Society, 1925), I, 122.
59Micelle, "Superior Council," 86.
^See "Records of the Superior Council" and the general 
correspondence between New Orleans and Versailles.
6lDart, "Assessors," 117-119*
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of the Superior Council of New France and judgments of the Council 
of State in France on colonial questions. These legal sources may
Ibe applied to Louisiana but with some variations. The legislative 
power of the governor and "commissaire ordonnateur" of Louisiana 
was very limited. While these officials could issue ordinances,
French Louisiana remained fairly free from local legislation of 
the nature which afflicted New France.62
However, because of the constant bickering between the two 
ambitious officials, the Superior Council came to perform another 
function —  one which had not been prescribed nor intended. It 
came to play a role in the system of checks and balances.
Before assuming the roles of governor and "commissaire 
ordonnateur", officials were informed of the situation and their 
respective duties and functions. The instructions show very few 
differences throughout the colonial period. In fact, the 
instructions dispatched to French Louisiana from Versailles differ 
little from those dispatched to the top officials charged with 
administration in any of the other colonies. The instructions 
embraced five principal areas: religion, justice, police,
military, and Indians. In the light of this, the "M^moire du roi 
pour servir d'instruction aux Srs. Vaudreuil gouverneur et Michel 
commissaire general de la marine, ordonnateur a la Loulsiane"
62Ibid.
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is singled out as indicative of all the others sent to Louisiana. 
Because the "m&Bolre" is necessary to understand the mechanism of 
the administrative system, it is presented below.
His Majesty has resolved to explain to Vaudreuil 
and Michel his intentions on the principal parts of 
the colonial administration entrusted to their 
care. However, before entering into details, His 
Majesty is pleased to observe that they must concur 
reciprocally in order to maintain unity and live in 
harmony, persuaded that nothing is more vital to 
the good of His Majesty's service, than the growth 
of the colony, and the peace and tranquility of the 
settlers.
The division which has reigned from time to 
time between the chiefs of the colony is sufficient 
proof of this necessity. His Majesty knows that, 
with the zeal and prudence of Vaudreuil and 
Michel, he will be satisfied with their attention 
on this matter.
Difference of opinion must not cause any 
dispute between them. When they will not agree on 
a matter, His Majesty wants a report of their 
respective reasons. However, if the disputed 
matter is urgent and cannot wait for His Majesty's 
orders, the governor's will shall prevail.
Since the undertakings on their conmon and 
particular functions can occasion arguments between 
them, His Majesty has judged it appropriate to 
explain their particular and conmon functions and 
strongly recomnends exact conformity.
All which regards the military and the dignity 
of command is the sole concern of the governor.
The governor will order the troops and militia and 
see to their discipline and readiness when called 
upon to serve. For this effect, he must be kept 
informed by the officers of the condition of their 
troops and even enter into details with them over 
their responsibility in maintaining strict 
discipline. Furthermore, he must see to it that 
the officers commit no injustice, such as with­
holding flour and pay, against their soldiers; and 
if an officer is found guilty of such, the governor 
must punish that offender independently of the 
restitution ordered by the "ordonnateur".
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His Majesty maintains In the colony a total of 
800 men: thirteen French companies of fifty men
each and I50 Swiss soldiers of Karrer Regiment.
As to the French troops, His Majesty provides for 
the necessary recruits. These recruits have been 
considerable up to now and His Majesty hopes that 
Vaudreuil will pay particular attention to reduce 
the number of them as much as possible. For this 
he must prevent abuses in connection with the 
military discharge which he will grant to sergeants 
and soldiers of his troops. He may grant a military 
discharge to those only who are unfit for service 
or who desire to settle in the colony. However, in 
connection with the latter, a discharge will be 
accorded to only those sergeants and soldiers, who 
by their talents and conduct, have the potential 
of becoming good farmers and contributing to the 
growth of the colony by actually settling in the 
colony rather than using their discharge as a way 
out of it. But, in order not to weaken the 
companies, His Majesty has fixed the number of 
discharges at two per company each year. This 
will add per year twenty-six settlers who 
successively will strengthen the colony and 
increase production. His Majesty commands 
Vaudreuil not to exceed this number. In addition, 
His Majesty has made appropriate arrangements for 
the quartering of soldiers and commands Vaudreuil 
and Michel to carry out these arrangements.
All the details connected with the militia 
concern the governor, who is informed of His 
Majesty's intentions on this subject.
The governing of the Indians is also the 
particular concern of Vaudreuil and requires a 
singular attention on his part, especially in the 
face of the present contingencies.
Fortification, when it involves projects, is 
another particular concern of the governor. But, 
when His Majesty will have approved them 
[fortifications] the execution will be the common 
endeavor of the governor and "ordonnateur".
Such is also the case with artillery, which is 
the particular concern of the governor when it 
comes to destination and destribution; however, 
the measures taken for its maintenance and 
conservation is a joint endeavor of the governor 
and "ordonnateur".
These then are, in general, the parts which 
particularly concern the governor. His Majesty 
will explain his intentions on those which are of 
special interest to the "ordonnateur" before going 
into details on what concerns them in common.
The administration of capital, supplies, 
ammunition, and generally all which pertains to the 
warehouses and treasury of the colony are the sole 
concern of the "conmissalre ordonnateur". No 
payment, sale, nor consumption will be made without 
the consent of the "ordonnateur". If however, 
Vaudreuil decides on an extraordinary expense for 
the service of the colony, His Majesty commands 
Michel to order it; but he commands Vaudreuil to 
make such expense only in case of absolute 
necessity and to report on his motives.
Michel must in addition provide Vaudreuil, upon 
request, with an inventory of supplies and 
ammunition in the warehouses along with the docket 
of the treasury in order to keep the governor 
informed of such matters. It is also the duty of 
Michel to render an account to the attorneys of 
vacant estates and to all those who may be charged 
with recovery in the colony. Vaudreuil must not 
interfere unless requested by Michel.
The administration of justice is the particular 
concern of the "commissaire ordonnateur". Vaudreuil 
must not interfere with the administration of 
justice except when his aid is needed in executing 
its judgments. However, the governor must at all 
times give all the necessary assistance in this 
area as expressly ordered by His Majesty.
Concerning the officers of justice, Vaudreuil 
and Michel will jointly render an account of their 
conduct and submit names for replacements in case 
of death or resignation. But, what concerns 
Vaudreuil in particular is to see to it that the 
administrative military officers give the judicial 
officers the respect due their office and to have 
the settlers maintain the same. Futhermore, His 
Majesty wishes that the councillors in the Superior 
Council of New Orleans have complete freedom in 
their suffrage. However, this council must not 
interfere directly or indirectly in the governing 
and general administration of the colony, His 
Majesty having entrusted it as part of his 
authority only to render justice to his subjects.
106
The land concessions along with the 
contestations which can arise on limits, size, 
location and boundaries are the joint concern of 
the governor and "ordonnateur".
The administration of the colony concerns the 
governor and "ordonnateur" in conmon. It embraces 
three principal domains: the increase in popu­
lation, the cultivation of the soil and the 
carrying on of commerce.83
From the above "m^moire", it would seem that Versailles 
dispatched very detailed Instructions in order to avert all 
unforeseen disputes between the governor and "commissaire 
ordonnateur".64 However clear these instructions were, they 
seldom improved the relationship between the two top officials 
because these instructions were too precise, too detailed, and 
subordinated the governor to the "commissaire ordonnateur" or 
vice versa even for the least of matters.85 This, along with 
slow communication and personal ambition, seems to be the key 
which explains the constant quarrels between the two. For 
example, in the instructions above, fortification is the 
particular concern of the governor when it involves projects. 
However, after royal approval the execution is a joint endeavor 
between the governor and "conmissaire ordonnateur". One sees a
83"M^moire du roi aux Srs. de Vaudreuil gouverneur et Michel 
de la Rouvilliere commissaire general de la marine ordonnateur de la 
Loulsiane," Versailles, December 23, 17̂ *8» AC, b8T-
64Villiers, Dernleres annees. 88.
85Ibid.. 89.
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similar arrangement with regard to artillery. These are only two 
examples of many that could be cited.
The drawbacks of this system of dual authority in 
governing colonies were common knowledge to officials in Versailles. 
An anonymous undated "m^molre" concerning the government of Saint 
Domingue and most likely written in the 1750's, seems to describe 
the situation of Louisiana. For that matter, it seems descriptive 
of the colonial administration as a whole:
" ...The present government of the colonies is 
one of dual authority. It is defective by nature.
Here are the drawbacks which necessarily ensue 
from its nature. The most striking is the diversity 
of ideas in the authority entrusted in two persons.
If they do not agree, everything is in abeyance and 
authority becomes useless. Anarchy reigns.
Versailles foresaw this and by fault allowed that 
in case of a difference of opinion, the governor's 
will shall prevail. The cure is as bad as the evil.
To avoid anarchy despotism is allowed. In fact , to 
become the sole arbiter of the colonial government, 
he must always oppose the Intendant. This system 
of government is defective to the point of self- 
destruction. ..
" ...If the governor dominates the intendant, the 
government is military; if, to the contrary, the 
intendant dominates, it is financial —  equal evils 
which bring about the ruin or stagnation of 
colonies. The worst disorder, not realized as 
such because it appears as good, occurs when the 
two top colonial officials yield to the will of one 
or the other. Then, all is lost; guided by their 
personal interests, they open a wide area for the 
satisfaction of their cupidity, sacrificing their 
enemies while rewarding their supporters... ,,ee
66Ibid., for both the comnent and "m^moire".
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There Is no better evaluation of the situation. For it 
was impossible to have at the same time and in the same colony 
two equally honest and capable administrators.67 This is 
especially true in Louisiana. Some authors attribute the 
stagnation of Louisiana to lack of stable institutions and a 
coherent administration.68 Rather, the answer is found in the 
colonial system itself.60
Conflict of personalities played a very disruptive role 
in French Louisiana because it was ever present between military 
and civilian officials whom the French government had invested 
with twin powers.70 The reason for this conflict lies not in 
French Louisiana but, rather in Versailles, in the mechanism of 
the colonial administration and its effects on colonial officials 
in the New World. This mechanism comes to light when the position 
of the governor in colonial days is examined.
A governor ran into problems with each administrative 
move, and contradiction awaited him at every turn. The governor 
was a part of a complicated mechanism —  the colonial 
administration —  the wheels of which adjusted themselves into a
^Ibid.
eaMicelle, "Superior Council," 87.
^ It must also be pointed out that the poor quality of settlers 
in Louisiana certainly contributed to the stagnation of the colony.
70Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 202; and in many 'Wmoires" and 
instructions sent to colonial administrators.
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totality of influences, more or less secret, of personal 
faithfulness, and of carefully maintained opposition. At the summit 
of this mechanism stood the Minister of Marine, generally reached 
only through the intermediary of the first "commis" to the colonies.
It was essential for the governor to court both, giving the former 
unlimited submission which included the long explanations and 
eloquent justifications and showing the latter a zealous respect 
which confirms reciprocal services. The bureaucratic system 
enforced by the Minister of Marine required colonial officials to 
keep constantly in touch with him through "m&noires", reports, and 
censuses. For it was the policy of the time to keep the two top 
colonial officials independent in their own spheres and when 
disagreement occurred, as it often did, the matter was settled 
at Versailles; and when it persisted, the usual remedy was 
recall —  the only recourse dictated by the poor and slow 
communication of the time. Below the governor, worried 
subordinates struggled to maintain or enhance their position.
This situation made it necessary to watch over their conduct 
while retaining their allegiance and dealing tactfully with their 
patrons. Everywhere present, always captious and often hostile 
loomed the intendant, or "conmissaire ordonnateur" —  civilians 
who would not have reached these offices without considerable 
support.71 Villiers, who apologizes for belaboring the point,
7lSee Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 271*
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explains that the constant Impulse of the "ordonnateur" to 
counteract the governor was an absolute system.72 This will be 
brought out below In the relationship between the governor and 
"commissaire ordonnateur". At any rate, everything led the high 
magistrate (intendant or "commlssalre ordonnateur") to oppose 
the action of the governor. This fact, more than any other, Is 
what shaped the colonial government and gave It Its character.
The motives behind the nominations, conflicts, cliques, successes, 
failures, and advancements of and even the relationship between 
the governor and "commlssalre ordonnateur" were conditioned and 
as such explained, to a great extent, by the characteristics of 
this mechanism. If a study on colonial administration ignores 
this point, it leaves much to be desired.
All the top colonial administrators found themselves at 
one time or another in the predicament of defending their 
position: the "commlssalre ordonnateur" because he manipulated
large sums and directed an army of subordinates who often used 
their position to profit from commercial activities; the governor 
because he possessed many powers and nominated commanders to posts 
where trade was carried on by the military officers. Each accused 
the other of malfeasance and corruption and was suspected of 
complacency because esprit de corps caused them to protect their 
subordinates.73 However, with family Influence at Versailles
72Villiers, Demiferes ann^ds, 2k.
73Pr4gault, Vaudreuil. 205.
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and political acumen In the colony, a governor or "commlssalre 
ordonnateur" survived and advanced In the system. A similar 
mechanism existed In the respective colonies but on a much 
smaller scale. The factions In the Superior Council created 
by the governor and "ordonnateur" were effects of this mechanism. 
That the system of dual authority by a military governor and a 
"commlssalre ordonnateur" should have worked can only be ascribed 
to the mechanism of the colonial administration.
That the colony of Louisiana was governed from Versailles, 
there is no doubt. The New World influenced the old and affected 
the diplomacy and dictates of Versailles. But when all is said 
and done, the rigidity of the colonial system, once established, 
developed a momentum of its own; and the colonial administrators 
who would not play the role of puppets did not advance far in 
the bureaucracy. Some played their role well, others did not.
Some were adept in the use of their personal diplomacy in the 
colony and their influence at Versailles, others were not.
Although the nature of the relationship of the two 
officials has been outlined, a detailed examination of this 
aspect of the colonial regime should be undertaken. Accordingly, 
the relationship between the "comnissaire ordonnateur" and the 
governor.during the administration of Governor Vaudreuil, 17^3 
to 1732, is singled out for the following reasons: first, it
was the most prosperous administration; second, in terms of 
relationship it was average when compared to both extremes,
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Salmon and Perler and Rocheoore and Kerl&rec; third, it provides 
a clear picture of the workings of the colonial system; fourth, 
the issues which were seemingly constant bones of contention were 
accentuated with Michel and Vaudreuil; and fifth, both the governor 
and "commlssaire ordonnateur" had influential family ties at home.
C H A P T E R  V
AH EXAMP IE OF THE REIATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE "COMMISSAIRE ORDONNATEUR" AND THE GOVERNOR
Governor Vaudreuil did not agree with his "ordonnateurs" 
any better than his predecessors had. The administrative history 
of his government was marked by sterile disputes and unjust 
reproaches carried on successively by Salmon, Le Normant, and 
Michel.1 At any rate, perhaps as an indication of his political 
acumen, Vaudreuil was appointed governor general of New France 
in 1752 after a stormy period in Louisiana.2
"Ordonnateur" Le Normant and Vaudreuil disagreed in the 
worst possible manner. They disagreed on almost all the matters 
which required joint collaboration and denounced each other 
vigorously.3 Le Normant, who had much more experience than 
Vaudreuil, adopted the irritating but effective system: "Let
others do what they may without desisting from your rights and 
go your own way whatever may be said."4 Here was the secret of
1Villier8, Dernleres ann^es, 2J>-2k.
2Ibid., 27.
^r^gault, Vaudreuil. 272; and Vaudreuil to Maurepas,
New Orleans, October 30, 17^5* AC, C1JA29.
Quoted in Fr4gault, Vaudreuil. 272.
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his strength. Yet the two men kept at all times a polite 
attitude though lacking cordiality in their relations.5
However with Michel, commissioned "ordonnateur" and 
first councillor in January, 17^7, to succeed Le Normant, even 
this cold urbanity disappeared. As Michel frankly admitted, 
the "scuffle" soon erupted. This time Vaudreuil emerged 
victorious, the more skilful.6
At first Michel and Vaudreuil cooperated. However, 
within a few weeks Michel began his harangues against Vaudreuil. 
What had happened? There were no quarrels since two parties 
are required for a dispute and Vaudreuil chose to remain silent. 
What vexed Michel the most was his Inability to give grandiose 
receptions as Vaudreuil did:7 "Vaudreuil, who receives more 
than I from the king, would hardly survive if the war had not 
provided him the means to develop a considerable holding which 
permits a comfortable living."8 He did not yet accuse Vaudreuil 
of misappropriation. This will come later and with anger. For 
the moment, Michel contented himself with Imitating the 
governor. He worked a small farm but without success.9 His
5Ibid.
°lbid.; and Michel to Rouilll, New Orleans, September 15 
171*9, AC, C13A3h.
7Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 278.




mother-in-law, aware of hla fallings, had foreseen it. "It Is 
perhaps, dear son, that you lack as much managerial ability in 
Louisiana as you did in New France, for the one who replaced 
you is very successful while you could only spend."10 She 
reminded him on another occasion: "Know, dear son, that we
placed you where you are now to set your affairs in order and 
not to reform the governor."11
The first major area of friction involved Membrede, a 
prot^g^ of Governor Vaudreuil. Membrede was appointed major of 
New Orleans on the recommendation of Vaudreuil. The post gave 
him a seat in the Superior Council. According to Michel, the 
major took over the police of New Orleans and instilled a 
great fear among the colonists of the capital city.12 The 
"ordonnateur" accused him of imprisoning and holding inhabitants 
in jail for weeks and assuming despotic authority. Furthermore, 
Michel complained to the Minister of Marine that Membrede and 
Vaudreuil dominated to the point of rendering an "ordonnateur" 
useless in the colony.13 However, the "ordonnateur" soon 
dropped his feud with Membrede and concentrated on bigger 
game —  the governor. Michel accused him of keeping the 
"ordonnateur" in the dark on administrative matters, claiming
10Quoted in ibid.
11Ibid.
laMichel to Rouill£, New Orleans, September 15, 17^9>
AC, C13A51*.
13Ibld.: and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 280 and 282.
that he should play a role In the governing of the Indians and 
therefore, should attend the Indian assemblies convened by the 
governor. Desperate, Michel wrote the Minister In 17^9 that he 
felt the most exasperating part of the whole situation to be 
the lack of attention given the "commlssalre gindral" and the 
attempt to deprive him of his functions and rights granted by 
the crown.14 In order that he might correct this slight to 
himself and to the king, Michel asked for additional power, 
which would leave no doubt as to his authority and functions.15
Early in 1751* Michel was once again at odd with 
Membrede whom he accused of venality and with Vaudreuil whom 
he again reproached for not consulting him on the governing 
of the Indians.16 In addition, the "ordonnateur" attacked 
Captain Tisserant who commanded the Illinois convoy in 17^6•
It seems that while en route, Tisserant had mysterious 
expenses and delivered less rum than had been boarded on his 
bateaux.17 It is not known whether or not these accusations 
were well founded. However, in 17^9, Tisserant was again 
givea the command of the convoy. The convoy was retarded 
and to justify himself, Tisserant insisted that unforseen
l4Ibid.
l5Michel to Rouill^, New Orleans, September 15, 171*9, 
AC, C13A54.
l0Michel to Rouill4, New Orleans, January 17, 1750,
AC, C13A31*; and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 282-283.
l7Ibid.
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obstacles Impeded his march. Michel disagreed. The main 
obstacles, according to Michel, were the constant drinking 
bouts engaged In by the commander, his soldiers and the 
colonists who accompanied him. This time the accusation was 
not ignored. The Minister assured Michel his accusations 
would not jeopardize his position and ordered Vaudreuil to 
punish Tisserant. To his surprise, the governor declared the 
"ordonnateur" was the only one who complained of Tisserant.18 
What is curious and perhaps an indication of his insecurity is 
that Michel joined Vaudreuil in defending the captain.18
At any rate, Versailles received Michel's denunciations 
in the usual manner. At that time, Rouill£, having succeeded 
Maurepas who was exiled on April 2ht 17^9> was Minister of 
Marine. Vaudreuil had always enjoyed the protection of 
Maurepas.20 Roullll was anxious to show the governor that the 
marine was in new hands and therefore severely reproached 
Vaudreuil for the lack of discipline of his troops and the 
abuses by post officers, matters which Michel had often called 
to the attention of Versailles. Rouill^ blocked the advancement 
of Membrede, whom Vaudreuil had proposed to command at Illinois.
laFr^gault, Vaudreuil. 283-28U; Michel to Rouill^,
New Orleans, January 22, 1750, AC, C13A3**-; Rouilld to Michel, 
Versailles, September 26, 1750, AC, B91; and Surrey, Commerce,
295-296.




At the same time Michel was reprimanded for defending Tisserant 
after having exposed him.21 Michel, who had complained about 
the lack of honors which the governor allowed the troops to 
give him, was told by Roulll^ that these honors were nevertheless 
superior to those normally due an "ordonnateur".22 As to 
Michel's quarrel with Membrede, the Minister remarked that if 
the "ordonnateur" had acted in a different manner, the governor 
would have put Membrede in his place.23 Finally, to Michel's 
insistence on sharing the government of the Indians, the 
Minister answered in a biting tone: "You must know better
than any one else that in colonies with an Indian population, 
the governors alone govern them... You have no right to be 
present at the councils which the governor holds with the 
Indians.1,24
These rebuttals did not stop Michel. He continued 
his attacks on Membrede and Vaudreuil while initiating others.
21Ibid., 285; Vaudreuil to Rouilld, New Orleans,
September 28, 17^9 > AC, C13A33; and Rouill^ to Vaudreuil, 
Versailles, June 11, 1750, AC, B91.
22Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 286; Rouill4 to Michel,
Versailles, November 23, 1750, AC, B91; and Rouilld to Michel, 
Versailles, September 26, 1750, ibid. However, Michel continued 
to complain about the lack of honor due his office. See for 
example Michel to the Minister, New Orleans, May 22 and 29,
1751, AC, C13A35.




His hostility toward Vaudreuil became systematic.25 Who was to 
blame for this hostility? In the final analysis it can be said 
that both must bear the fault, but Michel's was the greater.
At times, each had acted alone in matters which demanded joint 
action. Michel demanded powers which were not prescribed to 
"conmissaires ordonnateurs". However, his main liability was 
his lack of tact. In the end Vaudreuil maintained his position, 
and was even promoted to a higher office. Vaudreuil, as it 
was pointed out above, had influential support at Versailles 
and knew how to use it advantageously in dealing with his 
opposition. Michel had similar influence at Versailles but 
gambled it away by constantly making blunders and petty 
accusations. In ignoring the first accusations of Michel,
Vaudreuil showed ability, an ability which he probably learned 
through his contact with Le Normant. On many occasions,
Madame B^gon, who knew the interests of her son-in-law, advised 
him to gain the friendship of Vaudreuil and, if need be, 
sacrifice something to gain it.20 Living at Rochefort permitted 
her to stay abreast of the politics in the "bureaux" of the 
navy. She had great designs for the future of Michel's 
children who lived with her at Rochefort. But the foolishness 




lack of wisdom could ruin him along with others.27 "You 
bitterly complain about trifles... I preach nothing less than 
to sacrifice everything in order to get along with Vaudreuil 
whose influence is greater than ever."20
Madame B^gon even confided in Le Normant, former 
"commissaire ordonnateur", who sympathized with Michel; however, 
he too, advised prudence especially in letters to Versailles at 
a time when fusses about trifles were less tolerated. Le 
Normant even tried to influence the Minister in favor of his 
successor. In addition, the Influential Rostan, a top naval 
official at Bordeaux, promised Madame Bdgon as much.29
All this advice and these efforts in his behalf 
Irritated Michel to the point of accusing his mother-in-law of 
siding with Vaudreuil's family. He retorted that the governor 
was not as powerful as he appeared. After all, his only 
support was La Porte. As if this was not enough. La Porte 
was the powerful first "comnis" of the Ministry of Marine and 
directed the administration of French colonies in the New World.30
At this opportune moment Vaudreuil decided it was time 




30Ibid.; and La Roque de Roquebrune, "La direction,"
blO-kQ8.
121
silence. The occasion Is admirable for It shows Vaudreuil's 
political acumen.3(1 The governor declared to Rouilll on 
May 8, 1751» that he had not encroached on the powers of the 
"ordonnateur". To the contrary, desiring to please and for 
the sake of peace, Vaudreuil allowed the "ordonnateur" to 
encroach on the functions of the governor to the point of 
reproach from the home government. For example, on February 1, 
1750, Vaudreuil signed In concert with Michel an ordinance 
on the emission of treasury notes. As expected, the crown 
expressed Its displeasure when It learned that the colonial 
administration had resorted to an expedient which, not long 
before, had plunged the finances In disarray and the colony In 
a state of uneasiness. But, protested the governor, "the notes 
were already made and ready to circulate In the public, a fact 
which I could not ignore."32 Worse still, the "ordonnateur" 
had already drawn up his ordinance and when the governor 
objected, he was told that it would be posted with or without 
the governor's signature. In consideration for Michel and in 
order to prevent a general public mistrust in a paper money not 
validated by the governor, Vaudreuil lent himself to an operation 
of which he disapproved.33 "It Is not my intention," Vaudreuil
^Frdgault, Vaudreuil. 293* and Rouill^ to Vaudreuil 
and Michel, Versailles, November 23, 1750* AC, B91.
^Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 293» Vaudreuil to Rouill^, New 
Orleans, May 8, 1751* AC, C13A35; and Surrey, Commerce. 138-lto.
^Ibld.
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added, "to write a litany of complaints against Michel; 
however, it Is my duty to inform you that the 'ordonnateur' 
wants his will done in all matters and sole authority...."34
Vaudreuil then refuted Michel's accusation. He 
affirmed that he had informed the "ordonnateur" of the 
expedition to Santa Fe before its departure. Far from 
objecting then, Michel recognized its utility.35 This said, 
Vaudreuil attacked in his turn. Michel's negligence in 
supplying the posts provoked desertions, and his bad will 
complicated the governing of the Indians. On the information 
furnished by Michel, the home government had reproached 
Vaudreuil for having allowed some officials to run into debt 
to the amount of to,000 livres. The Minister, accordingly, 
ordered the governor to force these officers to make 
restitution or be thrown in jail. "Very well," answered 
Vaudreuil. "But, who made these advances? It was not the 
governor, for he did not have the right nor did he assume it. 
The irregularity was committed without his knowledge." It 
seemed that Michel and his subordinates attempted to gain 
popularity and support by giving these advances.36
34Vaudreuil to Rouill^, New Orleans, May 8, 1751» AC, 
C13&35; and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 293-29to
35Rouill^ to Michel, Versailles, October 2, 1750, AC,
B91; Rouill^ to Vaudreuil, ibid.; and Vaudreuil to Rouill^, New 
Orleans, May 8, 1751, AC, C13A35-
30Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 29to295» and Vaudreuil to Rouilll, 
New Orleans, May 11 and 12, 1751, AC, C13A35*
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Yet quarrels went on. Vaudreuil had assigned Duplessy 
to command at the English Turn. The officer quarrelled with 
the keeper of the warehouse. Duplessy, being drunk, Ill-treated 
the store-keeper Carrifere. Michel Immediately sided with Carri^re, 
his subordinate; and of course, Vaudreuil defended his own 
appointee.37 The disagreement which this incident occasioned 
not only pitted the two top officials one against the other, 
but also set the civil establishment against the military.
Michel raged while Vaudreuil remained silent: "The governor
is the golden calf adored by all."38 Michel attacked everybody, 
even his colleagues in the Superior Council, whom he branded as 
ignorant. Here was an example of the role played by cliques in 
the administrative system. Worse still, according to the 
"ordonnateur", the military dominated the Superior Council 
through the governor, the major and the governor's favorites.39 
To Michel, the root of all abuse in the posts was Vaudreuil and 
his wife: "There is no doubt that the governor has a third of
[Tombecb^] to his profit in addition to all the other [[posts].
No one doubts this here..."40 Michel claimed that the posts
^Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 297; Michel to Rouilli, New 
Orleans, May 15 and July 15, 1751* AC, C13A35* and Gayarr4, 
Louisiana. II, 57.
38Michel to Rouill£, New Orleans, July 15, 1751* AC,
C13A35.
39Ibid.; and Gayarr£, Louisiana. II, 57.
4°Fr4gault, Vaudreuil. 302-303* Gayarr^, Louisiana. II, 
57-61; and Michel to Rouill^, New Orleans, July 15, 1751* AC, 
C13A35.
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commanders were either Canadian supporters, relatives, or allies
of the governor.41 Vaudreuil did not deny this. But what about
his adversary? Was Michel an eye witness to this? That the
"ordonnateur" was deeply hostile to the governor Is difficult to
deny.42 Frigault's description of Michel Is interesting:
Extremely vain, bulging with superficial 
importance, jealous of the power, prestige and 
well being of Vaudreuil, imbued with a civilian 
prejudice against the military, moved by a 
sickly ambition, extremely suspicious and 
driven by his first denunciations, he 
desperately had to cast grievances and more 
violent accusations in order to secure his 
situation.43
Michel seemed never to lack motives in his endeavors to discredit, 
expose, and disgrace his colleague.44 In the process, the 
"ordonnateur" jeopardized his career. Fleuriau, the powerful 
"procureur g^n^ral", denounced Michel's pride: "I believe that
his pride is an incurable sickness and makes him forever furious."45 
When Kerl&rec became governor of Louisiana in 1752, he commented 





45Fleuriau to Roulll£, New Orleans, February 1, 1752,
AC, C13A36.
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Kerl&rec confided to Rouill^, "that kept you uninformed about 
matters which you should have known."46
Where It Is possible to verify Michel's assertions, one 
finds that his only source was gossip picked up from the streets 
of New Orleans.47 At any rate, no one confirmed what Michel 
alleged. This suffices for one to abstain from placing too much 
emphasis on Michel's testimony. This Is Villlers conclusion.
The long harangues of Michel were but "unjust reproaches" and 
"sterile disputes".46 What then of Michel's accusations of 
Vaudreuil: the doubtful honesty of the post commanders; the
lack of discipline of the troops, and the favoritism toward the 
Canadians in Louisiana? Vaudreuil was a Canadian patriot and 
did not hide it.48 As to the lack of discipline among the troops 
and their officers, the governor knew of its existence and 
regretted it. If he did not succeed in eliminating this problem 
any more than his predecessors had, it was undoubtedly because 
it was an inherent part of the administrative structure of French 
Louisiana, a sparsely populated colony in which the military 
element represented an excessive force. In considering this
4eKerl^rec to Roulll^, New Orleans, March 8, 1753» AC,
C13A37; and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 305*
47Ibid.
^^r^gault, Vaudreuil. 306-307; an<* Villiers, Dernleres 
armies, 2k.
46Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 307.
lamentable situation and Vaudreuilfs handling of It, the type 
of recruits supplied to French Louisiana cannot be Ignored. As 
mentioned previously, the recruits, far from being the pick 
of the army, were often the dregs. It Is true that post 
commanders abused their position. This was so, before and 
after Vaudreuil, in Louisiana as well as in New France.50
Caught In an impossible situation Michel was the 
object of an imperial mechanism which functioned but whose 
inefficiency was clear.31 When compared to that of his 
antagonist, the stature of Vaudreuil rose above the system.
The man, in the end, is worth more than the system of which he 
is a product.52 Vaudreuil left his mark on French Louisiana.
Though exaggerated, the following is Gayarrl's review of Vaudreuil1 
administration.
The administration of the Marquis of Vaudreuil 
was long and fondly remembered in Louisiana, as 
an epoch of unusual brilliancy, but which was 
followed up by corresponding gloom. His 
administration, if small things may be compared 
with great ones, was for Louisiana with regard 
to splendor, luxury, military display, and 
expenses of every kind, what the reign of 
Louis XIV had been for France. He was a man 
of patrician birth and high breeding, who 
liked to live in a manner worthy of his rank.
Remarkable for his personal graces and 
comeliness, for the dignity of his bearing and 
the fascination of his address, he was fond of
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poop, show and pleasure. Surrounded by a host 
of brilliant officers, of whom he was the Idol, 
he loved to keep up a miniature court, In 
distant Imitation of that of Versailles; and 
long after he had departed, old people were 
fond of talking of the exquisitely refined 
manners, the magnificent balls, the splendidly 
uniformed troops, the high-born young officers, 
and many other unparalleled things they had 
seen In the days of the Great Marquis. 3
Though the governor and "commlssalre ordonnateur" were often 
at odds, they did agree on certain matters such as those connected with 
public administration.
s^Gayarr^, Louisiana. II, 66.
C H A P T E R  V I
THE "COMMISSAIRE ORDONNATEUR" AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
The French crown considered agriculture and commerce the two 
most Important features of colonial administration.1 But above all, 
commerce preoccupied France at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century. It was the surest means for the growth of a colony since 
only commerce could interest France in the colonial task.2 However, 
Louisiana or any other colony could not play a role in the French 
imperial design without constant care from the mother country.3 
As a "commlssalre ordonnateur" explained in a "m£molre" on 
Louisiana, "colonies should be considered according to their 
service to the state but exploitation proceeds from their firm 
establishment, the number and industry of the settlers, crops and 
production and should be to the mutual advantage of the state and 
colonies."4 The French government understood this but only
1See for example "Mdmoire du roi aux Srs. Perier gouverneur 
et Salmon commlssalre ordonnateur a la Louislane," Marly,
May 22, 1731, AC, B55.
2Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. I38; and Maurepas to Bienville and 





to the point of choosing between immediate and long range 
Interests.5
Upon resuming control of Louisiana in 1731> the French crown 
was unable to send enough ships to trade with the colony. Hence, 
it planned to attract merchants by offering gratifications of 
forty livres per ton for the shipment of certain goods but eventually 
reduced this amount to twenty.6 The government made other attempts 
to induce French merchants to trade with the colony; and on 
August k, 1731, the French crown exempted for a period of six 
years merchant ships from transporting troops and weapons and 
declared the commerce of Louisiana open to all French subjects.7 
However, the desire to establish a profitable commerce was not 
enough. Other elements were needed to make commerce with Louisiana 
profitable. The colony needed settlers to engage in agriculture 
and Negro laborers to cultivate the soil. The French government 
realized this and believed that by providing the colonies with 
enough settlers and Negro slaves, commerce might be augmented to 
the volume of engaging 1,000 ships for carrying the American trade. 
"Such was the spirit of France when Iouisiana, for a second time, 
became a crown colony."8 The crown reflected this optimism in
5Ibjd.. 138-139.
Surrey, Commerce, 77.
7Frigault, Vaudreuil, 139* and Maurepas to Perier,
Versailles, January JO, 1731* AC, B55*
8Surrey, Commerce, 169.
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its Instructions to Governor Bienville and "commlssalre ordonnateur" 
Salmon in 1752«0
In the vocabulary of eighteenth century France, "police 
g4n4rale" signified general administration of the colony which was 
the joint concern of the governor and "commlssalre ordonnateur" 
and embraced three principal areas: population, agriculture and
commerce.10 Since Louisiana attracted few settlers, there was 
not much which could be done to increase the population of the 
colony except by releasing soldiers desirous of becoming settlers 
and by keeping those already in the colony. Accordingly, the 
Minister of Marine urged Governor Bienville to treat the colonists 
humanely and to protect them against any vexation from military 
officers and soldiers. Turning to "commlssalre ordonnateur"
Salmon, Maurepas expected his fiscal and judicial officer to minister 
to the needs of the inhabitants, facilitate their settlements, and 
most importantly, protect the weak from exploitation by the 
powerful and prevent the officers of the Superior Council from 
abusing their authority.11
The soil of Louisiana was suitable for the growth of several 
crops. Unlike that of New France, whose soil yielded no product
e"M^moire du rol pour servir d'instructions aux Srs. 
Bienville gouveroeur et Salmon commlssalre ordonnateur a la 
Louisiane," Marly, February 2, 1732, AC, B57.
10See for example ibid.
11Ibid.
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which could not be grown In France, Louisiana offered goods which 
the mother country needed.12 Therefore, the French crown oriented 
the agriculture of Louisiana not only toward a subsistence economy
1 Abut toward exports. For in Louisiana, agriculture meant commerce. 
The cultivation of sugar had yet to succeed in the colony by 1732, 
"perhaps," wrote the Minister, "because of the choice of land or 
the climate is unfavorable. Be that as it may, the soil can 
yield other crops capable of as much profit when in sufficient 
quantity for export."1'* Indigo for one was of high quality but, 
unfortunately, the settlers had abandoned its cultivation. The 
Minister strongly recommended to Bienville and Salmon to revive 
indigo production while he waited lnqpatiently for their report 
on the progress of the settlers to whom Salmon had distributed 
indigo seeds.15 Rice grew bountifully in French Louisiana. In 
1732, it was part of the diet of the colonists. The Minister 
noted that rice could be of great assistance in times of crisis 
and when flour from France was found wanting. In view of this,
l2DuchSne, Politique colonlale. 92; and Frigault, Vaudreuil.
138.
1 ̂ r^gault, Vaudreuil. 138•
14"M^moire du roi pour servir d'instructions aux Srs. 
Bienville gouverneur et Salmon commlssalre ordonnateur & la 
Louisiane," Marly, February 2, 1732, AC, B57; and "M^moire du 
roi aux Srs. Vaudreuil gouverneur et Salmon commlssalre ordonnateur 
de la Louisiane," Versailles, October 22, 17^2, AC, B7̂ -«
l5Ibid.
Maurepas urged Bienville and Salmon to continue its cultivation.16 
This was not the case with wheat, whose cultivation failed in 
lower Louisiana. Accordingly, the French crown discouraged its 
being planted in lower Louisiana. Besides, the inhabitants could 
be supplied by the Illinois province where wheat was a considerable 
success.17 Versailles regarded cotton and silk production as 
potentially important articles of trade and recommended the governor 
and "commlssalre ordonnateur" to give more attention to these two 
as the population increased.18 Because flax and hemp grew very 
well in Louisiana, the Minister noted that they "may be equally 
profitable both to the colony and commerce" and hoped that "the 
result of the test made on hemp and flax will motivate the settlers 
to develop this industry."19
The French government was pleased with the pitch production 
at Mobile. Salmon had taken steps to estimate the quantity which 
might be produced yearly. While the Minister waited for the 
"ordonnateur's" report, he ordered Bienville and Salmon "to impress 
upon the colonists the commercial importance of this industry."20 
To test its quality and in view of a market, Salmon shipped two
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hundred barrels of pitch to Rochefort. As France had an interest 
in developing the industry of Xouisiana as well, Maurepas 
instructed the colonial administrators to urge the settlers to 
exploit the Louisiana forests where timber for construction of 
ships and houses was plentiful. "This enterprise is all the more 
important," the Minister added, "since it could develop into a 
coastal trade between Louisiana and the French islands."21
As described in Chapter I, tobacco was both the main 
article of trade and a barrier in the way of the diversification 
of crops. The French crown recognized this: "Since His Majesty
realizes that the colonists have devoted their energy to the 
tobacco crop with great success and at the present regard it as 
the only source of livelihood, he has decided to favor it."22 
Thus, the crown fixed the price at which the farmers-general were 
to purchase Louisiana tobacco: thirty-five livres per 100 pounds
during 1732-1733; thirty livres during 173^-35; twenty-seven 
livres, ten sous during 1736-37; and twenty-five livres during 
1738* Needless to say, Versailles ordered Bienville and Salmon 
to send only good quality tobacco to France.23
21Ibid.; and mo ire du roi aux Srs. Perier gouverneur
et Salmon cotmnissaire ordonnateur & la Louisiane," Marly, May 22, 
1731, AC, B55-
22"M£moire du roi pour servir d'instruction aux Srs. 
Bienville gouverneur et Salmon commlssalre ordonnateur a la
Louisiane," Marly, February 2, 1732, AC, B57.
23Ibid.
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The third main area of colonial administration was commerce, 
an area the French government felt was essential to the growth of 
French Louisiana.24 The French crown took many steps to revive 
commerce In 1731-32 and expended considerable energy to promote 
the growth of the colony.25 The Minister reasoned that the 
duty-free comnerce between France and Louisiana, the gratifications 
and bounties, the profitable trade venture of the first ship 
which returned to the colony, and the assured tobacco market would 
make It feasible for other French merchants to supply the colony's 
needs.26 To attract French merchants to Louisiana, Maurepas 
instructed Bienville and Salmon to protect their commercial 
activities and provide all the facilities for the sale and pay­
ment of their wares.27
24See for example ibid.; "Mdmoire du roi aux Srs. Perier 
gouverneur et Salmon commlssaire ordonnateur & la Loulsiane," 
Marly, May 22, 1731> AC, B55; Maurepas to Bienville and Salmon, 
Versailles, September 2, 173^> AC, B6l; "Mlmoire du roi aux 
Srs. Vaudreuil gouverneur et Salmon commlssaire ordonnateur 
de la Loulsiane," Versailles, October 22, 17^2, AC, B71*; 
and Maurepas to Vaudreuil, Versailles, November k, 17^8,
AC, B87.
2^Surrey, Commerce. 176.
2a"M£moire du roi pour servir d'instruction aux Srs. 
Bienville gouverneur et Salmon commlssaire ordonnateur a la 
Loulsiane," Marly, February 2, 1732, AC, B57; Surrey, Commerce, 
177; Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 138-139; Gayarr^, Louisiana. II. 62; 
and "M^ moire du roi aux Srs. Perier gouverneur et Salmon 
commlssaire ordonnateur & la Loulsiane," Marly, May 22, 1731>
AC, B55.
27"Mimoire du roi pour servir d'instruction aux Srs. 
Bienville gouverneur et Salmon commlssaire ordonnateur & la 
Loulsiane," Marly, February 2, 1732, AC, B37.
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In its endeavor to attract French merchants to Louisiana, 
the French government foresaw no better inducement than the 
development of commerce with the Spanish colonies, for this under­
taking would be equally advantageous to both French merchants and 
colonists because of the considerable amount of money which this 
trade would involve.28 Though Louisiana was seldom in a position 
to do so, it supplied Pensacola, when possible, with merchandise 
and even with food until the agents of the Conpany of the Indies 
drove the Spanish from Louisiana.20 Among the many tasks of 
Governor Bienville and "ordonnateur" Salmon was the one of 
reestablishing trade between Pensacola and Louisiana. It appeared 
that in 1732, the governor of Pensacola was inclined to renew 
trade with the French colony since he had recently dispatched a 
ship to Mobile for provisions.30 "Bienville and Salmon" advised 
the Minister, "must take advantage of this and other opportunities 
for the purpose of renewing commerce."31
French commercial design went beyond Pensacola. It was 
Maurepas*s intention that the colonial administrators "must not 
limit their plans to commerce with Pensacola, but must also eye 







aware of Bienville's former contacts at Havana and Vera Cruz and 
was convinced "that the Spanish would send ships if Louisiana 
would designate a place for them to load speedily the desired 
supplies without publicity." The French crown knew full well that 
the Spanish would not take it upon themselves to trade at 
New Orleans.33 The belief was that corruption among Spanish 
officials would facilitate commerce with New Spain in spite of 
the legal restrictions.34 However, Maurepas warned that French 
merchants would not ship to Louisiana any goods suitable for the 
Spanish trade unless they were assured of a market.
What was the state of commerce between Louisiana and the 
French Islands? For one thing, Versailles envisioned a coastal 
trade between the two.33 For the realization of this enterprise, 
Louisiana needed to build ships to trade in lumber with the
^Ibid.
34Surrey, Commerce. 588; and Maurepas to Bienville and 
Salmon, Versailles, September 8, 1753* AC, B59»
35,,M^moire du roi pour servir d'instructions aux Srs. 
Bienville gouverneur et Salmon commlssaire ordonnateur & la 
Loulsiane," Marly, February 2, 1732, AC, B57.
33"Mdmoire du roi aux Srs. Perier gouverneur et Salmon 
commlssaire ordonnateur a la Loulsiane," Marly, May 22, 1732,
AC, B55, Maurepas to Salmon, Marly, May 22, 1731, AC, B55, 
Maurepas to Salmon, Versailles, August 21, 1731, AC, B55» 
Maurepas to Bienville and Salmon, Versailles, September 8, 1733, 
AC, B59; "Mdmoire du roi pour servir d'instruction au S. Salmon 
commlssaire de la marine ordonnateur & la Loulsiane," Marly,
May 19, 1731, AC, B55, and "M^molre du roi aux Srs. Vaudreuil 
gouverneur et Salmon commlssaire ordonnateur de la Loulsiane," 
Versailles, October 22, 17^2, AC, B7^«
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French islands. This would be of great advantage to the colony, 
for lumber could be exchanged for syrups, sugar, rum and other 
goods.37 The Minister believed that "if the colonists of 
Louisiana undertook this venture, the French islands would 
reciprocate and soon the commercial Interchange would benefit 
both."38 The French envisaged a still more lucrative trade in 
livestock, horses and mules which brought a dear price in the 
Antilles in 1731*30 However, the crown realized that the 
colony was not disposed for such an adventure in 1732; but 
Maurepas explained, "Louisiana has extensive prairies for 
grazing, and it is probable that the colonists will undertake 
it after Bienville and Salmon itqpress upon them its potential."40
However, the ensuing years, except for the short period of 
prosperity during Vaudreuil's administration, revealed that the 
optimistic plans of the French crown in 1732 and the energy applied 
by the governors and "commissalres ordonnateurs" did not 
materialize as expected. In 17^, Louisiana was near starvation;
^"M^moire du roi pour servir d'Instructions aux Srs. 
Bienville gouverneur et Salmon comnissaire ordonnateur a la 
Loulsiane," Marly, February 2, 1732, AC, B57.
^Ibid.
30Ibid.; and "M^moire du roi aux Srs. Perier gouverneur 
et Salmon commlssaire ordonnateur & la Loulsiane," Marly, May 22, 
1731, AC, B55-
^"M^molre du roi pour servir d' instruct ions aux Srs. 
Bienville gouverneur et Salmon commissalre ordonnateur & la 
Loulsiane," Marly, February 2, 1732, AC, B57.
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flour was sold for as much as 565 llvres a barrel and at times 
could not be bought at any price.41 If "ordonnateur" Le Normant 
had not found rice in 17^5> the government would have been unable 
to feed the troops.42 The farmers totally neglected their land 
which yielded some tobacco and even less indigo of poor quality.43 
The colonists were discouraged for lack of trade. The colony, 
without stable markets, was withering away. The economy of 
Louisiana, based on exotic goods, had to have exports.44 Louisiana 
had to find markets to survive. Rightly so, the French crown, 
in a move to ease the situation somewhat, thought of opening the
French market to such Louisiana products as flax, hemp, and
pitch but at lower prices. The home government also agreed to 
receive tobacco, indigo and rice.45 However, Maurepas hoped that 
French ship owners would organize the commerce or still that 
Louisiana would construct its own merchant marine, for France was 
on the verge of war.46 The colonial administrators of Louisiana
^Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 585* Le Normant to Maurepas, New 
Orleans, December 26, 17^-, AC, C15A28; and Maurepas to Vaudreuil,
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were left to fend for themselves in rebuilding the ruined colony 
in I7M1. First of all, Governor Vaudreuil and "conmlssaire 
ordonnateur" Le Normant had to relnstill in the colonists the 
will to work. However, it was not enough to energize the 
colonists; they needed an orientation.47 The governor and 
"conmlssaire ordonnateur" pointed to agriculture, industry and 
commerce. But, the lack of tools and capital quickly dampened 
their industrial hopes such as mining. However, the timber 
industry was more or less successful;46 for, although the samples 
shipped to Rochefort were of low quality and high price, France 
continued its purchases due to the demands of the royal shipyards.48 
From 17^5 to 17^6, Louisiana exported more than 18,000 livres 
worth of wood and more than 20,000 livres of pitch and tar.60 In 
spite of this partial success, colonial industry remained 
secondary; and the colony was forced to depend on its agriculture. 
Because indigo was profitable, the governor and "ordonnateur" 
encouraged the large planters to increase its production. In 17^, 
Vaudreuil boasted that because of his efforts, many colonists 
were intent on doubling their production.61 Le Normant, who opposed
47Ibid.
4aHenry Plauch4 Dart, "The Career of Dubreull in French 
Louisiana," L H &, XVIII (April, 1935), 279; and Fr^gault,
Vaudreuil.
48Maurepas to Vaudreuil and Salmon, October 22, 17^2, AC, B7^»
^^r^gault, Vaudreuil. 589*
^Vaudreuil to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 29, 17Mf,
AC, C13A28.
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Vaudreuil on many points, wrote in 17^9 that indigo cultivation, 
begun at the time of the couq>any of the Indies, abandoned and 
taken up many times thereafter, has been for the past four or 
five years seriously cultivated.52 In 17^, a hurricane destroyed 
part of the crop; but the subsequent good seasons rewarded the 
efforts of the colonists: the quality improved, the yield
increased, and the selling price doubled between 17^3 an<* 1750.53 
The demand for Indigo became such that the English attempted to 
gain a share of the Louisiana source. In 17^8, the British 
Parliament granted the Carolina merchants a substantial bounty 
for each pound of indigo transported to England. The French 
crown feared less that the measure would develop the Indigo 
industry of Carolina than that it would increase contraband be­
tween the English and French colonies.54 Everybody would profit 
except France: the colonists of Louisiana by access to an
excellent market; the Carolinians by a bounty for shipping Indigo 
to England; and England by acquiring the product without going 
through France, the latter losing both clients and profit.55
5aFr4gault, Vaudreuil. 389"390*
53Ibld.: Villiers, Demleres ann^es. 23; and Gayarr^, 
Louisiana. II, 19*
54Fr£gault, Vaudreuil. 390; and Maurepas to Vaudreuil and 
Michel, Versailles, January 2, 17^9, AC, B89.
5^?r£gault, Vaudreuil. 390*
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Rouilll, who succeeded Maurepas as Minister of Marine, 
convinced of the English economic design, alerted the colonial 
administrators of Louisiana to guard against the English.56
While the large planters Increased their Indigo crop, the 
small ones engaged in the more general but less profitable tobacco 
crop and experienced astonishing results. Unfortunately, the 
demand for tobacco decreased In the 17to(s. Consequently, by 
17^7 the warehouses of New Orleans and Pointe Couple were bulging 
with bales of tobacco which could not be sold In France.57 The 
majority of the farmers, discouraged by this situation, thought 
of curtailing production. Vaudreuil and Le Normant persuaded the 
colonists not to despair but to continue as usual the cultivation 
of tobacco with the promise of relief from France. The governor 
and "commlssaire ordonnateur", in their report on the conditions 
in Louisiana, persuaded the Minister to order the ship captains 
destined for Louisiana to load tobacco in preference to the other 
local products for their return voyage to France.58
What was the relative ltqportance of Louisiana products of 
the period? From 17^3 to 17^6, the colony shipped each year about
170,000 pounds of tobacco, valued at 30,000 francs. This profit
56Rouill! to Vaudreuil and Michel, Versailles, September 26, 
1750, AC, B91.
57Frlgault, Vaudreuil. 391*
58Vaudreuil to Maurepas, New Orleans, May 10, 17^7, AC, 
C13A31; Frlgault, Vaudreuil, 391; and Surrey, Commerce. 209.
ite
was modest compared to the returns of Indigo, whose yearly 
shipment of six thousand pounds brought In 18,000 francs. However, 
the most rewarding commerce was In furs even though the article 
did not bring high prices —  only thirty sous per pound. But 
during good or bad years, no less than 55,000 pounds, valued at 
82,500 francs, were collected.59 Le Normant denounced the short­
sightedness of Vaudreuil to Maurepas, the "ordonnateur's" prot4g^, 
accusing the governor of paying too much attention to the pelt 
industry. Nevertheless, Lhe trade in pelts comprised more than 
a third of the annual commerce of Louisiana and Involved about 
1,600 colonists.60 In 17^3, a colonist of Louisiana assessed the 
agricultural and industrial capacity of the colony as follows:
203.000 pounds of tobacco; 300,000 of rice; 70,000 of pelts;
50.000 of lead; 30,000 of salted meat; enough wood to fill a 
300 ton capacity ship; and cotton, wax and vegetables besides.61 
But, in spite of its potential and the efforts of the governors 
and "commissaires ordonnateurs", Louisiana never realized its full 
potential in agriculture and Industry; for it lacked stable markets 
in France and the French colonies. Thus the problem of production
58Fr4gault, Vaudreuil. 391-392; and Surrey, Commerce,
Chapter XIX, "The Fur Trade of Louisiana, 1699-1763," 355-366.
^Ibid.
^Quoted in G. Devron, ed., "A Chapter in Colonial 
History," L H <£» VI (October, 1923), 56^; and Fr^gault, 
Vaudreuil. 392.
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was exportation. Vaudreuil who had attempted to resolve the 
first, now attacked the second.62
The governor and "commlssaire ordonnateur" first turned 
their attention to the Antilles. Interested as Versailles was in 
promoting trade with the French islands, few of the Louisiana 
colonists had been able to afford the financial prerequisite.
However, some ships of the West Indies came to Louisiana. In 
17^3» Bienville reported that twelve ships of the French islands 
had visited Louisiana ports in 17U2.63 Two years later, Vaudreuil 
counted twenty which exchanged rum and other wares for lumber, 
vegetables and Spanish piastres.64 Still, more money left New 
Orleans than entered. However, this situation was soon to change.
The war of Austrian Succession (17^-17^8) "brought about a 
condition that made it possible to augment the supply of Spanish 
money in Louisiana to such an extent that from 17^5 to 17^8 the 
expenses of the colony were paid entirely in this medium."65 
French merchants trading with Cuba and fearing interception by 
English ships, had accumulated a considerable amount of the 
desired Spanish money at Havana. Since they were informed that
^Frdgault, Vaudreuil. 392.
63Bienville to Maurepas, New Orleans, February 17^3*
AC, C13A28.
64Fr4gault, Vaudreuil, 392; Vaudreuil to Maurepas, New 
Orleans, May 10, 17Mf, AC, C13A28.
65Surrey, Commerce. 106.
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the English did not patrol the Gulf of Mexico, they decided to 
transport their silver to Louisiana, where it could be exchanged 
for bills of exchange drawn on the French treasury.66 The colony 
welcomed the Spanish silver as an act of Providence, for it 
temporarily eased Louisiana's monetary crisis and activated her 
commerce.67 Thus, beginning with 17*4*4, the traffic with the French 
islands grew considerably;68 and from 17*4*4 to 1750, one million 
piastres flowed yearly to New Orleans.68
This occurred at a time when France maintained practically 
no direct contact with French Louisiana. The governor and 
"commlssaire ordonnateur" complained to Versailles. In 17**8,
Vaudreuil informed the Minister that French merchants had not 
provisioned the colony for two years.70 By 17*47, war in Europe 
between England and France brought to a standstill the communication 
between Louisiana and the parent state. There remained the 
Spanish trade.
It was to the credit of Vaudreuil and his "ordonnateurs" 
that at a time when Louisiana lost markets in France the
66Ibld.; Frlgault, Vaudreuil. 393» and "Mlmo ires sur la
Loulsiane," BN, Collection Joly de Fleury, 1726.
67"Mlmoires sur la Loulsiane," BN, Collection Joly de
Fleury, 1726 and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 393*
^Surrey, Commerce. 381.
^Ibid., 107.
7°Vaudreuil to Maurepas, New Orleans, March 20, 17*40, AC, 
C13A32; and Frdgault, Vaudreuil. 393*
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neighboring Spanish colonies filled the vacuum. In the aftermath 
of the war of 1719“1721 between French Louisiana and Spanish 
Pensacola during which the latter changed hands three times, 
her officials distrusted her neighbors at Mobile and New Orleans.71 
However, the French court, bent on gaining a share of the Spanish 
trade, consistently advised its governors and "commissaires 
ordonnateurs" to remove any suspicion the Spanish officials might 
have toward Louisiana.72 However, since 1739* the relationship 
between France and Spain had improved. War with England forced 
Spain into a rapprochement with France in view of assuring the 
provisioning of their New World possessions. Many Mexican ships 
anchored at Louisiana ports in 17^1; however, the warehouses 
being depleted, the ships returned home empty.73 This is not to 
say that the easing of trade restrictions in the Spanish colonies 
toward French merchants worked to the advantage of Louisiana. 
Because of the facility with which French merchant ships 
entered Mexican and Cuban ports between 17kO and 17**3» these 
colonies no longer needed provisions from Louisiana.74 However,
^Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 39^» and Heinrich, Loulsiane.
53-80.
72Smith, French Interests. 1^-15* Maurepas to Perier, 
Versailles, June 11, 1729, AC, C13A121 ; "M&noire du roi aux Srs. 
Perier gouverneur et Salmon commlssaire ordonnateur a la 
Loulsiane," Marly, May 22, 1731> AC, B55; and Maurepas to 
Vaudreuil, Versailles, September JO, 17^7, AC, B85«
73Fr4gault, Vaudreuil. 39̂ -»
7*Ibid., 39^-395
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without warning, the Spanish officials at Vera Cruz and Havana 
reimpo8ed the rigid trade restrictions.75 French merchants thus 
encountered many difficulties. Some no longer found markets for 
their cargoes, others were not able to take the money from their 
sales out of Spanish ports. The few Louisiana merchants who 
conducted trade in Spanish ports were ruined by the bribes they 
were forced to pay in order to trade.76 The governor and 
"commlssaire ordonnateur" were not too alarmed, for as Vaudreuil 
explained to Maurepas, "when the French merchants can no longer 
trade with the Spanish they will come to Louisiana."77 The 
merchants of Mobile faced similar restrictions and even 
confiscation of goods at Pensacola. Vaudreuil and Salmon, 
complying with Versailles's instruction not to antagonize 
Spanish officials in any way, prohibited Louisiana merchants 
from trading with the Spanish colonies until commercial policies 
changed and simultaneously assured Maurepas that the Spanish would 
eventually return for provisions.78 Le Normant, who succeeded 
Salmon in 17^, and Vaudreuil seemed to attach little importance 
to coumerce with Florida and New Mexico. They were eying bigger
75Le Normant to Maurepas, on board the Elephant. October 9» 
17^7, AC, C13A28; and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 395.
76Ibld.; and Vaudreuil to Maurepas, New Orleans, July 26, 
17^3, AC, C13A28.
77Vaudreuil to Maurepas, New Orleans, July 26, 17^3> AC,
C13A28.
78Ibjd.: Maurepas to Vaudreuil and Salmon, Versailles, 
January 7, 17^, AC, C13A28; and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 395*
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gains: the rich markets of New Spain and Cuba.78 Vaudreuil,
who had good relations with the governor of Cuba, inquired into 
the complaints of the French merchants. According to the Spanish 
administrator, the French merchants were to blame by insisting on 
trading prohibited articles. The Spanish governor assured his 
Louisiana colleague that the merchants would experience no 
difficulty if they observed the ordinances and even provided a 
Ust of goods which would enter without difficulty.80
Le Normant, "commlssaire ordonnateur" from 17^ to 17^8, 
wrote an interesting letter on the French trade at Havana. During 
his stay at Havana, Le Normant said that he was well received by 
the governor of Cuba and by other Spanish officials. "The 
Spanish," he informed the Minister of Marine, "depend on French 
flour, wines, and several other products which they now permit 
to enter and are the object of a considerable commerce. But 
most French merchants pose a threat to this commerce by 
introducing articles which are either prohibited or of poor 
quality."81 The "ordonnateur" urged strict compliance with 
the Spanish ordinances and further pointed out that France
78For importance attached to this trade see "Mrfmoire 
du roi aux Srs. Vaudreuil gouverneur et Salmon commlssaire 
ordonnateur de la Loulsiane," Versailles, October 22, 17**2,
AC, WTk; and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 396.
aoVaudreuil to Maurepas, New Orleans, December 29>
17^, AC, C13A28; and Frlgault, Vaudreuil. 396.
81Le Normant to Maurepas, on board the Elephant. 
October 10, 17Wf, AC, C13A28.
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had all the more reason not to offend Spanish authorities 
because France, with her commercial designs on Spain and her 
colonies, attempted to establish a consul at Havana.82 To 
the surprise of the governor and "commlssaire ordonnateur," the 
merchants who conformed to the Spanish regulations found easy 
access and, their sale completed, easy egress from the ports.
But In 17^6, as a result of orders from Madrid but more Importantly 
as a result of the gross Irregularities perpetrated by the French 
merchants, the governor of Cuba ordered the cargoes of French 
ships confiscated. However, confiscation became rare with time83 
because Vaudreuil and Le Normant were able to establish and 
maintain good relationships with their colleagues in Cuba and 
New Spain.84 Their efforts did not go unrewarded. Ships from 
Campeche, Vera Cruz, and Tampico destined for Havana stopped at 
Belize, where they exchanged part of their cargoes of precious 
wood, cochineal, cocoa, sarsaparilla, and vanilla for Louisiana 
products and French goods which the Spanish In Cuba were In the 
habit of buying. In Cuba Spanish merchants exchanged French goods 
for sugar, rum, and molasses, which they In turn traded at Belize
“ ibid.
83Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 597.
a4Ibid.; Maurepas to Vaudreuil, Versailles, April 15,
17^6, AC, B85; Maurepas to Vaudreuil, Versailles, August 15,
17^7, AC, B85; Maurepas to Le Normant, Versailles, May 11,
17^6, AC, B85; and Maurepas to Vaudreuil, Versailles,
November U, 171»8, AC, B87.
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for other goods before returning to Mexican ports.85 As far as 
Louisiana was concerned, this was contraband trade.
For a while, the economic life of Louisiana expanded as it 
had never before. The colonists thought only of commerce; they 
abandoned the soil and transformed themselves into merchants.86 
Even the affluent planters neglected their plantations in favor 
of commerce. Some amassed quick fortunes. But it was an artificial 
prosperity. Those involved in it were too busy to ponder its 
nature.87 It should have been realized that the end of the War 
of the Austrian Succession and the resuoqption of normal 
communication with Europe would bring an abrupt change to the 
prosperity of Louisiana. Immediately after the war, the Spanish 
authorities at Havana announced once again their intention of 
confiscating foreign ships entering the port.88 Le Normant feared 
the repercussion on the economy of French Louisiana. "Attesting 
to establish a permanent commerce with the Spanish colonies," 
wrote Le Normant, "is like chasing a ghost."88 Vaudreuil and
85Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 598-399* and Surrey, Commerce.
"Trade with Mexico," 388-Ul7 and "Trade with Cuba," hJl-kkZ.
8^r4gault, Vaudreuil. kOO; and N.M.M. Surrey, "The 
Development of Industries in Louisiana During the French Regime, 
1673-1763," H V H R ,  IX (1922), 234.
87Ibid.
88Frdgault, Vaudreuil, 1*00.
^"M&nolre sur l'adminlstration de la Loulsiane,"
New Orleans, 17^9* AC, C13A33.
150
acting "commlssaire ordonnateur" D'Aubevllle explained: "We
believed that trade with the Spanish had been firmly established."80
The restrictive policies of the Spanish authorities were 
bad enough, but what was worse was the excessive Indulgence of 
the colonists in the trade. Accordingly, the commercial activities 
of Louisiana slowed down to a dangerous pace in the aftermath of 
the Peace cf Alx-la-Chapelle.81
However, one must not place the whole blame on the 
recalcitrant attitude of the Spanish; the appearance of several 
French ships in allied waters played a part. The ports of Havana 
and New Spain had become saturated.82 Vaudreuil and Michel, who 
succeeded Le Normant, hoped that the Spanish authorities would 
now enforce the trade restrictions unrelentingly.83 Fortunately 
for Louisiana, the restrictions became more rigid with the result 
that merchants of Havana and New Spain, unable to trade at home, 
dispatched four or five ships to the Mississippi —  a modest 
beginning which rapidly developed into a substantial commerce.84 
Once again, the Spanish of Florida came to Louisiana for their
8°Vaudreuil and D'Aubervllle to Maurepas, New Orleans,
May k, 17U9, AC, C13A33*
^Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 1*00; and Villiers, Dernleres 
ann^es. 79~80.
0aFrdgault, Vaudreuil. 1*00-1*01.
83Ibld.. 1*00; and Vaudreuil to Roullli, New Orleans,
January 31, 1750, AC, C13A3^.
84Vaudreuil to Roulll^, New Orleans, September 2kt 
1750, AC, CI3A3U.
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provisions. Old habits reappeared. Mexican ships stopped at 
Mobile on their way to Pensacola. The contraband trade was in 
progress again. By the spring of 1751 the commerce was already 
worth one million livres.95
However, commerce between France and Louisiana did not 
resume so rapidly after the war, for French ship owners refused 
to transport Louisiana products to Europe. But, because of the 
difficulty encountered with the Spanish trade, by 17l*9 ships 
from France, in addition to those from Martinique and Saint 
Dominque, anchored in Louisiana ports.96 In January, 1750, 
Vaudreuil and Michel reported that because many ships visited 
Louisiana in 17l*9» the colonists now possessed a new spirit of 
optimism.97 "Since the close of the war," the governor wrote in 
June, 1750, "close to 100 ships have unloaded an abundance of all 
kinds of supplies."98 Most of the ships were from Martinique 
and Saint Domingue. High prices paid for wood, indigo, wax, 
tobacco, hemp, flax, and pelts induced the colonists to greater 
production. Between 1750 and 1753* trade with France, the French 
islands and Spanish ports surpassed the two million livres mark.
95Vaudreuil to Rouill4, New Orleans, May 2, 1751* AC, 
C13A35; and Frigault, Vaudreuil. 1*01.
96Vaudreuil to Maurepas, New Orleans, March 3> 171*9»
AC, C13A33; and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 1*02.
97Vaudreuil to Roullll, New Orleans, January 31f 1750,
AC, C13A31*-; Michel to Roullll, New Orleans, January 22, 1750, 
ibid.; and Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 1*02-1*03.
"Vaudreuil to Rouill^, New Orleans, June 2l*, 1750,
AC, CI3A3I*.
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Louisiana sold lflOt(XX) livres worth of indigo; 180,000 of 
construction wood; 250,000 of pelts; 36,000 of tobacco; 30,000 
of pitch and tar; and 25*000 of wax and oil. In addition, traders 
brought the equivalent of 300*000 livres in Spanish silver."
The colony of Louisiana owed its prosperity to Governor 
Vaudreuil. However, it is difficult to measure to what extent. 
Circumstances probably helped the governor; but there is little 
doubt that Vaudreuil made astute use of them. For Instance, he 
knew how to take advantage of such circumstances as the war of 
17^ ,  which erupted at a time when the colony was under duress.
His success may be explained in terms of his personal qualities: 
realism, perception, the gift of being able to define problems 
and the ability to apply solutions. But Vaudreuil had more. In 
the final analysis, his success stemmed from the fact that he 
was a colonial; he understood the nature of a colony. He 
conceived the nature of a colonial economy; he knew its needs and 
the attention it must receive from the mother country; and more 
importantly, he knew what to substitute when these needs were not 
fulfilled. During a period of misery and armed conflict, he gave 
Louisiana security and affluence and a certain prestige. It is 
no wonder that Louisiana reached its apogee during Vaudreuil's 
administration.100 It was followed by a corresponding gloom.




From 1753 to 1764, there was gradual disintegration in agriculture 
and commerce as well as in the moral fiber of the colony. The 
administration of Governor Kerl^rec was probably the most 
critical in terms of neglect, miseries, external threats at the 
hands of the English, and internal quarrels. The colony was 
exposed on all sides. From the beginning of the Seven Years' War 
in 175^, it was deprived of all the basic necessities.101 
Commerce with the Spanish colonies was drastically reduced in 
1755» and in November of that year, Kerl&rec received orders 
announcing that French merchants would no longer be received in 
Spanish ports.102 In 1761, the Spanish ports were still closed 
to French ships.103 The colony was reduced to the state described 
by Governor D'Abbadie in 1764.
The history of the commerce of French Louisiana is in 
general a tragic one. The growth of the colony depended on the 
development of a stable trade with France, the French Islands, and 
especially with the Spanish colonies. But there was always an 
ingredient lacking for the realization of stable commercial activities. 
When ships from France and the Spanish colonies were available, 
there were either no products or not enough to trade. Conversely,
i°1"TableaU des dlsordres et des malheurs qui agitent
et m£nacent la Loulsiane avec les moyens provislonnels d'y 
rem&ier," Louisiana, undated and anonymous, AC, C13C1.
loaVilliers, Dernlferes annles. 70.
1Q3Ibid.. 119.
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when Louisiana products were available, war or commercial 
restrictions hampered trade. But at all times there was the 
financial problem: lack of silver and inflation, a subject which
is the topic of the next chapter. It seems that without the 
contraband trade with the Spanish colonies, Louisiana would not 
have enjoyed even those few periods of prosperity which she had.
That the colony prospered for a while is due to the ability of 
Vaudreuil both at Versailles and in Louisiana. Governor Vaudreuil 
was able to put together, although only for a while, the 
necessary ingredients for prosperity. The remark of "commlssaire 
ordonnateur" Duclos in 1715 on the state of agriculture might 
also be said of commerce: "For one year of abundance there were
three of sterility."104 One must not forget also that it was a 
declining France which attempted to colonize Louisiana. The 
colonial administrators could not perform miracles.
The general administration of the colony occasioned little 
disagreement between the governor and "conmlssaire ordonnateur".
The policies were formulated from the beginning by Versailles 
and remained constant throughout the French period. However, 
the major bone of contention was in the implementation of some 
of these policies. Since implementation involved finance, the 
"commlssaire ordonnateur" played a major role in this area.
Since his reputation and advancement depended on his ability in
104Glraud, Loulsiane francalse. I, 299.
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this field, the "ordonnateur" closely guarded his financial 
powers. From this stemmed some of the bitter quarrels between 
the governor and "commissaire ordonnateur".
C H A P T E R  V I I
THE "COMMISSAIRE ORDONNATEUR" AND FINANCE
After retrocession in 1731* the French crown attempted to 
place the colony's finances on a specie basis by sending silver 
and supplies to meet the annual expenses. When this did not 
succeed it was then done with merchandise alone.1 But the several 
efforts to devise a plan for the approximate yearly expenses 
failed. Furthermore, these attempts did not keep silver money 
in circulation.2 The silver immediately returned to France, 
leaving the colony with no money for internal commerce since 
there were no other species with the exception of some Spanish 
piastres drawn from Pensacola but which French merchants also 
took to France as soon as they appeared in the colony.3 The 
French government was forced to resort once again to the use of 
bills of exchange in order to retain specie in the colony.4
1Surrey, Commerce. 123; and "M^moire sur les finances de
la Loulsiane," New Orleans, March, 17^-, AC, C13A28.
Surrey, Commerce, 123.
a,M&moire sur les finances de la Loulsiane," New Orleans, 




There was not enough hard currency in the treasury to meet 
the government's expenses for the first six months of 1753*5 In 
May of that year, Governor Bienville and "ordonnateur" Salmon 
recommended the use of bills of exchange to move the tobacco crop.0
The shortage of specie in Louisiana became so critical 
that the crown suggested on September 13, 1733. the issuence of 
card money similar to that already in use in New France with one 
exception: the cards would be considered at par with silver and
bills of exchange at the royal warehouses. By this the French 
government hoped that the new medium would stabilize the price of 
merchandise and supplies.7 However, the home government, cautious 
not to further confuse the financial situation, ordered Bienville 
and Salmon to ascertain how the colonists would accept the new 
currency. About seven months later, on April 3» 1734, the 
colonial administrators reported that after examining conditions 
in the colony, they saw no reason why card money could not be 
issued. However, they recommended a delay of two to three years 
before putting the new currency into circulation for two reasons.
sIbld., 123-124; and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, 
February T57”1733, AC, C13A17.
°Surrey, Commerce. 124; and Bienville and Salmon to 
Maurepas, New Orleans, May 12, 1735, AC, CI3AI6.
7Surrey, Commerce. 124; Maurepas to Bienville and 
Salmon, Versailles, September 13, 1733, AC, B59, Bienville 
and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, April 3, 1734, AC,
C13A18; and Dunbar Rowland and A. G. Sanders, eds.,
Mississippi Provincial Archives (3 vols.; Jackson, Mississippi: 
Press of the Mississippi Department of Archives and History,
1927), III, 646-61*9.
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First, the colonists still remembered the Company's paper which 
had greatly depreciated. Second, the administrators wanted to 
allow some of the colonists to become more prosperous.8 But, 
if the crown decided on immediate Issuance, Bienville and 
Salmon proposed that it issue only 300*000 livres along with an 
equal amount of silver for circulation in 1735 and the other 
half the following year. In this way the colonists would be 
gradually accustomed to the new currency.8 On August 17, 173^* 
Versailles replied that since card money had been to the benefit 
of New France since 1729, it had no doubt that it would 
produce a similar effect on Louisiana.10
Meanwhile specie continued to flow to France. At the end 
of fiscal year 173^, Salmon had drawn for payment to merchants 
118,^76 livres in bills of exchange in addition to 104,lH0 and 
2,210 livres payable in 1735 and 1736 respectively. Thus 
between April, 1732 and July, 173^* Salmon had drawn a total of 
391»607 livres in bills of exchange.11 The crown, disturbed 
by such a large emission, ordered Salmon on August 29, 1735* to
Surrey, Commerce, 12^-125; Bienville and Salmon to 
Maurepas, New Orleans, April 3* 173̂ -* AC, C13A18; and Rowland 
and Sanders, Archives. Ill, 6k6-6k9.
9Ibld.
10Surrey, Commerce. 123; Maurepas to Bienville and 
Salmon, Versailles, August 17* 173^* AC, B6l; and "Md moire sur




reduce the amount in the future.18 But this was to no avail for 
at the end of 1735, 327,38V livres in bills of exchange were 
drawn, whereupon the French government decided to fix the annual 
amount at 150,000 livres.13 A month later, the crown finally 
called for 200,000 livres in card money to circulate in 
Louisiana. The new currency would be written and signed by the 
comptroller at New Orleans and signed by the governor and 
"ordonnateur"
The year 1738 dawned with the colony's finances in a 
poor condition. While there was only 53,07V livres left of the
150,000 allowance, there was a debt of 105,385 livres occasioned 
by the Natchez and Chickasaw War and the merchants were 
demanding bills of exchange from the treasury. To meet the 
government's obligations, Salmon drew large quantities of 
treasury notes and borrowed 69,878 livres on the allowance of 
the current year, 80,122 livres on that of 1737, and 31,202 
on 1738. Thus at the end of 1738, 350,000 livres in paper 
circulated in Louisiana.15
The financial disorder of the colony gradually worsened. 
In 1737, because of the demands of foreign merchants for bills
18Kaurepas to Bienville and Salmon, Versailles,
August 29, 1735, AC, B63.
1 Surrey, Commerce, 126.
14Ibld.. 126-127; and Bienville and Salmon to Maurepas,
New Orleans, June 26, 1738, AC, C13A21.
1 Surrey, Commerce. 127.
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of exchange and the war debt, Salmon thought It necessary to 
Increase the amount of paper In circulation by 150,000 livres, 
totalling about 500,000 livres of paper money by the end of 
1737* Since retrocession, public expenditures increased with 
no provision to meet them.18
From 1739 to 1763, except for the years 17te-1750, 
paper money was practically the only form of currency In the 
colony.17 In 1739* Salmon resorted once again to the use of 
large amounts of treasury notes to meet the increasing demands 
of the merchants for bills of exchange and the current expenses. 
Although the "ordonnateur" drew in excess of 50,000 livres 
of the amount fixed by the crown and borrowed from the allowance 
of 17̂ *0, the colonial administrators were unable to redeem 
card money with silver or bills of exchange.18 The end result 
was further depreciation in treasury notes and card money.
Salmon proposed to the Minister of Marine an additional 200,000 
livres in card money to retire all the treasury notes which the 
"ordonnateur" was forced to redeem in bills of exchange. What 
happened was that the colonists had almost withdrawn all the 






device the "ordonnateur" used, each year the finances of 
Louisiana became more confused. At the end of 17**0 there were
900,000 livres In all sorts of paper In the colony.20
The financial situation was bad enough In 17^1, but to 
make matters worse, Bienville and Salmon were at odds: the
dispute originated In lack of cooperation In finances. Bienville 
claimed that Salmon no longer consulted him.21 Besides, the 
governor was confused by letters from Versailles written to 
both him and to Salmon In which the Minister Informed them 
of the crown's policies on financial matters particularly In 
regard to the emission of bills of exchange. He wondered 
whether or not this meant he too had financial duties. If so, 
the governor asked for Instructions prescribing joint action on 
the Issuance of bills of exchange and power to end the abuse 
In their distribution and Jobbing.22 Governor Bienville 
learned of the extent of jobbing upon his return from his last 
campaign against the Chickasaw. Apparently, several colonists 
speculated In bills of exchange for the purpose of exchanging 
them with merchants for cards or paper at a 0̂ to 60$ profit. 
Salmon must not have been aware of this, otherwise he would 
surely have stopped It, for the abuse had severe consequences
20Ibid.; and "M&nolre sur les finances de la Loulslane," 
New Orleans, March, 17Ml> AC, C13A28.
21Blenvllle to Maurepas, New Orleans, March 8, 17^1,
AC, C13A26.
^Ibld.: and Surrey, Commerce. 130-131*
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on the colony. Cards and treasury notes depreciated to half 
their value and generally all the goods from Prance or the 
French Islands were sold at exorbitant prices. But probably 
the worst effect was the financial ruin of three of the most 
prosperous colonists and the exodus of several families to 
France.23
Because of the continual depreciation of cards and 
treasury notes, Maurepas suggested the Immediate retirement of 
all paper money. Bur first, Maurepas ordered Salmon to estimate 
the amount of paper in circulation. The "ordonnateur", unable 
to estimate the outstanding amount and without waiting for 
further orders from the home government, issued on May 13,
17^1, an ordinance calling in all notes to his office under 
penalty of invalidation. For whatever reason the ordinance 
failed to bring in the paper.24 On October 13, 17^1, Maurepas 
strongly reprimanded Salmon for his most unsatisfactory 
financial report and strongly condemned some of his recent 
actions. The crown, probably acting on Bienville's letter of 
March 8, 17^1, regarded the liberal issuance of paper money 
the cause of depreciation. Accordingly, it ordered Salmon first 
to estimate the amount in the colony and then to call in the
23Blenville to Maurepas, New Orleans, March 8, 17^1,
AC, C13A26; and Maurepas to Bienville, Versailles, October 8, 
17^1, AC, B72.
24Surrey, Commerce, 131; and "M&noire sur les finances 
de la Louisiana," New Orleans, March, 17^, AC, C13A28.
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paper for redemption In bills of exchange.29 However, before 
the orders reached New Orleans. Salmon drew 119.112 livres on 
the allowance of 17**2.26 This last act angered the home 
government.
In 17*12. conditions worsened. The salaried officials 
paid In colonial paper were In a financial straights, unable to 
purchase their basic necessities. Moreover, while there were 
few colonists with sufficient means to engage In Spanish commerce 
which was drastically reduced, the French merchants accepted 
only sliver or bills of exchange for their goods.27 In an 
attempt to bring relief to the colony. Governor Bienville 
suggested the crown pay half of the salaried officials In bills 
of exchange. According to the governor, this "would Improve 
the condition of men who had nothing to sell and everything to 
buy" and would check the continual Increase In amount of treasury 
notes which resulted In proportionate depreciation of all 
paper money.28 The crown Ignored the suggestion. As a result,
Salmon, though ordered by Versailles not to exceed the limit of
2sMaurepa8 to Salmon, Versailles, October 13, 17*H,




200,000 livres, was forced to draw 236,620 livres worth of bills 
of exchange to meet the most urgent obligations of the colony.28
As Indicated above, the ordinance of May 13, 17^1, 
failed. The second decreed on January 13, 17^1 allowed the 
colonists a month to bring their treasury notes to New Orleans 
for conversion into new money. Those not registered within the 
allotted time would be Invalidated. The second ordinance had 
better results. Soon after its enactment, most of the 45^,620 
livres in circulation were turned in and converted into fresh 
currency.30
By 17^3, the crown was disgusted with the financial 
situation of Louisiana and Salmon's administration. Some 
colonists along with officials in France blamed the "ordonnateur's 
maladministration for the financial chaos of the colony.31 
Salmon, who had requested his recall in 17^2 was finally replaced 
in 17^U by Le Normant, the favorite of Maurepas who had served 
the crown well at Cap Francais.32 The charges against Salmon
^Ibid.. 133.
301bid.; and "M^moire sur les finances de la Louislane," 
New Orleans, March, 17^, AC, C13A28.
^Fr^gault, Vaudreull. 187; Maurepas to Salmon, Versailles 
October 22, 17*t2, AC, B7̂ -J Maurepas to Vaudreull, Versailles,
April 3* 17^, AC, B78; Maurepas to Salmon, Versailles, April 30, 
17^, AC, B78; and Surrey, Commerce. 133-13**-*
32Maurepas to Le Normant, Versailles, April 30, 17̂ *-, AC, 
B78; Maurepas to Vaudreull, Ibid.; and "M£molre du rol au S.
Le Normant commissaire gdndral de la marine, ordonnateur A la 
Louislane," ibid.
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were Investigated by both the new governor and "commissalre 
ordonnateur" In 17*44. Vaudreull, a very Influential man at 
Versailles, reported to the crown that the accusations were 
unfounded and flatly stated that he found nothing to 
substantiate the accusations and that, under similar 
circumstances, no other fiscal official could have administered 
the finances better or more profitably than Salmon.33 The 
governor's opinion was supported by Le Normant, commissioned as 
"commissaire ordonnateur" on April JO, 1744. In his financial 
report on Louisiana, the new "ordonnateur" criticized few of 
Salmon's methods. Salmon should not be blamed for the 
financial disorder; rather, the main cause for the disorder 
since retrocession stemmed from inadequate annual funding to 
meet colonial expenses and the manner in which French merchants 
carried on trade in the colony.34
At the end of 1744, there were about 1,050,000 livres of 
paper money in circulation. Le Normant who entered upon his 
duties In October, 1744, began to collect royal debts and used 
the money to redeem demands on the treasury. Thus, by the 
beginning of 1745, the paper in circulation had been reduced to
33Surrey, Commerce, 134; Vaudreull to Maurepas, New 
Orleans, August 25, 17*0, AC, C1JA28; Fr4gault, Vaudreull. 188; 
and Vaudreull to Maurepas, New Orleans, January 6, 17^5* AC, 
C13A29.
34Surrey, Commerce, 134; and "M^molre sur les finances 
de la Louislane," New Orleans, March, 1744, AC, C13A28.
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8k7,*05 livres.35 However, Le Normant's experiments with the 
different types of currency brought no immediate relief. While 
the general opinion was favorable to retirement, there was no 
agreement on the method of withdrawal. The two administrators, 
Vaudreull and Le Normant, suggested that If the crown would 
ship supplies or Negro slaves to the colony for exchange In 
paper at a fixed value with silver, the home government could 
easily retire the undesirable currency. Versailles rejected 
the suggestion, considering It too slow for the immediate 
results which it sought. Moreover, the crown reasoned that 
since a large quantity of the paper money was In the hands of 
speculators and traders, the latter would buy the supplies and 
slaves and resell them to the colonists at prices which would 
further Injure the colony*s finances.3®
In view of this, Governor Vaudreull and "ordonnateur"
Le Normant pondered whether all types of paper money should be 
withdrawn on the same basis. Surrey states the problem: "Since
cards had always been preferred to other kinds of colonial 
currency, some were inclined to give them an advantage in the 
rate of exchange, at least over the treasury notes which had 
contributed most fc the cause of depreciation."37 This plan was
35Surrey, Co amerce. I3U-I35; and "Mlmolre sur les finances




also rejected by the home government on the grounds that It 
would also be beneficial only to speculators who In the past 
had been instrumental in depreciating paper money.30 Since the 
crown considered all forms of colonial paper equally good, it 
decided to fix the retirement ratio at five to two, the rate of 
depreciation based on silver agreed on August, 17^3*30 Part of 
the paper would be retired in 17^5 and the rest in 17k6 by use 
of silver and bills of exchange. Accordingly, Le Normant 
proceeded to call in the paper which was registered, checked 
and finally burned. By this means, 838,11*8 livres were 
cancelled by October 2ht 17^5.40 It must be pointed out that 
this was made possible by the flow of silver from the Spanish 
colonies, particularly Cuba, occasioned by the War of the 
Austrian Succession.
It seemed that by the end of 17l*5» Le Normant had gone 
far in solving the problem of depreciation. But the next 
problem was to determine the nature and type of the new currency. 
The "ordonnateur" was against paper money of any type. Since it 
was impossible for the "ordonnateur" or the governor to limit 
the amount of paper drawn on the treasury by post commanders, 
whose bills, took a year or eighteen months to arrive at New Orleans,
^Ibid.
^Surrey, Commerce. 135-136; and "M&molre sur les 
finances de la Louislane," New Orleans, March, 17^» AC, C13A28.
^Surrey, Commerce. 136.
168
to estimate the amount needed for Indian affairs, to depend 
on royal ships which made It necessary at times to buy supplies 
at high prices from private merchants, and to sell the 
merchandise at an advantageous price when several ships 
anchored at New Orleans at the same time.41 For these reasons 
and others It was Impossible to estimate the amount of paper 
required for a fiscal year or the bills of exchange to redeem 
it. A paper currency Issued under these conditions, would 
depreciate and result once again In financial disorder and 
confusion. Even the slightest depreciation would be dangerous 
to the economic health of the colony, for the colonists would 
engage in speculation. As Le Normant and others remarked, 
speculation was one of the main occupations of the colonists.
It was the "ordonnateur's" belief that card money could provide 
temporary relief; but after a year it would be difficult to 
maintain it. Instead of paper money, Le Normant proposed the 
use of Spanish piastres with an assigned value greater than Its 
real value In order to keep it in the colony and to Induce the 
colonists to greater production of local products which could 
be exchanged for foreign goods. This would eliminate the need 
of other types of currency for foreign trade.42
41Ibid.; and "M^moire sur les finances de la Louislane," 
New Orleans, March, 17^, AC, C13A28.
^Ibid.: and Gayarr£, Louisiana. II, 56-37.
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However, it was demonstrated since 1731 that silver 
could not be kept in the colony; while the experience of New 
France with card money led many to believe that there was no 
better system available for Louisiana. But what was the 
difficulty occasioned by card money? Those in favor of cards 
argued that they had maintained their value for two years and 
depreciated only because of the extraordinary expense occasioned 
by the war against the Natchez and Chickasaw and Salmon's 
preference for treasury notes. Therefore, they pointed out, 
with supplies in the warehouses along with bills of exchange 
drawn on the French treasury as security, card money would 
stabilize the finances of the colony.43 The crown approved the 
use of card money and proposed on April 30> 17^-, the Issuance 
of cards on the five to two basis for circulation in Louisiana. 
However, the crown waited because of the increased trade 
between Louisiana and the French islands and because of War in 
Europe which brought an abundant flow of Spanish silver to 
New Orleans.44 Owing to circumstance, Le Normant had difficulty 
in drawing bills of exchange. The entire allowance of 17^6 was 
exchanged for Spanish silver which was spent for strengthening 




and Le Normant Informed Versailles that the local expenses were 
paid by means of bills of exchange and silver obtained from 
sales of supplies from the warehouses.40
The successor to Le Normant, Michel, soon after his 
arrival In 17̂ *8, was convinced that the colony needed more 
money. Accordingly, and without consulting Vaudreull, Michel 
presented his plan to the governor for his signature. Vaudreull 
refused to sign on the grounds of Its Irregularity and 
doubtful legality. But Michel was determined to have his way, 
whereupon he Informed Vaudreull that regardless of his 
signature, additional money would be Issued. The governor 
signed the ordinance which went Into effect on February 1, 1750. 
About 108,000 livres were Issued and put Into circulation; but 
the amount soon Increased considerably, causing public 
uneasiness. Michel, who kept the governor uninformed about the 
quantity of notes, assured him there was no reason for fear.48
The French government strongly reprimanded the two 
officials In their action since only the crown had the right to 
create or alter the money of the kingdom. This right It shared
40Ibld.; and Vaudreull and Le Normant to Maurepas,
New Orleans, December 9> 17^8, AC, C13A32.
47Fr4gault, Vaudreull. 293; Surrey, Commerce. 138-139» 
Michel to Roulll£, New Orleans, September 29, 1750, AC, C13A3^; 
and Vaudreull to Rouill£, New Orleans, May 8, 1751, AC, C13A35*
^Surrey, Commerce. 139*
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with no one. Michel had exceeded his power without the slightest 
justification. If the colony was In need of money, the 
"ordonnateur" should have used bills of exchange and money from 
the sale of supplies from the warehouses. Roullltf, the Minister of 
Marine, informed Michel the records showed that for the past two 
years the warehouses were amply supplied. Even though there 
had been no other recourse, the financial situation did not warrant 
such an act, especially since the financial situation was recovering 
from the excessive amount of paper money. Finally, the crown 
ordered Michel to withdraw the notes he had placed in circulation 
by bills of exchange borrowed from future allowances.48 To clear 
himself, Vaudreull was forced to make an explanation to Roullle 
for his acquiescence In this financial policy. "The notes were 
already to circulate in the public, a fact which I could not 
ignore."90 So in consideration for Michel and In order to prevent 
a public mistrust In a paper money not validated by the governor, 
Vaudreull lent himself to an operation of which he disapproved.91
The damage was done. Before the notes were retired, 
counterfeits began to circulate and public discontent increased.52 
In order to restore confidence in the paper money, the colonial 
government attested to bring the offenders to justice, However,
481 bid.. 139-11*0; And Rouill^ to Vaudreull and Michel, 
Versailles, October 23, 1750* AC, B91.
90Vaudreull to Roullle, New Orleans, May 8, 1751» AC, C13A35; 
and Frlgault, Vaudreull. 293~29^»
91 Ibid.
^Surrey, Commerce. 1̂ *0.
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too many Important colonists were Involved. The prosecution ended 
In a farce, with one conviction, that of a mulatto slave who was 
whipped, branded and sold In Saint Domingue.53
On January JO, 1752, Michel sent to Versailles his last 
financial report before leaving office. It can be seen from this 
report that lack of Spanish commerce made It necessary to draw 
yearly a large sum of bills of exchange: kjj,k08 livres in 17**9>
500,000 livres in 1750; 700,000 livres in 1751; and only 535*000 
livres in 1752. The reduction in 1752 is explained by the 
reinforcement of the strict Spanish commercial restrictions after 
the war of 17^-17^8* In addition, Michel's report revealed that 
the crown had initiated better provision for paying the expenses 
of Louisiana. Furthermore, near the end of 1752, there remained 
555*023 livres in the treasury which indicated that for the period 
between 17̂ 9 to 1751* there was no need to issue additional paper 
money.54
D'Aubervllle replaced Michel as "commissaire ordonnateur" 
in 1752 and Kerl&rec succeeded Governor Vaudreull who was promoted 
to governor general of New France. Unfortunately, lnsplte of 
Versailles' opposition, the "ordonnateurs" who succeeded Michel 
followed his example of issuing notes redeemable in bills of 
exchange.55 The financial and commercial health of Louisiana was
53Ibid.
54Ibld.. lUO-1^1; and Michel to Roullle, New Orleans, January 
30, 1752, AC, C13A36.
55Surrey, Commerce, l*H-lU2.
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stimulated by silver, especially Spanish. However, the war which 
erupted once again between France and England in 1736 made the 
risk of sending silver to the colony too great.50 To compensate 
for this, the crown Instructed the colonial officials to issue 
special notes drawn on the local treasury, payable in three months 
and redeemable in bills of exchange at New Orleans. Because of 
the war the governor and "ordonnateur'* granted similar power to 
post commanders so that they might meet their obligations. To 
the surprise of none, the debts which the administrators contracted 
with merchants and colonists grew out of proportion because of 
abuses of the privilege.57 Consequently, owing to lack of silver, 
the old habits which had disrupted colonial finance reappeared.
The "ordonnateurs" from 1732 to 1738 contributed nothing new to 
financial management. They continued to issue large quantities 
of paper money of different forms.58
In 1738, with Rochemore as "commlssalre ordonnateur", 
a general state of chaos existed in the colony from which it never 
recovered.50 Besides the sad state of colonial finance, Rochemore 
was involved in a systematic opposition to Governor Kerlerec. The 




“ Rochemore to the Minister, New Orleans, August 17, 1738, 
AC, C13AlfO; and Surrey, Commerce. lkj.
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economic stagnation.00 On entering office on August 17» 1758, 
Rochemore reported to Versailles that he found the office of 
comptroller of New Orleans vacant, the treasury without specie 
and more than 1,800,000 livres borrowed on future allowance.
The royal warehouses were empty causing the "ordonnateur" to buy 
at high prices in local stores.01 Rochemore decided to call in 
all the paper and issue a new currency in order to distinguish 
his administration from the preceeding one. His plan which 
allowed only an eight day period of recall caused much discontent 
and protest. Worst still, Rochemore did all this without the 
knowledge of Kerllrec who learned of it when he read it on the 
public board.02 Needless to say, it occasioned a bitter 
quarrel in addition to ill-feeling that already existed between 
the two. Meanwhile, Rochemore sent to Versailles his plan for 
the financial stabilization of the colony in January, 1759* In 
it, he advocated the reestablishment of card money similar to the 
one of 1744 but with one basic difference: the emission would be
made in France. The "ordonnateur" believed that his plan would 
reduce prices of commodities and reestablish confidence in the
°°"Tableau des d£sordres et des malheurs qui agitent et 
m&iacent la Louislane," Louisiana, undated and anonymous, AC, C13C1; 
Vllliers, Deralferes armies, 98; Kerl£rec to the Minister, New Orleans, 
December 3» 1T5&, AC, CIJA^K); Kerl&rec to the Minister, New Orleans, 
September 25, 1758, ibid.; and Gayarr^, Louisiana, II, 84-88.
^Surrey, Commerce, 143; and Rochemore to the Minister, New 
Orleans, August 17, 1756, AC, ClJAltO.
°^Gayarr4, Louisiana. II, 84-85; Rochemore to the Minister, 
New Orleans, August 17, 1758, AC, Cl3Ato; and Surrey, Commerce,
143-144.
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colonial currency. For his plan to succeed, there must be no 
resorting to treasury notes except under absolute necessity.63 
Whether or nor his suggestion was sound, the crown already 
disenchanted with his work, totally Ignored his proposal. However, 
the crown did not Ignore Rochemore's unauthorized emission of paper 
In 1753. On January 19f 1759* the home government strongly 
reprimanded the "ordonnateur" for violating the Instructions given 
him before leaving France for his post In Louisiana. Rochemore, 
as Michel had done earlier, violated an exclusive royal privilege. 
Because of this and In addition to his failure to consult the 
governor, who most likely would have disapproved of the plan, 
Versailles pronounced the whole affair as an unexcusable blunder 
and ordered the recall of all the paper In question for redemption 
In bills of exchange. Finally, because of Michel's earlier 
blunder and Rochemore's recent one, the "ordonnateur" was ordered 
to furnish two semi-annual reports on the financial condition of 
the colony and quarterly reports on bills of exchange Issued on
the French treasury.64
It was clear that the financial state of Louisiana was
deteriorating. On February 25, 1759* Governor Kerlerec Informed 
the crown of the deplorable financial situation.65 In another
^Lochemore to the Minister, New Orleans, January 2, 1759* AC, 
Cl^A^l; and Surrey, Commerce. lMt-.
^The Minister to Rochemore, Versailles, January 19, 1759» AC, 
B109; and Surrey, Commerce. lUU-l^.
65Kerl&rec to the Minister, New Orleans, February 25, 1759*
AC, C15A41.
176
letter on June 25* 1759. Kerlerec asserted that of 1,995,000 livres
In bills of exchange only about 200,000 were Issued according to the
dictates of the home government. The rest was In speculation sold
between fifteen and eighteen per cent profit to merchants who
made up the difference by raising the prices of their merchandise.
Kerlerec also accused the treasurer of New Orleans, who In addition
to his fiscal responsibility was In charge of munition, of
provisioning royal ships with supplies from the royal warehouses
amounting to 200,000 livres and then drawing on the French
treasury a bill of exchange of the same amount, thus costing the
crown 1+00,000 livres. Finally, the bills of exchange were sold to
speculators at a profit.®® The "ordonnateur", defending the official
under him, denied the allegation. However, in spite of Rochemore*s
family influence at Versailles, the crown responded to Kerlerec's
reports. On August 29> 1759* lb decided to recall Rochemore.
"Your antipathy for Governor Kerlerec and a 
disregard for all the wise council he gave you on 
your arrival in the province; your haste, in 
spite of his advice, to call in all the treasury 
notes and to draw that year more than 1,800,000 
livres in bills of exchange on the French 
treasury...for these reasons and for many more, 
founded upon your unsociable nature and incompati­
bility with the colonial service...the crown has 
decided to recall you to France."®7
®®Surrey, Commerce. ll+5; and Kerlerec to the Minister, New 
Orleans, June 25» 1759» AC, Cl̂ Â -l.
®7The Minister to Rochemore, Versailles, August 291 1759» AC, 
B109; and Surrey, Commerce. lU6.
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Family Influence at Veraallle8 prevented the implementation 
of this order. Thus Rochemore stayed on to harass Kerlerec to the 
detriment of the colony.08 One is led to believe that Rochemore, 
fully aware of France's disenchantment with Louisiana and her 
involvement in a death struggle with England over colonies, took 
advantage of the situation for personal gains. Kerlerec's only 
course was to point out the administrative abuses of Rochemore 
to Versailles. In a letter dated October 8, 1759» the governor 
accused the "ordonnateur" of selling merchandise destined as 
Indian presents from the king's warehouses. The goods were sold 
at lower prices to Rochemore's supporters who resold them at a 
500 to 600 per cent profit. Thus the "ordonnateur" shared in 
the gains and at the same time could show the governor a 
balanced budget. Kerlerec further accused Rochemore of jobbing 
in merchandise in order to control prices. The dealings of 
Rochemore were common knowledge. Public resentment against such 
irregularities was increasing daily. Unless one belonged to the 
Rochemore clique, it was difficult for an official to find bills 
of exchange.08 Such methods encouraged speculation to eat away 
at the social fibers of the colonial society. An appointee of 
the "ordonnateur" sold bills of exchange in New Orleans at fifteen
^Gayarre, Louisiana, II, 86-87; Villiers, Dernleres annees. 
140-141; and Surrey, Commerce, 146.
^Kerlerec to the Minister, New Orleans, October 8, 1759> AC, 
Cl̂ Al*-!; and Surrey, Commerce. lU6-1^7>
178
per cent profit.70 The crown, Informed of Rochemore*s abuses, 
demanded a full report on his administration and explanation on 
how his secretary, Belot, had amassed 1*0,000 livres In less than 
a year without Rochemore's Intrigue.71
Rochemore, In a letter to Versailles on October 12, 1759> 
explained his recall of treasury notes. He stated that Michel 
and Vaudreull had resorted to the same expedient but Ignored the 
accusations of Kerlerec and others.72 Even Rochemore admitted 
that speculation in bills of exchange had become an established 
business to the point of rendering the treasury notes worthless.73 
The existing conditions in the royal treasury of the home 
government did not help the financial disorder of Louisiana. The 
French treasury nearly bankrupt, suspended payment of bills of 
exchange on October 15, 1759* and informed the officials in 
Louisiana that it was no longer able to send the required 
supplies.74 Kerlerec, who by the end of 1759 was almost in full 
charge of the finances, was instructed to draw bills of exchange
7°Ibid.
7lIbid.
72Rochemore to the Minister, New Orleans, October 12, 1759» AC, 
C15A^1; and Surrey, Commerce, 1^7-lU8.
73Ibid.
74The Minister to Kerlerec, Versailles, October 15, 1759* AC, 
Cl̂ Alil; and Surrey, Commerce, 148.
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only for the most pressing expenses and to hold the confidence 
of the royal government.75
In the light of this, the financial outlook of Louisiana 
was most discouraging in I76O. Though disheartened by the 
situation, Governor Kerlerec continued his efforts to rid the 
colony of Rochemore's abuses.76 Rochemore began his administration 
with 596,000 livres in 1758* In October, 1759 > Rochemore had drawn 
6,687,850 livres in bills of exchange much of it borrowed on the 
allowances of 1759 and I76O.77
In I76O, the bitter struggle between Kerlerec and
Rochemore reached a climax. Amid cries of "Vive le roi et
Monsieur le gouverneur," Kerlerec, supported by troops, entered
the "ordonnateur*s" house and seized the merchandise. The
"ordonnateur" realized his term of office was nearly at an end.
Surrey describes his situation:
Rochemore, a man of less than mediocre ability, 
deprived of his best political supporters by 
this time, fearful of being murdered, was unable, 
henceforward, to carry on extensively his evil 
practices in the administration of the finances 
of the province. Kerlerec was practically in 
full control.78
75Ibid.
76The Minister to Kerlerec, Versailles, May 21, 1759* AC, 
B109; the Minister to Kerlerec and Rochemore, Versailles, January 19, 
1759, ibid.; Gayarre, Louisiana, II, 8k; and Surrey, Commerce, 148.
"^Surrey, Commerce, 1U8-149.
7eIbid.. ll*9; *nd Villiers, Derniferes ann^es, 9k.
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Kerlerec then formulated an elaborate plan to Improve the finances 
of the colony. Although his proposal might have relieved the 
financial situation, the crown did not order its enforcement.
When Foucault became acting "ordonnateur" on May 20, 1760, 
he was forced to buy supplies for the troops at high prices since 
the warehouses were empty. Abuses were everywhere. Speculation 
was rampant. Irregularities in the management of finances 
increased daily.70 The governor on July 7> 1761, wrote that 
"France is to be pitied if it cannot find an 'ordonnateur' to 
succeed Rochemore."80 Before the end of 1761, the French 
government appointed D'Abbadie "commissaire ordonnateur" of 
Louisiana to replace Foucault. The new "ordonnateur" received 
detailed instructions. The crown, on the matter of finances, 
permitted D'Abbadie to draw 600,000 livres in bills of exchange 
for the present expenses of which 250,000 were to buy 
urgent supplies fxasr Vera Cruz and Campeche and the rest to 
purchase provisions from France. However, no bills of 
exchange would be redeemed without an accompanying report 
explaining the purpose. Moreover, to restore confidence in 
the currency, the "ordonnateur" was ordered to evaluate the 
exact amount of paper in circulation and send the statement, 
signed by the "ordonnateur", governor and comptroller, to
"^Surrey, Commerce. 151S an<* Villiers, Dernieres annees.
1^4-11*5 •
^Kerlerec to the Minister, New Orleans, July 7* 1761 i AC, 
C15A^2; and quoted in Surrey, Commerce, 151*
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Versailles. The crown intended to retire the paper for silver. 
D'Abbadie was commanded to act in conjunction with the governor 
and comptroller of New Orleans.81 One must look into the finances 
of the Spanish regime in order to evaluate D'Abbadie's performance.
In summary, the lack of an adequate amount of specie was 
probably the main Impediment to financial stability and 
commercial development in Louisiana. The result was a run away 
inflation and concomitant speculation, both of which kept the 
finances of the colony close to chaos. Thus, the consistently 
uncertain state of colonial finance made commerce with Louisiana 
unattractive. With the exception of brief periods of active 
contraband trade with Spanish colonies and the flow of Spanish 
silver to New Orleans occasioned by European wars, French 
Louisiana was poorly supplied with specie from France. In fact, 
the colony received only minimal financial support from the home 
government. The specie which France cent to the colony and the 
Spanish silver which found its way to New Orleans immediately 
left in payments for supplies.
From time to time France attempted to ameliorate the 
financial situation of the colony; but the measures adopted 
proved to be expedients. France could have improved the finances 
either by Increasing the purchase of Louisiana products or by 
pouring large sums of money into the colony or both. But the
8lSurrey, Connerce. 152-1515*
crown was unwilling or unable to do this. Instead It blundered 
creating a financial chaos and it blamed the "ordonnateurs" for 
maladministration. It is true that bitter quarrels between 
"ordonnateurs" and governors and abuses such as those of 
Rochemore did not help the financial situation. The main 
responsibility for the disorder steamed from Versailles.
It is evident from the correspondence that the position 
of "ordonnateur" in the question of finances was the more 
critical one. Since funds were a constant problem, the fiscal 
official held the more difficult task. The "ordonnateurs" did 
surprisingly well considering what they had to work with, for 
even the most conscientious could do little to improve the 
financial situation if there was little help from Versailles. 
His work was however, more rewarding in the judicial realm.
C H A P T E R  V I I I
THE "(XMflSSAIRE ORDONNATEUR" AND JUSTICE
Civil government began In Louisiana In 1712 with Antoine 
Crozat. The establishment of civil government and the enactment 
of the "Coutumes de Paris" for its guidance was the beginning of 
legal institutions in Louisiana.1 For the administration of the 
"Coutumes" a law court called the Superior Council was established. 
The two most important legal officers were the first councillor or 
presiding judge, the "commissaire ordonnateur", and the "procureur 
general", who was both the lawyer for the people and legal advisor 
to the government.2 The other members of the Superior Council 
were residents usually influential and of means.
The powers and duties of the "commissaire ordonnateur" in 
the judicial realm can be divided into general and special duties.3 
The "ordonnateur" by the terms of his commission as first councillor 
was charged with the general supervision of colonial justice. The 
power of appointing or removing judicial officers was not vested in
1Henry Plauche Dart, "Courts and Law in Colonial Louisiana," 
LHQ. IV (July, 1921), 259.
^Ibid., 261.




his hands or those of the governor. The crown reserved this right. 
However, the "comnlssaire ordonnateur" and the governor nominated 
In common individuals for the position of councillor to the 
Superior Council. The "ordonnateur" was instructed to closely 
supervise the judical officials and empowered to intervene to 
prevent miscarriage of justice.4 This was not always an easy task 
since the councillors were not responsible to him or to the 
governor. When a councillor was on good terms with the governor 
and/or with the Council it was difficult for the "ordonnateur" to 
control him. On the other hand, the opposite was to his advantage.
The "commissaire ordonnateur" as first councillor was empowered to 
call letigation before him or have the "procureur general" call a 
case before the Superior Council. But then, the "procureur 
general" did not always cooperate.5
The special judicial powers of the "ordonnateur" were more 
definite. The "ordonnateur" took cognizance of all criminal cases, 
especially those which the crown considered serious such as treason, 
sedition, and counterfeiting.6 In addition, the "ordonnateur" 
judged all contestations related to comnerce and property. The 
latter occupied much of his time because the careless manner of
‘tSee instructions on page 105.
^unro, "Office of Intendant," 27_29.
^Ibid.
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land distribution and the loose definition of property rights 
invited disputes among the colonists.7
To reiterate, as expressly stated in the instructions to 
the governors and "comnissalres ordonnateurs", the administration 
of justice was the particular concern of the "ordonnateur". The 
governor was not to interfer with the administration of justice 
except when called upon to execute its judgments. Both were 
ordered to supervise the officials under their charge in the 
Superior Council, to jointly render an account of their conduct 
and submit names for replacement in case of death or resignation. 
But what concerned the governor in particular with regard to the 
Superior Council was that the administrative military officers 
should give the civil judicial officers the respect due their 
office and that the colonists should maintain the same posture. 
Furthermore, since the crown entrusted the Superior Council with 
authority to render justice to its subjects, the councillors were 
to have complete freedom in this endeavor.8 However, the practical 
side of judicial administration was somewhat different from what 
was prescribed by Versailles.
The procedure was rather simple. There were no lawyers in 
French Louisiana except for the first councillor and the "procureur 
general". A plaintiff seeking justice, entered the office of the
7Ibid.
e"M&noire du roi aux Srs. Vaudreuil gouverneur et Michel de 
la Rouvlllifere commissalre g&nir&l de la marine ordonnateur de la 
Louisiane," Versailles, December 23* 17^8* AC, B87.
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"procureur general" who, depending on his evaluation, advised the
plaintiff to see the clerk of the Superior Council.9 The clerk
then wrote out a petition which was signed by the plaintiff and
witnessed by the clerk.10 "If It was an Issue of fact or any kind
that required attention," the first councillor endorsed It thereby
permitting the petition to be filed. It seemed the clerk did not
have that prerogative.11
The petition filed, orders were given by the "procureur
general" to service It and for the defendant to appear. Meanwhile,
the sheriff of the court took the petition to the defendant and
presented him with a copy.12 The sheriff then endorsed the
original copy saying in effect:
"I certify that I took the petition and the order 
in this case to John Stallth...; that I read to him 
the contents of this petition, in order that he 
might not say hereafter that he did not know what it 
was, and that I then left a copy of the same with 
him. In testimony of all of which I am making and 
signing this return."13
The defendant, thus ordered to appear in court, went to the
"procureur general" or to the clerk to present his defense which




l3Quoted In ibid.. 265.
187
was then written out and signed In a similar fashion. The hearing 
soon followed.14 This was the normal proceedure.
There is no evidence however, of a formal trial. The 
councillors along with the two lawyers of the Superior Council, the 
first councillor and the "procureur general", usually sat around a 
table and settled the matter after hearing the quarrel of "their 
friends and neighbors."15 For more serious cases both the 
prosecution and defense presented their views in writing; usually 
the clerk prepared each version. Sometimes the "procureur general" 
prepared one and the clerk the other.16 As stipulated by the Edict 
of 1716 concerning the Superior Council, civil cases required that 
three judges agree while five must agree in criminal cases.17
For criminal cases, the "procureur general" initiated the 
prosecution by an inquiry into or an investigation of the facts.
The accused was then confronted by a written report of the 
testimony. The accused, detained in jail and subject to 
interrogation, was without legal assistance. Though he could deny 
the evidence and confront the accusing witnesses, he could not 
attend the trial or cross-examine. There was no jury; the case 




17See "Projet de lettre patente...1'etablissement du conseil 
superieur," Versailles, October 1, 1731> AC, C13A13* and Dart, "Legal 
Institutions," 82-84.
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read the evidence. Since there were no appeal, the judgment or 
sentence was executed Immediately.18
A look at the "Records of the Superior Council" reveals the 
nature of Its work, the numerous reasons for which the colonists 
called upon the Council, the nature of colonial society, and last 
but not least, the extent of the judicial duties and power of the 
"comml88aire ordonnateur" In the Superior Council and In the 
colony.18 For one thing, the records show that the Superior
lSHenry Plauch£ Dart, "Criminal Trials In Louisiana, 1720* 
1766," LHQ, III (July, 1920), 279.
l8Petltion of recovery, summons to pay claim, sunmons to 
reverse a trade in slaves, court orders, decisions in civil suits, 
petition for auction of houae, petition to transfer contract, summons 
in boat suit, petition for transfer of seized funds, petition for 
annulment of seizure, petition in opposition, sale of house, inquest 
ordered, summons to testify, petition for collaboration In closing 
account, petition to fulfill contract, sunmons for hearing, petition
for new marriage contract, decision on marriage contract, petition for 
action of redress, petition in suit of libel, summons of witnesses in 
libel suit, testimony in libel suit, petition for inventory of legacy, 
petition to collect, petition to attach property, sale of real estate, 
seals placed on property, petition to sue against false witness, 
petition for voiding of contract, petition for appointment of trustee, 
petition to receive legacy, petition for old right of way, attachment 
of goods, funds, contract of service and mutual profit, petition for 
loan, petition to marry, petition to evict, petition over pipes, 
statement of account, petition to waive hearing, petition to sell 
house, report on Gentilly Road, petition to occupy, petition to cite 
before court at New Orleans, summons in eviction suit, petition to 
cancel sale, power of attorney, decision in sundry suits, testimony 
in defamation suit, petition for open road, summons to deliver papers, 
Attorney General's decision over the Gentilley Road, inventory of 
personal effects, sale of surviving effects, petition for appointment 
of guardian, defendant's acknowledgement of pleading, seizure of short 
measures, defense in disputed marriage contract, and petition for just 
judgment.
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Council was the center of legal activities In French Louisiana and
that the "comnissalre ordonnateur" had extensive legal and judicial
pswers over matters settled by and In the Council.20 By virtue of
his commissions of "ordonnateur" of Louisiana and first councillor
to the Superior Council, the "ordonnateur" was the source of all
power In deciding ordinary quarrels and disputes and over all
aspects of life, welfare, and property of the colonists.21 For
instance, most of the petitions and decisions were signed and
summons ordered by the "ordonnateur". Furthermore, the "ordonnateur"
seemed to control the sale, purchase, auction, and occupancy of
houses and had similar power over property. For example, here is
how a petition to occupy was registered in the Superior Council
on May 25, 1725:
Antoine de La Boublaye has acquired a plantation on 
the Mississippi from Caron, baker, but it appears 
that no real estate can be sold without the 
Council's good pleasure. May it please the Council 
to approve the transfer in question, so that the 
petitioner may enjoy his acquisition. Aproved on 
condition that the proceeds be consigned to 
Company's treasury for payment of Caron's debt.22
In another petition to sell a house registered on May 50, 1725* one
finds the following:
^See for example "Records of the Superior Council of 
Louisiana," in different volumes of the LHQ.
21Henry Plauche Dart, "A Case in Admiralty in Louisiana, 1741, 
Before Salmon, J.," LHQ. VII (January, 1924), 5“19*
22"Records of the Superior Council of Louisiana," LHQ. II 
(July, 1919), 350.
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Undersigned Hebert, Canadian, being about to start 
for Illinois, asks permission to sell a house of 
his In this town to a private party, In case the 
Company needs It not. Granted on condition of his 
leaving half of the proceeds to the treasury. He 
may use the other half for his trip, "although he 
owes much to the Company."23
The petitions used after the departure of the Company of the Indies
indicate the greater authority of the "ordonnateur": petition to
Superior Council to sell a house, permit for sale signed by
Salmon, October 21, 1726; petetlon to Salmon for permit to sell a
plantation, permit signed by Salmon, no date; petition to Salmon
for permit to sell a house, August 12, 1736; petition to Salmon
for permit to sell a house, signed by Salmon, February 9, 1736;
petition to Superior Council for permit to sell a house, permit
signed by Salmon, January 15, 1736; petition to Salmon for permit
to sell a lot, January 2h, 1733* and petition to sell a house,
permit signed by Salmon, October 7, 1735*24
Moreover, as the first judge of the superior court, the
"ordonnateur" dispatched judges to distant poets or impowered local
commanders where they held court and represented the Superior
Council of New Orleans. Appeals from their decisions returned to
the Superior Council for final review.25
g3Ibld.. 331-
24See ibid., VIII, 119, 120, U 3, 278, 1*80, and 676.
^Caldwell, "The French," 16.
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Sometimes It was necessary for the "commissalre ordonnateur" 
to form special courts to hear cases not defined In his Instructions 
and or of unusual nature. In October, 17^1, there arose an argument 
between a ship owner and his captain over the repair of the ship.
The threatened ship owner laid the whole affair before Salmon who 
soon realized that it was not an ordinary lawsuit between two 
visitors to the colony but one of a more Important jurisdiction —  
the admiralty.28 The adjudication of maritime matters was usually 
decided by special royal judges. After consulting "procureur 
general" Fleuiau on the subject, Salmon, acting as an admiralty 
court, heard the case.27
An earlier special court was created at the beginning of 
173^. On February 16, 173^» Salmon was given extra judicial power 
to terminate and decide all the disputes between the Company of the 
Indies and the colonists. Two judges, appointed by the "ordonnateur", 
were to assist him.28
The practical side of justice was influenced and conditioned 
by the relationship between the governor and "commissaire 
ordonnateur" and by the factions in the Superior Council, usually 
the civilian and military. Sometimes a governor exceeded his powers 
in attempting to have his way in the Superior Council. On January 15,
2®Dart, "Admiralty," 5“19- 
^Ibid.
20Maurepas to Salmon, Versailles, February 16, 173^» AC, B6l.
192
1733* Salmon informed the Minister that Governor Perier attempted 
to have two councillors, D'Ausaeville and Prat, removed from the 
Superior Council. The "ordonnateur" adhering to Versailles' 
advice of harmony with the governor, went along with the chief 
administrator while Fleuriau, the "procureur general", openly 
opposed the governor on the grounds that he had no right to 
interfere with the judicial officers. Thereupon a major 
controversy developed in the Council.20 Perier was soon recalled. 
There is no doubt that one of the main reasons for the crown's 
action was his attempt to unduly influence the councillors. While 
some governors were outright despots at times others were shrewd 
leaders of cliques.
"Ordonnateur" Michel gave a vivid account of the conflicts 
between civilian and military factions in the Superior Council 
which plagued the colony from time to time. One might add, however, 
that it was especially pronounced during Michel's administration.
On May 15, 1731* Michel complained to Versailles that Ensign 
Duplessy, appointed by Governor Vaudreuil to command at the English 
Turn, ill-treated Carriere, a civilian store-keeper. The 
"ordonnateur" inmediately sided with his appointee while Vaudreuil 
accused the civilian of disrespect to a military officer.30 Michel 
was determined to teach the military a lesson. To add fuel to the
^Salmon to Maurepas, Mew Orleans, January 15, 1733* AC, 
C1JA17; and Salmon to Maurepas, New Orleans, February 19, 1733* Ibid.
a0Michel to Rouill^, New Orleans, July 15* 1731* AC, C15A35* 
Fregault, Vaudreuil. 297; and Gayarr^, Louisiana. II, 57*
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flame, the Duplessy affair was followed by a more serious one, the 
Dernevllle affair. It Involved a military officer, Captain Pierre 
Henry Dernevllle, the son-in-law of "procureur gin^ral" Fleuriau 
and a civilian named Battar. According to Michel, both the father 
and son-in-law attempted to cheat Battar In connection with the 
sale of a mulatto belonging to Dernevllle. On the other hand, the 
attitude of the "ordonnateur" In publicly siding with Battar was 
most incompatible with his position as chief judicial officer.
It was difficult for Dernevllle to find someone to defend him in 
the Superior Council.31 Because of the inflamed nature of the 
case, both the "ordonnateur" and "procureur general" removed 
themselved from judging the case and since councillor Kemion 
was sick, the decision was left to Vaudreuil, Major D'Auberville, 
Roguet, friend of Fleuriau, Le Breton, and Lalande. In order to 
decrease the number of judges, the military clique summarily 
decided not to use the services of Le Breton, acting "procureur 
general". Thus, the military controlled the judgment.32 Michel
openly expressed his indignition:
This is how justice is administered here and 
will always be as such as long as the military forms
part of the superior Council. Everywhere else and
even in the Councils with twelve councillors only 
the governor has a voice in the Council. But not 
in Louisiana. Here where there are but four
3l"Records of the Superior Council of Louisiana," LHQ, XX 
(1937), 1122-1131» Fr^gault, Vaudreuil. 298* and Michel to Rouille, 
New Orleans, July 15, 1751, AC, C13A35*
^iichel to Roulll<£, New Orleans, July 15, 1751, AC, C13A35*
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councillors and or assessors, the governor, the 
royal lieutenant, and major are always in accord 
when a military affair arises. If the number of 
military officers is not sufficient to swing the 
decision in their favor, it is not difficult for 
them to influence some of the other councillors.
The governor of this colony is like a golden calf, 
adored by all. The governor is invested with all 
authority whom nobody dares to displease. And 
besides his military powers, he nominates in common 
with the "ordonnateur" subjects for the Superior 
Council. His choice always prevails. The 
governor enjoys all the privileges of the time of 
the Company of the Indies. Thus, supported by the 
military and favored by the councillors, who dare 
not displease him, the governor can always tilt 
the scale in his favor.
The end result is that, unfamiliar with the laws 
and "Coutumes de Paris", they judge and decide on 
sight and influence others to the detriment of the 
colonists and strangers who are forced to bow to 
the tiranical military officers. For when one says 
officer, everyone trembles. Furthermore, when a 
military officer has any misunderstanding with a 
civilian the former never fails to exclaim: "Are
you aware that you are speaking to an officer?"
If by chance, the dispute comes before the 
"ordonnateur", the defense may be summed up in 
these words: "What! Sir! he dares thus speak
to, or thus act toward an officer!" and although 
the officer may be in the wrong, judgment is 
always given against his adversary, because the 
military influence is predominant in the Council 
through the governor, the major, and the governor's 
flatterers.3®
Needless to say, regardless of who was to blame, when the Council
was thusly divided, justice suffered.
33Ibid.: and Gayarr^, Louisiana. II, 57•
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The Instructions to the "coumisaaires ordonnateurs" indicate 
that justice was badly administered in French Louisiana.34 This was 
not always the fault of colonial officials. As French rule neared 
its end, there was a parallel between the progressive neglect of 
the colony and decline of the Superior Council. For many years 
positions of councillors remained vacant. On October 5, 1758, of 
the four councillors prescribed by the Edict of May 22, 1731» for 
the Superior Council in addition to the "ordonnateur", there 
remained only Fontenette duly appointed and commissioned by the 
crown.35 The office of "procureur g^n&ral" had been vacant for 
six years. Meanwhile, Roguet was acting "procureur general".
Kernion, Lalande, and Lafreniere were acting councillors. Governor 
Kerl^rec and "ordonnateur" Rochemore urged the home government to 
fill these positions as quickly as possible for the sake of justice.36 
In 1760, Kerl&rec informed Versailles that since the death of Roguet, 
there was not one single titular councillor in the Superior Council; 
Lalande, Kernion, and La Chaise were still without appointments.37 
Finally, Versailles filled the positions on January 18, I762.38
^See for exaiqple "M^moire pour servir d'instruction a M 
Bobe-Descloseaux commissaire de la marine faisant fonctions 
d'ordonnateur a la Louisiane," Versailles, October, 1759 > AC, C13AB1.
35Kerlerec and Rochemore to the Minister, New Orleans,
October 5, 1758, AC, ClJAto.
36Ibid.
^Villiers, Dernieres ann^es. 112.
aeThe Minister to 1 "l^rec and D'Abbadie, Versailles, January
18, 1762, AC, Bill*.
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In spite of the views to the contrary held by Versailles, 
justice In the hands of the "canmissalre ordonnateur" was well 
administered. In the context of the times, the ordinary legal needs 
of the colonists were met. The "ordonnateur" rendered greater 
service to the colonists In this area probably because he possessed 
a freedom of action which he did not enjoy In other spheres of 
colonial administration.
C H A P T E R  I X
CONCLUSION
It was eighteenth century France with its mercantilistic 
economic system and a colonial policy whose basic tenet was 
that colonies existed for the mother country which attempted to 
hold the vast and nascent colony of Louisiana. France had neither 
the material nor the moral resources to colonize Louisiana, 
resources which had enabled her to conduct with more success the 
colonization of New France and the French islands. Be that as 
it may, France had two main Interests in the lower Mississippi: 
to prevent a foreign foothold at the mouth of the Mississippi and 
to realize commercial gains at Spain's expense. The latter did 
not materialize and the colony became a financial liability. 
Louisiana received special attention at times, such as during 
Governor Vaudreuil's administration. But this is explained by the 
changing diplomatic situation in Europe with its repercussion in 
the New World. Because of the Bourbon dynasty, the Family Compact, 
and the rising threat of her hereditary enemy, France was forced 
to retain Louisiana. The colony was neglected. But then, France 
could not give what she did not have, what she vitally needed 
elsewhere. It was a matter of priority. In short, Louisiana was 
the victim of the international events of the times and became a
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pawn on the diplomatic chessboard of Europe. French Louisiana was 
never conquered by arms. The fate of its population and immense 
territory was decided in Europe. In 17^2, union with Spain was 
more important than Louisiana and other French possessions of 
the New World.
Meanwhile, between 1731- *nd 1763* colonial administrators 
strove to implement the designs of the home government. One of the 
two most important administrators was the "comnissaire ordonnateur". 
Because of his financial responsibility, the "ordonnateur" often 
bore the brunt of the crown's failures in the colony. An 
examination of the origin and nature of the office reveals the 
important role played by the "commissalre ordonnateur" in the 
colonial government. It is evident that none of the fiscal and 
judicial officials of French Louisiana was commissioned as an 
intendant of finance, justice, and police.
The political authority of the colony was shared by a 
governor and "commissalre ordonnateur". The former was charged 
with the military duties and the latter with royal finances and 
commerce, while general administration of the colony was the 
common concern of both. However, conflict of personalities played 
a disruptive role in French Louisiana because rivalry was ever 
inherent between military and civilian officials whom the French 
crown invested with dual authority. The basic reason for this 
conflict lies, however, not in Louisiana but in Versailles, in 
the mechanism of the colonial administration. Every colonial
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administrator found himself, at one time or another, in the 
predicament of defending his position in the eyes of his superiors 
in France. But, with family influence at Versailles and a display 
of political ability in the colony a governor or "comnissaire 
ordonnateur" survived and advanced in the system. Though the 
governor and "comnissaire ordonnateur" were often at odds, they 
did agree for the most part on the general policies of public 
administration, such as population, agriculture, and commerce.
However, the history of commerce of French Louisiana is 
in general a tragic one. The growth of the colony depended on 
the development of a stable trade with France, the French islands, 
and especially with the Spanish colonies. But there was always 
at least one ingredient lacking for the realization of stable 
commercial activities. When ships were available, there were 
either no products or not enough with which to carry on trade.
On the other hand, when a supply of Louisiana products was 
available, war or commercial restrictions imposed by the crown 
hampered trade. Without the contraband trade with the Spanish 
colonies, Louisiana would not have enjoyed even those few periods 
of prosperity which she had. But the financial problem was ever 
present. The colony was consistently plagued with lack of silver, 
inflation, and speculation.
The scarcity of specie was probably the main impediment to 
financial stability and commercial development in Louisiana. The 
result was a run away inflation and concomitant speculation, both
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of which kept the finances of the colony near chaos. Thus, the 
constant uncertain state of colonial finance made commerce with 
Louisiana unattractive. With the exception of brief periods of 
active contraband trade with Spanish colonies and the consequent 
flow of Spanish silver to New Orleans, French Louisiana was poorly 
supplied with specie. The colony received only minimal financial 
support from the home government. Besides, the specie which 
France sent to Louisiana and the Spanish silver which found its 
way to New Orleans imnediately left in payments for supplies.
At times France attempted to ameliorate the financial 
situation of the colony. However, the measures taken proved to be 
mere expedients. The home government might have improved the 
finances either by increasing purchase of Louisiana products or 
by pouring large sums of money into the colony or both. But 
France was unwilling or not in a position to do so. Instead, 
the crown adopted halfway measures, creating a financial chaos 
for which the "ordonnateur" was blamed. The bitter quarrels between 
"ordonnateurs" and governors and abuses, such as those of Rochemore, 
did not help the financial situation. But the major responsibility 
for the disorders steamed from Versailles. It is evident from the 
correspondence that the position of "ordonnateur" in the question of 
finances was the more critical one. Since funds were a constant 
problem, the fiscal official held the otore difficult task to 
perform. But the "ordonnateurs" did surprisingly well considering 
what they had to work with, for even the most conscientious could
do little to improve the financial situation if there was little 
assistance from Versailles.
In the judicial realm, in spite of the views to the 
contrary held by Versailles, justice in the hands of the 
"ordonnateur" was well administered. In the context of the times 
the ordinary legal needs of the colonists were met. The 
"ordonnateur" rendered greater service to the colonists in this 
area probably because he possessed a freedom of action which he 
did not enjoy in other spheres of colonial administration.
The "comnissaire ordonnateur" was an indispensable figure 
though not an intendant of finance, justice, and police, in the 
administration of an area which was a pawn for the French crown 
on the diplomatic chessboard of Europe.
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